From: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com,
kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, peterz@infradead.org,
tony.luck@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de,
mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, seanjc@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, rafael@kernel.org, david@redhat.com,
dan.j.williams@intel.com, len.brown@intel.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com,
ying.huang@intel.com, chao.gao@intel.com,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, nik.borisov@suse.com,
bagasdotme@gmail.com, sagis@google.com, imammedo@redhat.com,
kai.huang@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v14 04/23] x86/cpu: Detect TDX partial write machine check erratum
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2023 23:14:28 +1300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3191588b67c04bdac682e12dab67499f7bde0a3c.1697532085.git.kai.huang@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1697532085.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
TDX memory has integrity and confidentiality protections. Violations of
this integrity protection are supposed to only affect TDX operations and
are never supposed to affect the host kernel itself. In other words,
the host kernel should never, itself, see machine checks induced by the
TDX integrity hardware.
Alas, the first few generations of TDX hardware have an erratum. A
partial write to a TDX private memory cacheline will silently "poison"
the line. Subsequent reads will consume the poison and generate a
machine check. According to the TDX hardware spec, neither of these
things should have happened.
Virtually all kernel memory accesses operations happen in full
cachelines. In practice, writing a "byte" of memory usually reads a 64
byte cacheline of memory, modifies it, then writes the whole line back.
Those operations do not trigger this problem.
This problem is triggered by "partial" writes where a write transaction
of less than cacheline lands at the memory controller. The CPU does
these via non-temporal write instructions (like MOVNTI), or through
UC/WC memory mappings. The issue can also be triggered away from the
CPU by devices doing partial writes via DMA.
With this erratum, there are additional things need to be done. To
prepare for those changes, add a CPU bug bit to indicate this erratum.
Note this bug reflects the hardware thus it is detected regardless of
whether the kernel is built with TDX support or not.
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
---
v13 -> v14:
- Use "To prepare for ___, add ___" in changelog (Dave)
- Added Dave's tag.
v12 -> v13:
- Added David's tag.
v11 -> v12:
- Added Kirill's tag
- Changed to detect the erratum in early_init_intel() (Kirill)
v10 -> v11:
- New patch
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 58cb9495e40f..f11cfc3cdf81 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -494,6 +494,7 @@
#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
#define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */
#define X86_BUG_GDS X86_BUG(30) /* CPU is affected by Gather Data Sampling */
+#define X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE X86_BUG(31) /* CPU may incur #MC if non-TD software does partial write to TDX private memory */
/* BUG word 2 */
#define X86_BUG_SRSO X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index be4045628fd3..4e229265e596 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -184,6 +184,21 @@ static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
return false;
}
+static void check_tdx_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /*
+ * These CPUs have an erratum. A partial write from non-TD
+ * software (e.g. via MOVNTI variants or UC/WC mapping) to TDX
+ * private memory poisons that memory, and a subsequent read of
+ * that memory triggers #MC.
+ */
+ switch (c->x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_EMERALDRAPIDS_X:
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE);
+ }
+}
+
static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 misc_enable;
@@ -335,6 +350,8 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
*/
if (detect_extended_topology_early(c) < 0)
detect_ht_early(c);
+
+ check_tdx_erratum(c);
}
static void bsp_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
--
2.41.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-17 10:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-17 10:14 [PATCH v14 00/23] TDX host kernel support Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 01/23] x86/virt/tdx: Detect TDX during kernel boot Kai Huang
2023-10-17 13:24 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 02/23] x86/tdx: Define TDX supported page sizes as macros Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 03/23] x86/virt/tdx: Make INTEL_TDX_HOST depend on X86_X2APIC Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` Kai Huang [this message]
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 05/23] x86/virt/tdx: Handle SEAMCALL no entropy error in common code Kai Huang
2023-10-17 13:34 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 06/23] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL error printing for module initialization Kai Huang
2023-10-17 13:37 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-18 6:27 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-18 7:40 ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-10-18 8:26 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-18 14:17 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 07/23] x86/virt/tdx: Add skeleton to enable TDX on demand Kai Huang
2023-10-17 14:24 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-18 6:51 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-18 13:56 ` Dave Hansen
2023-10-18 19:55 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-18 7:57 ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-10-18 8:29 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-18 8:39 ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-10-18 8:57 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-18 9:14 ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-10-18 9:17 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 08/23] x86/virt/tdx: Get information about TDX module and TDX-capable memory Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 09/23] x86/virt/tdx: Use all system memory when initializing TDX module as TDX memory Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 10/23] x86/virt/tdx: Add placeholder to construct TDMRs to cover all TDX memory regions Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 11/23] x86/virt/tdx: Fill out " Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 12/23] x86/virt/tdx: Allocate and set up PAMTs for TDMRs Kai Huang
2023-10-24 5:53 ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-10-24 10:49 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-24 13:31 ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 13/23] x86/virt/tdx: Designate reserved areas for all TDMRs Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 14/23] x86/virt/tdx: Configure TDX module with the TDMRs and global KeyID Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 15/23] x86/virt/tdx: Configure global KeyID on all packages Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 16/23] x86/virt/tdx: Initialize all TDMRs Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 17/23] x86/kexec: Flush cache of TDX private memory Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 18/23] x86/virt/tdx: Keep TDMRs when module initialization is successful Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 19/23] x86/virt/tdx: Improve readability of module initialization error handling Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 20/23] x86/kexec(): Reset TDX private memory on platforms with TDX erratum Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 21/23] x86/virt/tdx: Handle TDX interaction with ACPI S3 and deeper states Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:53 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2023-10-18 3:22 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-18 10:15 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2023-10-18 10:51 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-18 10:53 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2023-10-19 20:45 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-24 10:46 ` Huang, Kai
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 22/23] x86/mce: Improve error log of kernel space TDX #MC due to erratum Kai Huang
2023-10-17 10:14 ` [PATCH v14 23/23] Documentation/x86: Add documentation for TDX host support Kai Huang
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