[PATCH v2 1/3] staging: rtl8723bs: format comments

[Ian To <onlyian4981@gmail.com>]

Some comments were not formatted correctly. Reported by checkpatch.

Signed-off-by: Ian To <onlyian4981@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 92 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
index 1e9eff01b1aa..f4556ae54352 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ const char *security_type_str(u8 value)
 /* WEP related ===== */
 
 /*
-	Need to consider the fragment  situation
-*/
+ *	Need to consider the fragment  situation
+ */
 void rtw_wep_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe)
-{																	/*  exclude ICV */
+{
 	union {
 		__le32 f0;
 		unsigned char f1[4];
@@ -342,23 +342,23 @@ static const unsigned short Sbox1[2][256] = {      /* Sbox for hash (can be in R
 	}
 };
 
- /*
-**********************************************************************
-* Routine: Phase 1 -- generate P1K, given TA, TK, IV32
-*
-* Inputs:
-*     tk[]      = temporal key                         [128 bits]
-*     ta[]      = transmitter's MAC address            [ 48 bits]
-*     iv32      = upper 32 bits of IV                  [ 32 bits]
-* Output:
-*     p1k[]     = Phase 1 key                          [ 80 bits]
-*
-* Note:
-*     This function only needs to be called every 2**16 packets,
-*     although in theory it could be called every packet.
-*
-**********************************************************************
-*/
+/*
+ **********************************************************************
+ * Routine: Phase 1 -- generate P1K, given TA, TK, IV32
+ *
+ * Inputs:
+ *     tk[]      = temporal key                         [128 bits]
+ *     ta[]      = transmitter's MAC address            [ 48 bits]
+ *     iv32      = upper 32 bits of IV                  [ 32 bits]
+ * Output:
+ *     p1k[]     = Phase 1 key                          [ 80 bits]
+ *
+ * Note:
+ *     This function only needs to be called every 2**16 packets,
+ *     although in theory it could be called every packet.
+ *
+ **********************************************************************
+ */
 static void phase1(u16 *p1k, const u8 *tk, const u8 *ta, u32 iv32)
 {
 	signed int  i;
@@ -383,30 +383,29 @@ static void phase1(u16 *p1k, const u8 *tk, const u8 *ta, u32 iv32)
 	}
 }
 
-
 /*
-**********************************************************************
-* Routine: Phase 2 -- generate RC4KEY, given TK, P1K, IV16
-*
-* Inputs:
-*     tk[]      = Temporal key                         [128 bits]
-*     p1k[]     = Phase 1 output key                   [ 80 bits]
-*     iv16      = low 16 bits of IV counter            [ 16 bits]
-* Output:
-*     rc4key[]  = the key used to encrypt the packet   [128 bits]
-*
-* Note:
-*     The value {TA, IV32, IV16} for Phase1/Phase2 must be unique
-*     across all packets using the same key TK value. Then, for a
-*     given value of TK[], this TKIP48 construction guarantees that
-*     the final RC4KEY value is unique across all packets.
-*
-* Suggested implementation optimization: if PPK[] is "overlaid"
-*     appropriately on RC4KEY[], there is no need for the final
-*     for loop below that copies the PPK[] result into RC4KEY[].
-*
-**********************************************************************
-*/
+ **********************************************************************
+ * Routine: Phase 2 -- generate RC4KEY, given TK, P1K, IV16
+ *
+ * Inputs:
+ *     tk[]      = Temporal key                         [128 bits]
+ *     p1k[]     = Phase 1 output key                   [ 80 bits]
+ *     iv16      = low 16 bits of IV counter            [ 16 bits]
+ * Output:
+ *     rc4key[]  = the key used to encrypt the packet   [128 bits]
+ *
+ * Note:
+ *     The value {TA, IV32, IV16} for Phase1/Phase2 must be unique
+ *     across all packets using the same key TK value. Then, for a
+ *     given value of TK[], this TKIP48 construction guarantees that
+ *     the final RC4KEY value is unique across all packets.
+ *
+ * Suggested implementation optimization: if PPK[] is "overlaid"
+ *     appropriately on RC4KEY[], there is no need for the final
+ *     for loop below that copies the PPK[] result into RC4KEY[].
+ *
+ **********************************************************************
+ */
 static void phase2(u8 *rc4key, const u8 *tk, const u16 *p1k, u16 iv16)
 {
 	signed int  i;
@@ -1456,7 +1455,7 @@ static void gf_mulx(u8 *pad)
 		pad[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] ^= 0x87;
 }
 
-/**
+/*
  * omac1_aes_128_vector - One-Key CBC MAC (OMAC1) hash with AES-128
  * @key: 128-bit key for the hash operation
  * @num_elem: Number of elements in the data vector
@@ -1530,7 +1529,7 @@ static int omac1_aes_128_vector(u8 *key, size_t num_elem,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/**
+/*
  * omac1_aes_128 - One-Key CBC MAC (OMAC1) hash with AES-128 (aka AES-CMAC)
  * @key: 128-bit key for the hash operation
  * @data: Data buffer for which a MAC is determined
@@ -1541,7 +1540,8 @@ static int omac1_aes_128_vector(u8 *key, size_t num_elem,
  * This is a mode for using block cipher (AES in this case) for authentication.
  * OMAC1 was standardized with the name CMAC by NIST in a Special Publication
  * (SP) 800-38B.
- * modify for CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ * modify for CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ */
 int omac1_aes_128(u8 *key, u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mac)
 {
 	return omac1_aes_128_vector(key, 1, &data, &data_len, mac);
-- 
2.45.3