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From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@debian.org>,
	mingo@kernel.org, oleg@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	debian-kernel@lists.debian.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] seqlock: Allow UBSAN to fail optimizing
Date: Mon, 02 Feb 2026 08:01:14 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <30284EE3-5F5B-4D68-BD40-0F91A482BFAE@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260202082939.GB1282955@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net>



On February 2, 2026 12:29:39 AM PST, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
>On Sun, Feb 01, 2026 at 07:39:46PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Sun, Feb 01, 2026 at 12:47:41PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>> > On Sat, Jan 31, 2026 at 10:42:35AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>> > > On Sat, Jan 31, 2026 at 10:39:42AM +0100, Salvatore Bonaccorso wrote:
>> > > > Kees, Peter approached the Debian kernel list above to drop
>> > > > CONFIG_UBSAN again, which, so I think we need to revert your
>> > > > 6cfadabfe015 ("Enable UBSAN_BOUNDS and UBSAN_SHIFT"):
>> > > > https://salsa.debian.org/kernel-team/linux/-/commit/6cfadabfe015fa0d659fc8e3efd495cbcae3e44e
>> > > > 
>> > > > I have make a MR for our packaging for the change in
>> > > > https://salsa.debian.org/kernel-team/linux/-/merge_requests/1804
>> > > 
>> > > I am strongly opposed -- this undoes years of security flaw mitigation
>> > > work and leaves Debian (and only Debian!) exposed to trivial array index
>> > > overflows. The bounds sanitizer is the corner stone of memory safety
>> > > for C, and is not some "experimental" feature. GCC has a long history
>> > > of trouble with inlining, so this is not something unique to enabling
>> > > this feature.
>> > > 
>> > > I replied similarly to the PR. This would be a major mistake to disable.
>> > 
>> > Why the heck is bounds checking part of UBSAN? The simple fix here is to
>> > get it out from CONFIG_UBSAN, so that CONFIG_UBSAN is debug only crap.
>> 
>> Out of bounds accesses are considered "undefined". *sigh*
>
>*sigh* indeed.
>
>> But yes, now that we have the "transitional" kconfig symbols I can
>> trivially rename CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS and remove its CONFIG_UBSAN
>> dependency.
>
>That would be great; I can sit on this patch a while, its mostly build
>robots and the like occasionally tripping this.
>
>It would be good to have the compiler folks agree that bounds checking
>is production code though :-)
>
>> > Notably, none of the UBSAN configs that tripped the optimization fail
>> > even had bounds checking enabled.
>> 
>> Which ones tripped it? KASAN (in software tagging mode) is usually the
>> heavy-weight one that considerably bloats code generation. I haven't
>> seen systemic problems with -fsanitize=bounds, and I thought the weird
>> cases (which confused the value range tracking) with -fsanitize=shift
>> got fixed back in GCC 12 (or maybe 13).
>
>I'm not sure which one (I didn't care to find out, its debug nonsense
>and nobody cares etc.. :-).
>
>One has:
>
>CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UBSAN=y
>CONFIG_UBSAN=y
>CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP=y
>CONFIG_CC_HAS_UBSAN_BOUNDS_STRICT=y
># CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS is not set
># CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT is not set
>CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO=y
>CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL=y
>CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM=y
>
>The other has:
>
>CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UBSAN=y
>CONFIG_UBSAN=y
># CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP is not set
>CONFIG_CC_HAS_UBSAN_BOUNDS_STRICT=y
># CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS is not set
>CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT=y
>CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO=y
># CONFIG_UBSAN_UNREACHABLE is not set
>CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL=y
># CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM is not set
>CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT=y
>
>The common ones are DIV_ZERO and BOOL.

DIV_ZERO is a known trouble-maker in Clang (though for its pathological behavior it needs CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP). Perhaps we should drop it entirely?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook

      reply	other threads:[~2026-02-02 16:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-29 11:07 Peter Zijlstra
2026-01-31  9:39 ` Salvatore Bonaccorso
2026-01-31 18:42   ` Kees Cook
2026-02-01 11:47     ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-02-02  3:39       ` Kees Cook
2026-02-02  8:29         ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-02-02 16:01           ` Kees Cook [this message]

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