[PATCH v2] x86/sev: Guard sev_evict_cache() with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT

[Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>]

The sev_evict_cache() is guest-related code and should be guarded by
CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT, not CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV.

CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y is required for a guest to run properly as an
SEV-SNP guest, but a guest kernel built with CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n would
get the stub function of sev_evict_cache() instead of the version that
performs the actual eviction. Move the function declarations under the
appropriate #ifdef.

Fixes: 7b306dfa326f ("x86/sev: Evict cache lines during SNP memory validation")
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # 6.16.x
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 38 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 02236962fdb1..465b19fd1a2d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -562,6 +562,24 @@ enum es_result sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(struct ghcb *ghcb,
 
 extern struct ghcb *boot_ghcb;
 
+static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages)
+{
+	volatile u8 val __always_unused;
+	u8 *bytes = va;
+	int page_idx;
+
+	/*
+	 * For SEV guests, a read from the first/last cache-lines of a 4K page
+	 * using the guest key is sufficient to cause a flush of all cache-lines
+	 * associated with that 4K page without incurring all the overhead of a
+	 * full CLFLUSH sequence.
+	 */
+	for (page_idx = 0; page_idx < npages; page_idx++) {
+		val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE];
+		val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE - 1];
+	}
+}
+
 #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
 #define snp_vmpl 0
@@ -605,6 +623,7 @@ static inline int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc,
 static inline int snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(u8 *buffer) { return -ENODEV; }
 static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void) { }
 static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void) { }
+static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages) {}
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
@@ -619,24 +638,6 @@ int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level);
 void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages);
 void kdump_sev_callback(void);
 void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void);
-
-static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages)
-{
-	volatile u8 val __always_unused;
-	u8 *bytes = va;
-	int page_idx;
-
-	/*
-	 * For SEV guests, a read from the first/last cache-lines of a 4K page
-	 * using the guest key is sufficient to cause a flush of all cache-lines
-	 * associated with that 4K page without incurring all the overhead of a
-	 * full CLFLUSH sequence.
-	 */
-	for (page_idx = 0; page_idx < npages; page_idx++) {
-		val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE];
-		val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE - 1];
-	}
-}
 #else
 static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
 static inline int snp_rmptable_init(void) { return -ENOSYS; }
@@ -652,7 +653,6 @@ static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV
 static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
 static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { }
 static inline void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) {}
-static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages) {}
 #endif
 
 #endif

base-commit: f83ec76bf285bea5727f478a68b894f5543ca76e
-- 
2.46.2