From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
paul@paul-moore.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, keescook@chromium.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
mic@digikod.net, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 01/11] LSM: Identify modules by more than name
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 12:52:49 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <30d1110a-7583-4fa1-85c8-d6ce362f5ae2@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e391877d-cd10-3c6d-1f57-0aaa32846a8e@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
On 10/5/2023 5:58 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> On 2023/09/13 5:56, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux
>> Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the
>> module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change
>> the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the
>> individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to
>> security_add_hooks().
> I came to worry about what purpose does the LSM ID value (or more precisely,
> "struct lsm_id") is used for. If the LSM ID value is used for only switch
> {reading,writing} /proc/self/attr/ of specific LSM module's information, only
> LSM modules that use /proc/self/attr/ will need the LSM ID value.
>
> But this series uses "struct lsm_id" as one of arguments for security_add_hooks(),
> and might be reused for different purposes.
>
> Then, BPF-based LSMs (which are not considered as in-tree LSM modules, for
> only BPF hook is considered as in-tree LSM module) might receive unfavorable
> treatment than non BPF-based LSMs?
>
> [PATCH v15 05/11] says
>
> Create a system call to report the list of Linux Security Modules
> that are active on the system. The list is provided as an array
> of LSM ID numbers.
>
> The calling application can use this list determine what LSM
> specific actions it might take. That might include choosing an
> output format, determining required privilege or bypassing
> security module specific behavior.
>
> but, at least, name of BPF-based LSMs won't be shown up in lsm_list_modules()
> compared to non BPF-based LSMs? Then, the calling application can't use this
> list determine what BPF-based LSM specific actions it might take?
That is correct. Just as knowing that your system is using SELinux won't
tell you whether a specific action might be permitted because that's driven
by the loaded policy, so too knowing that your system is using BPF won't
tell you whether a specific action might be permitted because that's driven
by the eBPF programs in place.
I wish we could stop people from saying "BPF-based LSM". BPF is the LSM. The
eBPF programs that implement a "policy" are NOT a LSM. There needs to be a
name for that, but LSM is not it.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-20 19:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20230912205658.3432-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2023-09-12 20:56 ` [PATCH v15 00/11] LSM: Three basic syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-09-12 20:56 ` [PATCH v15 01/11] LSM: Identify modules by more than name Casey Schaufler
2023-09-15 11:32 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-15 17:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-16 6:32 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-17 16:38 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-20 10:20 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-20 15:08 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-23 4:46 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-24 1:58 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-24 11:06 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-24 19:48 ` Kees Cook
2023-10-05 12:58 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-20 19:52 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2023-10-21 12:20 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-21 14:11 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-10-29 10:57 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-29 18:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-12 20:56 ` [PATCH v15 02/11] LSM: Maintain a table of LSM attribute data Casey Schaufler
2023-09-12 20:56 ` [PATCH v15 03/11] proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrs Casey Schaufler
2023-09-12 20:56 ` [PATCH v15 04/11] LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Casey Schaufler
2023-10-03 14:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-06 1:04 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-09 15:36 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-09 16:04 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-10 9:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-10 13:10 ` Paul Moore
2023-09-12 20:56 ` [PATCH v15 05/11] LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call Casey Schaufler
2023-10-03 14:27 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-12 10:16 ` Dmitry V. Levin
2024-03-12 13:25 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-12 15:27 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-12 17:06 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-12 17:44 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-12 18:09 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-12 18:28 ` Dmitry V. Levin
2024-03-12 21:50 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-12 22:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-12 22:06 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-12 22:17 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-12 23:17 ` Paul Moore
2023-09-12 20:56 ` [PATCH v15 06/11] LSM: wireup Linux Security Module syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-10-03 14:27 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-09-12 20:56 ` [PATCH v15 07/11] LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctx Casey Schaufler
2023-10-03 14:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-09-12 20:56 ` [PATCH v15 08/11] Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks Casey Schaufler
2023-10-03 14:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-20 19:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-10-20 19:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-12 20:56 ` [PATCH v15 09/11] AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks Casey Schaufler
2023-09-12 20:56 ` [PATCH v15 10/11] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2023-09-12 20:56 ` [PATCH v15 11/11] LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-10-03 14:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-12 22:07 ` [PATCH v15 00/11] LSM: Three basic syscalls Paul Moore
2023-10-13 21:55 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-16 12:04 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-16 15:06 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-17 7:01 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-17 15:58 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-17 16:07 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-18 9:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-18 13:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-10-18 14:14 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-18 16:35 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-18 20:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-10-18 20:40 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-19 7:45 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-20 16:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-10-19 8:49 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-13 4:03 ` Paul Moore
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