From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
To: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: mtk.manpages@gmail.com, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Documenting ptrace access mode checking
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2016 09:42:09 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <33209000-3fd4-0b26-f249-eb4e1a9e1651@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160622224428.GA15902@pc.thejh.net>
Hi Jann,
Thanks for your further review. Follow-up of one point below.
On 06/23/2016 12:44 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 09:21:29PM +0200, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:
>> On 06/21/2016 10:55 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
>>> On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 11:41:16AM +0200, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:
[...]
>>>> The algorithm employed for ptrace access mode checking deter‐
>>>> mines whether the calling process is allowed to perform the
>>>> corresponding action on the target process, as follows:
>>>>
>>>> 1. If the calling thread and the target thread are in the same
>>>> thread group, access is always allowed.
>>>>
>>>> 2. If the access mode specifies PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS, then for
>>>> the check in the next step, employ the caller's filesystem
>>>> user ID and group ID (see credentials(7)); otherwise (the
>>>> access mode specifies PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS, so) use the
>>>> caller's real user ID and group ID.
>>>
>>> Might want to add a "for historical reasons" or so here.
>>
>> Can you be a little more precise about "here", and maybe tell me why
>> you think it helps?
>
> I'm not sure, but it might be a good idea to add something like this at the
> end of 2.:
> "(Most other APIs that check one of the caller's UIDs use the effective one.
> This API uses the real UID instead for historical reasons.)"
>
> In my opinion, it is inconsistent to use the real UID/GID here, the
> effective one would be more appropriate. But since the existing code uses
> the real UID/GID and that's not a security issue for existing users of
> the ptrace API, this wasn't changed when I added the REALCREDS/FSCREDS
> distinction.
>
> I think that for a reader, it might help to point out that in most cases,
> when a process is the subject in an access check, its effective UID/GID
> are used, and this is (together with kill()) an exception to that rule.
> But you're the expert on writing documentation, if you think that that's
> too much detail / confusing here, it probably is.
Okay -- got it now, I think. I made this text:
2. If the access mode specifies PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS, then, for
the check in the next step, employ the caller's filesystem
UID and GID. (As noted in credentials(7), the filesystem
UID and GID almost always have the same values as the cor‐
responding effective IDs.)
Otherwise, the access mode specifies PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS,
so use the caller's real UID and GID for the checks in the
next step. (Most APIs that check the caller's UID and GID
use the effective IDs. For historical reasons, the
PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS check uses the real IDs instead.)
[...]
Cheers,
Michael
--
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-23 7:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-06-21 9:41 Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2016-06-21 19:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-06-21 20:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-21 20:58 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-06-22 19:20 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2016-06-22 19:20 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2016-06-23 19:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-06-24 9:57 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2016-06-22 21:51 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-06-23 7:06 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2016-06-23 18:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-06-24 8:18 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2016-06-21 20:55 ` Jann Horn
2016-06-22 19:21 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2016-06-22 21:11 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-23 7:02 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2016-06-24 8:40 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2016-06-24 15:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-06-24 20:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-25 7:21 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2016-06-22 22:44 ` Jann Horn
2016-06-23 7:42 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) [this message]
2016-06-24 6:35 ` Jann Horn
2016-06-23 18:05 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-06-24 8:33 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
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