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From: "Gupta, Pankaj" <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
To: Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@gmail.com>,
	luto@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	jgross@suse.com, tiala@microsoft.com, kirill@shutemov.name,
	jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	ashish.kalra@amd.com, srutherford@google.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, anshuman.khandual@arm.com,
	pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, adrian.hunter@intel.com,
	daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com,
	alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com, sandipan.das@amd.com,
	ray.huang@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, michael.roth@amd.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, venu.busireddy@oracle.com,
	sterritt@google.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	samitolvanen@google.com, fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: pangupta@amd.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH V5 11/15] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
Date: Fri, 5 May 2023 12:59:36 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3ec60d7a-c5e7-2570-a0f2-ef435d904cfd@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230501085726.544209-12-ltykernel@gmail.com>

Hi Tianyu,

I tried to understand some details of this patch. Please find below
some comments/questions.

Thanks,


> Add a #HV exception handler that uses IST stack.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
> ---
> Change since RFC V2:
>         * Remove unnecessary line in the change log.
> ---
>   arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S             | 22 +++++++----
>   arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h |  6 +++
>   arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h       | 40 +++++++++++++++++++-
>   arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h  |  1 +
>   arch/x86/include/asm/trapnr.h         |  1 +
>   arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h          |  1 +
>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c          |  1 +
>   arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c        |  9 ++++-
>   arch/x86/kernel/idt.c                 |  1 +
>   arch/x86/kernel/sev.c                 | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/kernel/traps.c               | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c          |  2 +
>   12 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> index eccc3431e515..653b1f10699b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
>   
>   #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>   /**
> - * idtentry_vc - Macro to generate entry stub for #VC
> + * idtentry_sev - Macro to generate entry stub for #VC
>    * @vector:		Vector number
>    * @asmsym:		ASM symbol for the entry point
>    * @cfunc:		C function to be called
> @@ -515,14 +515,18 @@ SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
>    *
>    * The macro is only used for one vector, but it is planned to be extended in
>    * the future for the #HV exception.
> - */
> -.macro idtentry_vc vector asmsym cfunc
> +*/
> +.macro idtentry_sev vector asmsym cfunc has_error_code:req
>   SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
>   	UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
>   	ENDBR
>   	ASM_CLAC
>   	cld
>   
> +	.if \vector == X86_TRAP_HV
> +		pushq	$-1			/* ORIG_RAX: no syscall */
> +	.endif
> +
>   	/*
>   	 * If the entry is from userspace, switch stacks and treat it as
>   	 * a normal entry.
> @@ -545,7 +549,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
>   	 * stack.
>   	 */
>   	movq	%rsp, %rdi		/* pt_regs pointer */
> -	call	vc_switch_off_ist
> +	.if \vector == X86_TRAP_VC
> +		call	vc_switch_off_ist

I think the stack switching logic is similar for #VC & #HV.
So, we can use common function. Just the corresponding fallback
stack switching is different. Maybe we can pass the hint as an
argument (%rsi?) to something like "sev_switch_off_ist()", and use
the corresponding (#HV or #VC) fallbacks stack?

> +	.else
> +		call	hv_switch_off_ist	
> +	.endif
> +
>   	movq	%rax, %rsp		/* Switch to new stack */
>   
>   	ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
> @@ -568,10 +577,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
>   
>   	/* Switch to the regular task stack */
>   .Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@:
> -	idtentry_body user_\cfunc, has_error_code=1
> -
> -_ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym)
> -SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
> +	idtentry_body user_\cfunc, \has_error_code
>   .endm
>   #endif
>   
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
> index 462fc34f1317..2186ed601b4a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
> @@ -30,6 +30,10 @@
>   	char	VC_stack[optional_stack_size];			\
>   	char	VC2_stack_guard[guardsize];			\
>   	char	VC2_stack[optional_stack_size];			\
> +	char	HV_stack_guard[guardsize];			\
> +	char	HV_stack[optional_stack_size];			\
> +	char	HV2_stack_guard[guardsize];			\
> +	char	HV2_stack[optional_stack_size];			\
>   	char	IST_top_guard[guardsize];			\
>   
>   /* The exception stacks' physical storage. No guard pages required */
> @@ -52,6 +56,8 @@ enum exception_stack_ordering {
>   	ESTACK_MCE,
>   	ESTACK_VC,
>   	ESTACK_VC2,
> +	ESTACK_HV,
> +	ESTACK_HV2,
>   	N_EXCEPTION_STACKS
>   };
>   
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
> index b241af4ce9b4..b0f3501b2767 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
> @@ -317,6 +317,19 @@ static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
>   	__visible noinstr void kernel_##func(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code);	\
>   	__visible noinstr void   user_##func(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
>   
> +
> +/**
> + * DECLARE_IDTENTRY_HV - Declare functions for the HV entry point
> + * @vector:	Vector number (ignored for C)
> + * @func:	Function name of the entry point
> + *
> + * Maps to DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW, but declares also the user C handler.
> + */
> +#define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_HV(vector, func)				\
> +	DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(vector, func);			\
> +	__visible noinstr void kernel_##func(struct pt_regs *regs);	\
> +	__visible noinstr void   user_##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +
>   /**
>    * DEFINE_IDTENTRY_IST - Emit code for IST entry points
>    * @func:	Function name of the entry point
> @@ -376,6 +389,26 @@ static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
>   #define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_USER(func)				\
>   	DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(user_##func)
>   
> +/**
> + * DEFINE_IDTENTRY_HV_KERNEL - Emit code for HV injection handler
> + *			       when raised from kernel mode
> + * @func:	Function name of the entry point
> + *
> + * Maps to DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW
> + */
> +#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_HV_KERNEL(func)					\
> +	DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(kernel_##func)
> +
> +/**
> + * DEFINE_IDTENTRY_HV_USER - Emit code for HV injection handler
> + *			     when raised from user mode
> + * @func:	Function name of the entry point
> + *
> + * Maps to DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW
> + */
> +#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_HV_USER(func)					\
> +	DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(user_##func)
> +
>   #else	/* CONFIG_X86_64 */
>   
>   /**
> @@ -463,8 +496,10 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs,			\
>   	DECLARE_IDTENTRY(vector, func)
>   
>   # define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC(vector, func)				\
> -	idtentry_vc vector asm_##func func
> +	idtentry_sev vector asm_##func func has_error_code=1
>   
> +# define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_HV(vector, func)				\
> +	idtentry_sev vector asm_##func func has_error_code=0
>   #else
>   # define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_MCE(vector, func)				\
>   	DECLARE_IDTENTRY(vector, func)
> @@ -618,9 +653,10 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_DF,	xenpv_exc_double_fault);
>   DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_CP,	exc_control_protection);
>   #endif
>   
> -/* #VC */
> +/* #VC & #HV */
>   #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>   DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC(X86_TRAP_VC,	exc_vmm_communication);
> +DECLARE_IDTENTRY_HV(X86_TRAP_HV,	exc_hv_injection);
>   #endif
>   
>   #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
> index e9e2c3ba5923..0bd7dab676c5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
>   #define	IST_INDEX_DB		2
>   #define	IST_INDEX_MCE		3
>   #define	IST_INDEX_VC		4
> +#define	IST_INDEX_HV		5
>   
>   /*
>    * Set __PAGE_OFFSET to the most negative possible address +
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/trapnr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/trapnr.h
> index f5d2325aa0b7..c6583631cecb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/trapnr.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/trapnr.h
> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
>   #define X86_TRAP_XF		19	/* SIMD Floating-Point Exception */
>   #define X86_TRAP_VE		20	/* Virtualization Exception */
>   #define X86_TRAP_CP		21	/* Control Protection Exception */
> +#define X86_TRAP_HV		28	/* HV injected exception in SNP restricted mode */
>   #define X86_TRAP_VC		29	/* VMM Communication Exception */
>   #define X86_TRAP_IRET		32	/* IRET Exception */
>   
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> index 47ecfff2c83d..6795d3e517d6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible notrace
>   struct pt_regs *fixup_bad_iret(struct pt_regs *bad_regs);
>   void __init trap_init(void);
>   asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *eregs);
> +asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *hv_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *eregs);
>   #endif
>   
>   extern bool ibt_selftest(void);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> index 8cd4126d8253..5bc44bcf6e48 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -2172,6 +2172,7 @@ static inline void tss_setup_ist(struct tss_struct *tss)
>   	tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_MCE] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(MCE);
>   	/* Only mapped when SEV-ES is active */
>   	tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC);
> +	tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_HV] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(HV);
>   }
>   
>   #else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
> index f05339fee778..6d8f8864810c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
> @@ -26,11 +26,14 @@ static const char * const exception_stack_names[] = {
>   		[ ESTACK_MCE	]	= "#MC",
>   		[ ESTACK_VC	]	= "#VC",
>   		[ ESTACK_VC2	]	= "#VC2",
> +		[ ESTACK_HV	]	= "#HV",
> +		[ ESTACK_HV2	]	= "#HV2",
> +		
>   };
>   
>   const char *stack_type_name(enum stack_type type)
>   {
> -	BUILD_BUG_ON(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS != 6);
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS != 8);
>   
>   	if (type == STACK_TYPE_TASK)
>   		return "TASK";
> @@ -89,6 +92,8 @@ struct estack_pages estack_pages[CEA_ESTACK_PAGES] ____cacheline_aligned = {
>   	EPAGERANGE(MCE),
>   	EPAGERANGE(VC),
>   	EPAGERANGE(VC2),
> +	EPAGERANGE(HV),
> +	EPAGERANGE(HV2),
>   };
>   
>   static __always_inline bool in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
> @@ -98,7 +103,7 @@ static __always_inline bool in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stac
>   	struct pt_regs *regs;
>   	unsigned int k;
>   
> -	BUILD_BUG_ON(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS != 6);
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS != 8);
>   
>   	begin = (unsigned long)__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks);
>   	/*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
> index a58c6bc1cd68..48c0a7e1dbcb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
> @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
>   
>   #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>   	ISTG(X86_TRAP_VC,		asm_exc_vmm_communication, IST_INDEX_VC),
> +	ISTG(X86_TRAP_HV,		asm_exc_hv_injection, IST_INDEX_HV),
>   #endif
>   
>   	SYSG(X86_TRAP_OF,		asm_exc_overflow),
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> index 20f3fd8ade2f..7b06d7c0914f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> @@ -2006,6 +2006,59 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_USER(exc_vmm_communication)
>   	irqentry_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
>   }
>   
> +static bool hv_raw_handle_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
> +static __always_inline bool on_hv_fallback_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{

Don't see this functioned used yet?

> +	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)regs;
> +
> +	return (sp >= __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(HV2) && sp < __this_cpu_ist_top_va(HV2));
> +}
> +
> +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_HV_USER(exc_hv_injection)
> +{
> +	irqentry_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
> +	instrumentation_begin();
> +
> +	if (!hv_raw_handle_exception(regs)) {
> +		/*
> +		 * Do not kill the machine if user-space triggered the
> +		 * exception. Send SIGBUS instead and let user-space deal
> +		 * with it.
> +		 */
> +		force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_OBJERR, (void __user *)0);
> +	}
> +
> +	instrumentation_end();
> +	irqentry_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
> +}
> +
> +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_HV_KERNEL(exc_hv_injection)
> +{
> +	irqentry_state_t irq_state;
> +
> +	irq_state = irqentry_enter(regs);

Any reason for not using "irqentry_nmi_enter" here?
We are dispatching both irqs & NMI's right?

Thanks,
Pankaj
> +	instrumentation_begin();
> +
> +	if (!hv_raw_handle_exception(regs)) {
> +		pr_emerg("PANIC: Unhandled #HV exception in kernel space\n");
> +
> +		/* Show some debug info */
> +		show_regs(regs);
> +
> +		/* Ask hypervisor to sev_es_terminate */
> +		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ);
> +
> +		panic("Returned from Terminate-Request to Hypervisor\n");
> +	}
> +
> +	instrumentation_end();
> +	irqentry_exit(regs, irq_state);
> +}
> +
>   bool __init handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs)
>   {
>   	unsigned long exit_code = regs->orig_ax;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> index d317dc3d06a3..d29debec8134 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> @@ -905,6 +905,46 @@ asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *r
>   
>   	return regs_ret;
>   }
> +
> +asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *hv_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *regs) > +{
> +	unsigned long sp, *stack;
> +	struct stack_info info;
> +	struct pt_regs *regs_ret;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * In the SYSCALL entry path the RSP value comes from user-space - don't
> +	 * trust it and switch to the current kernel stack
> +	 */
> +	if (ip_within_syscall_gap(regs)) {
> +		sp = this_cpu_read(pcpu_hot.top_of_stack);
> +		goto sync;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * From here on the RSP value is trusted. Now check whether entry
> +	 * happened from a safe stack. Not safe are the entry or unknown stacks,
> +	 * use the fall-back stack instead in this case.
> +	 */
> +	sp    = regs->sp;
> +	stack = (unsigned long *)sp;
> +
> +	if (!get_stack_info_noinstr(stack, current, &info) || info.type == STACK_TYPE_ENTRY ||
> +	    info.type > STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION_LAST)
> +		sp = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(HV2);
> +sync:
> +	/*
> +	 * Found a safe stack - switch to it as if the entry didn't happen via
> +	 * IST stack. The code below only copies pt_regs, the real switch happens
> +	 * in assembly code.
> +	 */
> +	sp = ALIGN_DOWN(sp, 8) - sizeof(*regs_ret);
> +
> +	regs_ret = (struct pt_regs *)sp;
> +	*regs_ret = *regs;
> +
> +	return regs_ret;
> +}
>   #endif
>   
>   asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *fixup_bad_iret(struct pt_regs *bad_regs)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
> index e91500a80963..97554fa0ff30 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
> @@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ static void __init percpu_setup_exception_stacks(unsigned int cpu)
>   		if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) {
>   			cea_map_stack(VC);
>   			cea_map_stack(VC2);
> +			cea_map_stack(HV);
> +			cea_map_stack(HV2);
>   		}
>   	}
>   }


  reply	other threads:[~2023-05-05 11:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-01  8:57 [RFC PATCH V5 00/15] x86/hyperv/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 01/15] x86/hyperv: Add sev-snp enlightened guest static key Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 02/15] x86/hyperv: Decrypt hv vp assist page in sev-snp enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01 15:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 03/15] x86/hyperv: Set Virtual Trust Level in VMBus init message Tianyu Lan
2023-05-02 19:30   ` Zhi Wang
2023-05-04 15:38     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-05-04 15:58       ` Zhi Wang
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 04/15] x86/hyperv: Use vmmcall to implement Hyper-V hypercall in sev-snp enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 05/15] clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: decrypt hyperv tsc page " Tianyu Lan
2023-05-04 16:54   ` Zhi Wang
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 06/15] hv: vmbus: decrypt VMBus pages for " Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 07/15] drivers: hv: Decrypt percpu hvcall input arg page in " Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 08/15] x86/hyperv: Initialize cpu and memory for " Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 09/15] x86/hyperv: Add smp support for sev-snp guest Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01 10:20   ` [EXTERNAL] " Saurabh Singh Sengar
2023-05-04 15:55     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01 10:32   ` Saurabh Singh Sengar
2023-05-01 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2023-05-04 15:51     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 10/15] x86/hyperv: Add hyperv-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 11/15] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler Tianyu Lan
2023-05-05 10:59   ` Gupta, Pankaj [this message]
2023-05-11 13:25     ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 12/15] x86/sev: Add Check of #HV event in path Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 13/15] x86/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 14/15] x86/sev: optimize system vector processing invoked from #HV exception Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01  8:57 ` [RFC PATCH V5 15/15] x86/sev: Fix interrupt exit code paths " Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01 16:02   ` Tom Lendacky
2023-05-04 22:41     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-05-01 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH V5 00/15] x86/hyperv/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv Tom Lendacky

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