From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mail.zytor.com (terminus.zytor.com [198.137.202.136]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6FFEFA933; Wed, 2 Jul 2025 02:02:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=198.137.202.136 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1751421741; cv=none; b=f5hLCheFoicNcxRhOpD7/MOepNiCYPnzpVV0D8gtaicSELF+HT94v5bmI51XiXzzC5z9NrXyzmQ5e9G7zUUZdqefXigCfcKrfUzhYYqGXZjubtLf8rwAVkSBmNWEvHINLc+wgUvKkZx+gSQ6ti/HWC0SBDk49uu2BOFdIcq604k= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1751421741; c=relaxed/simple; bh=hzNyt4OsXsTplu2/gsTkh57eENzJE8o2yhf0YMOWyxY=; h=Date:From:To:CC:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:Message-ID: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=Si7Ngaa35qUe0+F0IpZMIEyMAlRAXfi/sANby6W5UTUD/lWX/o3EZZlCHGMboze0aAR7XI0EKwLFTxHQyShVtQfCseDF7c8s9sbEeFG1XX8ebSCnO7e8XBWGw7CqpUkiytMZXpiniHiyfDfR6+1HKDGOohbuVAIoE0xRirDH9+s= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=zytor.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=zytor.com; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=zytor.com header.i=@zytor.com header.b=E9tdaCIl; arc=none smtp.client-ip=198.137.202.136 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=zytor.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=zytor.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=zytor.com header.i=@zytor.com header.b="E9tdaCIl" Received: from [127.0.0.1] (c-76-133-66-138.hsd1.ca.comcast.net [76.133.66.138]) (authenticated bits=0) by mail.zytor.com (8.18.1/8.17.1) with ESMTPSA id 56220cdX457483 (version=TLSv1.3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128 verify=NO); Tue, 1 Jul 2025 19:00:39 -0700 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 mail.zytor.com 56220cdX457483 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zytor.com; s=2025062101; t=1751421644; bh=xsBLzF3UyZbaFPKi2ZS9R/n92G41U6FG3scZwTR38ro=; h=Date:From:To:CC:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=E9tdaCIlWT+jCmX/+CfRzVCcIpysnoePPDS0qBRG+lh62cVFQRL0dxVWZRJ3LnScw Tsashqy1y3xJZSpEXwiZ9Qu00tOwNawGjNZE+YNOgxYveInrBPbuugBo1Uc6hSKIdh dwii7pNyjYiH65+CHzJw7yze/mhjXafHpTqB1NLmmTuwBJDMuR6TQqD8gMkGdYg2Fe Hd1DsC8LD9MtNVn6u2hbb1tv6engmhSynp0QaC9W2InnY4Bs1dgNMJeSh8bBEGujaz l7TIiwlZdLySQWzRmZ31mFWxuqtlh4bJvgcXrWFWKSzjO5tly2wZIJOrQ7zynooele fPnwxEZaa89/w== Date: Tue, 01 Jul 2025 19:00:38 -0700 From: "H. Peter Anvin" To: Sohil Mehta , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Andy Lutomirski , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra , Ard Biesheuvel , "Paul E. McKenney" , Josh Poimboeuf , Xiongwei Song , Xin Li , "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" , Brijesh Singh , Michael Roth , Tony Luck , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Alexander Shishkin CC: Jonathan Corbet , Ingo Molnar , Pawan Gupta , Daniel Sneddon , Kai Huang , Sandipan Das , Breno Leitao , Rick Edgecombe , Alexei Starovoitov , Hou Tao , Juergen Gross , Vegard Nossum , Kees Cook , Eric Biggers , Jason Gunthorpe , "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" , Andrew Morton , Luis Chamberlain , Yuntao Wang , Rasmus Villemoes , Christophe Leroy , Tejun Heo , Changbin Du , Huang Shijie , Geert Uytterhoeven , Namhyung Kim , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org Subject: Re: [PATCHv8 14/17] x86/traps: Handle LASS thrown #SS User-Agent: K-9 Mail for Android In-Reply-To: <95dc18fd-73b0-4019-92d2-c0e6aaf22c96@intel.com> References: <20250701095849.2360685-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> <20250701095849.2360685-15-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> <95dc18fd-73b0-4019-92d2-c0e6aaf22c96@intel.com> Message-ID: <3D770C94-8BB8-4D71-BF48-6FA78C1DA967@zytor.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On July 1, 2025 6:35:40 PM PDT, Sohil Mehta wro= te: >On 7/1/2025 2:58 AM, Kirill A=2E Shutemov wrote: >> LASS throws a #GP for any violations except for stack register accesses= , >> in which case it throws a #SS instead=2E Handle this similarly to how o= ther >> LASS violations are handled=2E >>=20 > >Maybe I've misunderstood something: > >Is the underlying assumption here that #SS were previously only >generated by userspace, but now they can also be generated by the >kernel? And we want the kernel generated #SS to behave the same as the #G= P? > >> In case of FRED, before handling #SS as LASS violation, kernel has to >> check if there's a fixup for the exception=2E It can address #SS due to >> invalid user context on ERETU=2E See 5105e7687ad3 ("x86/fred: Fixup >> fault on ERETU by jumping to fred_entrypoint_user") for more details=2E >>=20 >> Co-developed-by: Alexander Shishkin >> Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin >> Signed-off-by: Kirill A=2E Shutemov >> --- >> arch/x86/kernel/traps=2Ec | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ >> 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) >>=20 >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps=2Ec b/arch/x86/kernel/traps=2Ec >> index ceb091f17a5b=2E=2Ef9ca5b911141 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps=2Ec >> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps=2Ec >> @@ -418,12 +418,6 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_segment_not_present) >> SIGBUS, 0, NULL); >> } >> =20 >> -DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_stack_segment) >> -{ >> - do_error_trap(regs, error_code, "stack segment", X86_TRAP_SS, SIGBUS, >> - 0, NULL); >> -} >> - >> DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_alignment_check) >> { >> char *str =3D "alignment check"; >> @@ -866,6 +860,39 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) >> cond_local_irq_disable(regs); >> } >> =20 >> +#define SSFSTR "stack segment fault" >> + >> +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_stack_segment) >> +{ >> + if (user_mode(regs)) >> + goto error_trap; >> + >> + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED) && >> + fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_SS, error_code, 0)) >> + return; >> + >> + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LASS)) { >> + enum kernel_exc_hint hint; >> + unsigned long exc_addr; >> + >> + hint =3D get_kernel_exc_address(regs, &exc_addr); >> + if (hint !=3D EXC_NO_HINT) { > >The brackets are not needed for singular statements=2E Also the max line >length is longer now=2E You can fit this all in a single line=2E > >> + printk(SSFSTR ", %s 0x%lx", kernel_exc_hint_help[hint], >> + exc_addr); >> + } >> + > >> + if (hint !=3D EXC_NON_CANONICAL) >> + exc_addr =3D 0; >> + >> + die_addr(SSFSTR, regs, error_code, exc_addr); > >The variable names in die_addr() should be generalized as well=2E They >seem to assume the caller to be a #GP handler=2E > >> + return; >> + } >> + >> +error_trap: >> + do_error_trap(regs, error_code, "stack segment", X86_TRAP_SS, SIGBUS, >> + 0, NULL); >> +} >> + >> static bool do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs) >> { >> int res; > An #SS can be generated by the kernel if RSP is corrupted=2E This is fatal= , but as always we want to get a message out=2E