From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
keescook@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
luto@kernel.org, will@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 01/13] arm64: stackleak: fix current_top_of_stack()
Date: Sun, 8 May 2022 20:24:38 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3d65baac-93b6-7f21-1bf6-9b17d1fce843@linux.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220427173128.2603085-2-mark.rutland@arm.com>
Hi Mark!
On 27.04.2022 20:31, Mark Rutland wrote:
> Due to some historical confusion, arm64's current_top_of_stack() isn't
> what the stackleak code expects. This could in theory result in a number
> of problems, and practically results in an unnecessary performance hit.
> We can avoid this by aligning the arm64 implementation with the x86
> implementation.
>
> The arm64 implementation of current_top_of_stack() was added
> specifically for stackleak in commit:
>
> 0b3e336601b82c6a ("arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin")
>
> This was intended to be equivalent to the x86 implementation, but the
> implementation, semantics, and performance characteristics differ
> wildly:
>
> * On x86, current_top_of_stack() returns the top of the current task's
> task stack, regardless of which stack is in active use.
>
> The implementation accesses a percpu variable which the x86 entry code
> maintains, and returns the location immediately above the pt_regs on
> the task stack (above which x86 has some padding).
>
> * On arm64 current_top_of_stack() returns the top of the stack in active
> use (i.e. the one which is currently being used).
>
> The implementation checks the SP against a number of
> potentially-accessible stacks, and will BUG() if no stack is found.
As I could understand, for arm64, calling stackleak_erase() not from the thread
stack would bring troubles because current_top_of_stack() would return an
unexpected address from a foreign stack. Is this correct?
But this bug doesn't happen because arm64 always calls stackleak_erase() from
the current thread stack. Right?
> The core stackleak_erase() code determines the upper bound of stack to
> erase with:
>
> | if (on_thread_stack())
> | boundary = current_stack_pointer;
> | else
> | boundary = current_top_of_stack();
>
> On arm64 stackleak_erase() is always called on a task stack, and
> on_thread_stack() should always be true. On x86, stackleak_erase() is
> mostly called on a trampoline stack, and is sometimes called on a task
> stack.
>
> Currently, this results in a lot of unnecessary code being generated for
> arm64 for the impossible !on_thread_stack() case. Some of this is
> inlined, bloating stackleak_erase(), while portions of this are left
> out-of-line and permitted to be instrumented (which would be a
> functional problem if that code were reachable).
Sorry, I didn't understand this part about instrumentation. Could you elaborate
please?
> As a first step towards improving this, this patch aligns arm64's
> implementation of current_top_of_stack() with x86's, always returning
> the top of the current task's stack. With GCC 11.1.0 this results in the
> bulk of the unnecessary code being removed, including all of the
> out-of-line instrumentable code.
>
> While I don't believe there's a functional problem in practice I've
> marked this as a fix since the semantic was clearly wrong, the fix
> itself is simple, and other code might rely upon this in future.
>
> Fixes: 0b3e336601b82c6a ("arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin")
> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 10 ++++------
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> index 73e38d9a540ce..6b1a12c23fe77 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -381,12 +381,10 @@ long get_tagged_addr_ctrl(struct task_struct *task);
> * of header definitions for the use of task_stack_page.
> */
>
> -#define current_top_of_stack() \
> -({ \
> - struct stack_info _info; \
> - BUG_ON(!on_accessible_stack(current, current_stack_pointer, 1, &_info)); \
> - _info.high; \
> -})
> +/*
> + * The top of the current task's task stack
> + */
> +#define current_top_of_stack() ((unsigned long)current->stack + THREAD_SIZE)
> #define on_thread_stack() (on_task_stack(current, current_stack_pointer, 1, NULL))
>
> #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-08 19:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-27 17:31 [PATCH v2 00/13] stackleak: fixes and rework Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] arm64: stackleak: fix current_top_of_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 16:41 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-04 19:55 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-05 8:25 ` Will Deacon
2022-05-08 17:24 ` Alexander Popov [this message]
2022-05-10 11:36 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] stackleak: move skip_erasing() check earlier Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 17:44 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:40 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] stackleak: remove redundant check Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 18:17 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:46 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11 3:00 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-11 8:02 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11 14:44 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-12 9:14 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 16:17 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-24 10:03 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-26 22:09 ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] stackleak: rework stack low bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] stackleak: clarify variable names Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 20:49 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 13:01 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11 3:05 ` Kees Cook
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] stackleak: rework stack high bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 21:27 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:22 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 16:32 ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] stackleak: rework poison scanning Mark Rutland
2022-05-09 13:51 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 13:13 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 17:33 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-24 13:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-26 23:25 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-31 18:13 ` Kees Cook
2022-06-03 16:55 ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] lkdtm/stackleak: avoid spurious failure Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] lkdtm/stackleak: rework boundary management Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 19:07 ` Kees Cook
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] lkdtm/stackleak: prevent unexpected stack usage Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] lkdtm/stackleak: check stack boundaries Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] stackleak: add on/off stack variants Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] arm64: entry: use stackleak_erase_on_task_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 16:42 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 19:16 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] stackleak: fixes and rework Kees Cook
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