From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
"kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com"
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "dwmw@amazon.co.uk" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
"dyoung@redhat.com" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
"seanjc@google.com" <seanjc@google.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"sagis@google.com" <sagis@google.com>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Chatre, Reinette" <reinette.chatre@intel.com>,
"bhe@redhat.com" <bhe@redhat.com>,
"Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"thomas.lendacky@amd.com" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"nik.borisov@suse.com" <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
"ashish.kalra@amd.com" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
"Yamahata, Isaku" <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/5] x86/kexec: Do unconditional WBINVD for bare-metal in stop_this_cpu()
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2025 10:03:13 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <37b8fef5a0a77bbd2452be486d4cc4f463cebacb.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e0d9a3d599025c92fce5e159e8acc1af32844912.camel@intel.com>
On Thu, 2025-03-13 at 18:40 +0000, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> > index 9c75d701011f..8475d9d2d8c4 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> > @@ -819,18 +819,19 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)
> > mcheck_cpu_clear(c);
> >
> > /*
> > - * Use wbinvd on processors that support SME. This provides support
> > - * for performing a successful kexec when going from SME inactive
> > - * to SME active (or vice-versa). The cache must be cleared so that
> > - * if there are entries with the same physical address, both with and
> > - * without the encryption bit, they don't race each other when flushed
> > - * and potentially end up with the wrong entry being committed to
> > - * memory.
> > + * Use wbinvd to support kexec for both SME (from inactive to active
> > + * or vice-versa) and TDX. The cache must be cleared so that if there
> > + * are entries with the same physical address, both with and without
> > + * the encryption bit(s), they don't race each other when flushed and
> > + * potentially end up with the wrong entry being committed to memory.
> > *
> > - * Test the CPUID bit directly because the machine might've cleared
> > - * X86_FEATURE_SME due to cmdline options.
> > + * stop_this_cpu() isn't a fast path, just do unconditional WBINVD for
> > + * bare-metal to cover both SME and TDX. Do not do WBINVD in a guest
> > + * since performing one will result in an exception (#VE or #VC) for
> > + * TDX or SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guests which the guest may not be able to
> > + * handle (e.g., TDX guest panics if it sees #VE).
> > */
> > - if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax(0x8000001f) & BIT(0)))
> > + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
> > wbinvd();
>
> I see that this already has Tom's RB, but I'm not sure how this works for AMD.
> The original SME patch tried to avoid writing to memory by putting the wbinvd
> immediately before the halt, but today it is further away. Below this hunk there
> are more instructions that could dirty memory before the halt. Ohh... it's new.
> 9 months ago 26ba7353caaa ("x86/smp: Add smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() callback") adds
> a function call that would touch the stack. I think it's wrong? And probably
> introduced after this patch was originally written.
(I'll reply others separately since today I am a little bit sick.)
That callback is for TDX guset (which doesn't invoke WBINVD during kexec). It
doesn't impact SME host.
I kinda agree maybe the code here can be improved, e.g., the code to call
smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() perhaps should be called before the WBINVD.
>
> Then the cpuid_eax() could be non-inlined, but probably not. But the
> boot_cpu_has() added in this patch could call out to kasan and dirty the stack.
Could you elaborate this since I don't see how kasan is involved?
>
> So I think the existing SME case might be theoretically incorrect, and if so
> this makes things very slightly worse.
As explained above the function call is empty for SME host.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-14 10:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-12 11:34 [RFC PATCH 0/5] TDX host: kexec/kdump support Kai Huang
2025-03-12 11:34 ` [RFC PATCH 1/5] x86/kexec: Do unconditional WBINVD for bare-metal in stop_this_cpu() Kai Huang
2025-03-13 18:40 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-14 10:03 ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2025-03-14 15:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-03-14 16:28 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-14 18:18 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-03-14 18:57 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-17 10:11 ` Huang, Kai
2025-03-18 3:41 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-20 0:03 ` Huang, Kai
2025-03-17 12:52 ` kirill.shutemov
2025-03-17 21:59 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-19 16:41 ` Dave Hansen
2025-03-19 17:03 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-19 21:42 ` Huang, Kai
2025-03-12 11:34 ` [RFC PATCH 2/5] x86/kexec: Do unconditional WBINVD for bare-metal in relocate_kernel() Kai Huang
2025-03-13 23:17 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-14 9:44 ` Huang, Kai
2025-03-18 3:54 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-19 9:57 ` Huang, Kai
2025-03-19 16:20 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-12 11:34 ` [RFC PATCH 3/5] x86/kexec: Disable kexec/kdump on platforms with TDX partial write erratum Kai Huang
2025-03-12 23:27 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-13 0:57 ` Huang, Kai
2025-03-13 17:18 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-13 22:32 ` Huang, Kai
2025-03-13 22:47 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-13 23:57 ` Huang, Kai
2025-03-14 19:03 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-17 1:19 ` Huang, Kai
2025-03-17 23:53 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-03-12 11:34 ` [RFC PATCH 4/5] x86/virt/tdx: Remove the !KEXEC_CORE dependency Kai Huang
2025-03-12 11:34 ` [RFC PATCH 5/5] x86/virt/tdx: Update the kexec section in the TDX documentation Kai Huang
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