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From: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>, x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	David.Kaplan@amd.com, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/22] x86/srso: Set CPUID feature bits independently of bug or mitigation status
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2023 08:42:08 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <35c7815e-4212-2c14-1515-bd10e9e649db@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <caf4d0a1233ccc1c33f4ff8d3fe302c9289f4bea.1692580085.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>



On 21.08.23 г. 4:18 ч., Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> Booting with mitigations=off incorrectly prevents the
> X86_FEATURE_{IBPB_BRTYPE,SBPB} CPUID bits from getting set.
> 
> Also, future CPUs without X86_BUG_SRSO might still have IBPB with branch
> type prediction flushing, in which case SBPB should be used instead of
> IBPB.  The current code doesn't allow for that.
> 
> Also, cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() has some surprising side effects
> and the setting of these feature bits really doesn't belong in the
> mitigation code anyway.  Move it to earlier.
> 
> Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation")
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>

LGTM and it's a lot more clear when IBPB_TYPE can actually be set.

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>


> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h |  2 --
>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c        | 28 +++++++++-------------------
>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       | 13 +------------
>   3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> index fd750247ca89..9e26294e415c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -676,12 +676,10 @@ extern u16 get_llc_id(unsigned int cpu);
>   #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD
>   extern u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void);
>   extern u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void);
> -extern bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void);
>   extern void amd_clear_divider(void);
>   #else
>   static inline u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void)	{ return 0; }
>   static inline u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void)		{ return 0; }
> -static inline bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void)	{ return false; }
>   static inline void amd_clear_divider(void)		{ }
>   #endif
>   
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> index 7eca6a8abbb1..b08af929135d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> @@ -766,6 +766,15 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>   
>   	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT))
>   		smp_num_siblings = ((cpuid_ebx(0x8000001e) >> 8) & 0xff) + 1;
> +
> +	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE)) {

The only way this check can be true is if this kernel is running as a 
guest and KVM has synthesized this flag already, right?

> +		if (c->x86 == 0x17 && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
> +			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
> +		else if (c->x86 >= 0x19 && !wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB)) {
> +			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
> +			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB);
> +		}
> +	}
>   }
>   
>   static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)

<snip>

  reply	other threads:[~2023-08-21  5:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-21  1:18 [PATCH 00/22] SRSO fixes/cleanups Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:18 ` [PATCH 01/22] x86/srso: Fix srso_show_state() side effect Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  5:42   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-21  6:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21 16:17     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-22  5:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:18 ` [PATCH 02/22] x86/srso: Set CPUID feature bits independently of bug or mitigation status Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  5:42   ` Nikolay Borisov [this message]
2023-08-21  9:27   ` Andrew Cooper
2023-08-21 14:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-23  5:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-23 12:22         ` Andrew Cooper
2023-08-24  4:24           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-24 22:04             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  6:42               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21 13:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 03/22] KVM: x86: Support IBPB_BRTYPE and SBPB Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  9:34   ` Andrew Cooper
2023-08-21 16:23     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21 16:35       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-21 16:46         ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-21 16:50           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-21 17:05         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-24 16:39           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-24 17:07             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21 16:49   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 04/22] x86/srso: Fix SBPB enablement for spec_rstack_overflow=off Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21 14:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21 16:36     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-22  5:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-22  6:07         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-22 21:59           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23  1:27             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 05/22] x86/srso: Fix SBPB enablement for mitigations=off Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23  5:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-23 20:55     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23 23:02   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 06/22] x86/srso: Print actual mitigation if requested mitigation isn't possible Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23  6:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 07/22] x86/srso: Remove default case in srso_select_mitigation() Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-23  6:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 08/22] x86/srso: Downgrade retbleed IBPB warning to informational message Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-24  4:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 09/22] x86/srso: Simplify exit paths Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 10/22] x86/srso: Print mitigation for retbleed IBPB case Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-24  4:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-24 21:40     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 11/22] x86/srso: Slight simplification Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-24  4:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 12/22] x86/srso: Remove redundant X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB check Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 13/22] x86/srso: Fix vulnerability reporting for missing microcode Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 14/22] x86/srso: Fix unret validation dependencies Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 15/22] x86/alternatives: Remove faulty optimization Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 16/22] x86/srso: Unexport untraining functions Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  5:50   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 17/22] x86/srso: Disentangle rethunk-dependent options Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 18/22] x86/rethunk: Use SYM_CODE_START[_LOCAL]_NOALIGN macros Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 19/22] x86/srso: Improve i-cache locality for alias mitigation Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 20/22] x86/retpoline: Remove .text..__x86.return_thunk section Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 21/22] x86/nospec: Refactor UNTRAIN_RET[_*] Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-21  1:19 ` [PATCH 22/22] x86/calldepth: Rename __x86_return_skl() to call_depth_return_thunk() Josh Poimboeuf

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