From: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
To: mic@digikod.net, gnoack@google.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com,
jannh@google.com, outreachy@lists.linux.dev,
netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 4/4] documentation/landlock: Adding scoping mechanism documentation
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2024 22:15:22 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <319fd95504a9e491fa756c56048e63791ecd2aed.1721269836.git.fahimitahera@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1721269836.git.fahimitahera@gmail.com>
- Defining ABI version 6 that supports IPC restriction.
- Adding "scoped" to the "Access rights".
- In current limitation, unnamed sockets are specified as
sockets that are not restricted.
Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
---
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index 07b63aec56fa..61b91cc03560 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
=====================================
:Author: Mickaël Salaün
-:Date: April 2024
+:Date: July 2024
The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global
filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
@@ -306,6 +306,16 @@ To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target
process, a sandboxed process should have a subset of the target process rules,
which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer.
+IPC Scoping
+-----------
+
+Similar to Ptrace, a sandboxed process should not be able to access the resources
+(like abstract unix sockets, or signals) outside of the sandbox domain. For example,
+a sandboxed process should not be able to :manpage:`connect(2)` to a non-sandboxed
+process through abstract unix sockets (:manpage:`unix(7)`). This restriction is
+applicable by optionally specifying ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET`` in
+the ruleset.
+
Truncating files
----------------
@@ -404,7 +414,7 @@ Access rights
-------------
.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
- :identifiers: fs_access net_access
+ :identifiers: fs_access net_access scoped
Creating a new ruleset
----------------------
@@ -446,7 +456,7 @@ Special filesystems
Access to regular files and directories can be restricted by Landlock,
according to the handled accesses of a ruleset. However, files that do not
-come from a user-visible filesystem (e.g. pipe, socket), but can still be
+come from a user-visible filesystem (e.g. pipe, unnamed socket), but can still be
accessed through ``/proc/<pid>/fd/*``, cannot currently be explicitly
restricted. Likewise, some special kernel filesystems such as nsfs, which can
be accessed through ``/proc/<pid>/ns/*``, cannot currently be explicitly
@@ -541,6 +551,13 @@ earlier ABI.
Starting with the Landlock ABI version 5, it is possible to restrict the use of
:manpage:`ioctl(2)` using the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right.
+Special filesystems (ABI < 6)
+-----------------------------
+
+With ABI version 6, it is possible to restrict IPC actions such as connecting to
+an abstract Unix socket through ``LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET``, thanks
+to the ``.scoped`` ruleset attribute.
+
.. _kernel_support:
Kernel support
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-18 4:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-18 4:15 [PATCH v7 0/4] Landlock: Abstract Unix Socket Scoping Support Tahera Fahimi
2024-07-18 4:15 ` [PATCH v7 1/4] Landlock: Add abstract unix socket connect restriction Tahera Fahimi
2024-07-19 18:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-23 1:13 ` Tahera Fahimi
2024-07-25 14:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-26 6:50 ` Günther Noack
2024-07-26 8:07 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-30 16:05 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-30 21:41 ` Tahera Fahimi
2024-07-18 4:15 ` [PATCH v7 2/4] selftests/landlock: Abstract unix socket restriction tests Tahera Fahimi
2024-07-25 18:53 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 4:15 ` [PATCH v7 3/4] samples/landlock: Support abstract unix socket restriction Tahera Fahimi
2024-07-25 14:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 4:15 ` Tahera Fahimi [this message]
2024-07-25 14:24 ` [PATCH v7 4/4] documentation/landlock: Adding scoping mechanism documentation Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-26 8:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
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