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From: "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] Provide options to enable spectre_v2 userspace-userspace protection
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 21:38:59 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3609a852-1477-a5b2-3858-c2cbfb3999a9@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1537392876.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>

On 09/19/2018 04:35 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
> This patchset provides an option to apply IBPB and STIBP mitigation
> to only non-dumpable processes.
> 
> Jiri's patch to harden spectre_v2 makes IBPB and STIBP available for
> general spectre v2 app to app mitigation.  IBPB will be issued for
> switching to an app that's not ptraceable by the previous
> app and STIBP will be always turned on.
> 
> However, leaving STIBP on all the time is expensive for certain
> applications that have frequent indirect branches. One such application
> is perlbench in the SpecInt Rate 2006 test suite which shows a
> 21% reduction in throughput.  Other application like bzip2 in
> the same test suite with  minimal indirct branches have
> only a 0.7% reduction in throughput. IBPB will also impose
> overhead during context switches.
> 
> App to app exploit is in general difficult
> due to address space layout randomization in apps and
> the need to know an app's address space layout ahead of time.
> Users may not wish to incur app to app performance
> overhead from IBPB and STIBP for general non security sensitive apps
> and use these mitigations only for non-dumpable apps.
> 
> The first patch provides a lite option for spectre_v2 app to app
> mitigation where IBPB is only issued for security sensitive
> non-dumpable app.  The second patch extends this option
> where STIBP is only issued for non-dumpable app.
> 
> The changes apply to intel cpus affected by spectre_v2. Tom,
> can you update the STIBP changes for AMD cpus on  
> __speculative_store_bypass_update and x86_virt_spec_ctrl
> to update the SPEC_CTRL msr for AMD cpu?

Hi Tim,

Let me think about this a bit, since it can get a bit tricky if
I want to avoid multiple MSR writes when only one may have been
needed (assuming SSBD is not using the SPEC_CTRL MSR).

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> Thanks.
> 
> Tim
> 
> Tim Chen (2):
>   x86/speculation: Option to select app to app mitigation for spectre_v2
>   x86/speculation: Provide application property based STIBP protection
> 
>  Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  11 +++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h                |   3 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h            |   9 ++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h                |  12 +++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h              |   4 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 105 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  arch/x86/kernel/process.c                       |   9 +-
>  arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                               |  41 ++++++++-
>  8 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-09-20 21:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-19 21:35 Tim Chen
2018-09-19 21:35 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/speculation: Option to select app to app mitigation for spectre_v2 Tim Chen
2018-09-19 21:35 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Provide application property based STIBP protection Tim Chen
2018-09-20  7:57   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-20 17:17     ` Tim Chen
2018-09-20  8:00   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-20 17:32     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-02 15:41   ` Jon Masters
2018-10-02 15:43     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-10-02 15:44       ` Jon Masters
2018-09-20 21:38 ` Lendacky, Thomas [this message]
2018-09-21 15:44   ` [PATCH 0/2] Provide options to enable spectre_v2 userspace-userspace protection Lendacky, Thomas
2018-09-21 17:14     ` Tim Chen
2018-09-21 17:44       ` Lendacky, Thomas

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