From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751887AbeDYKiN (ORCPT ); Wed, 25 Apr 2018 06:38:13 -0400 Received: from mout.kundenserver.de ([212.227.126.187]:50205 "EHLO mout.kundenserver.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751451AbeDYKiH (ORCPT ); Wed, 25 Apr 2018 06:38:07 -0400 Subject: Re: [PATCH] p9caps: add Plan9 capability devices To: Richard Weinberger , "Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult" Cc: LKML References: <40d4c871-a16a-7b8f-2d4a-422a5a490693@infradead.org> <20180211215028.16210-1-metux@gmx.de> <20180211215028.16210-2-metux@gmx.de> From: Enrico Weigelt Organization: metux IT consult Message-ID: <3ffb5399-46b8-7279-fda2-2ca5b40c04d3@metux.net> Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2018 12:38:02 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686 on x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:YJApcYarjUecWghVs6AzDz/lfOLHLEAIma5jn73ju50QxgKsCZF hT36GfO8W1qncJSzPqnqYRZzj22brOIu5WdxtnK1NwG2UuPrZCp/xzOYBCyYjsIUgFS80yh qMRkLQ+S4TKxNd5AZAjULRsse+0jDYwJjYNs5jmzCN2mYhjeH/oIMKof4IoUgut/5hra136 krNmoRn2cUoT21kZZxSKw== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V01:K0:o8ZhzSKPCiM=:ELdtN1Z0JXDY/zlYbSV8Lh llx4n16qQ3UqMXWFxZdlcrzcFP+Sy2eZa4SjSVbwZ1zO5ku4LhOXHazkxXia263pX685OVvta 1UirY92j+glmNYx6j+zKpJ6ucxTaPnh78eZ9ShATYLWAnnRKQ1r5sdEwEF9KVitDXSHbn5FoG 5R4d3hy5CEdukRVayrGC/aGtvwy79T7r/d1wnwXiPvHflM4T5mkRzfw/HdCPHKbb70l5GTYj4 0wVov4VYNi7xfs/j/FX0aoHxiQ3IERRBlK7OFsJL2Dz8VNpoSH39PhmhUo42RS+fD5cQKYef7 1fvvBbE0q9+8OGPZM2r3pcxDNcDt6VsfNDbqVzjgTqDNb7Q0AZ+W66PYNNaij4ypC4WqIKIZ6 m4DuoMQBxzEU62XyLELGS3WdLHE5EfIB+mwv0JOV78e00Va0zVEQ1xDDThLazuarklYltiC6h aUBsrcMIpEXGMOPLl8gpe/iPHyoaACEawHRjy5biVEasphHdQrjokPaRRsDTrBtiO0dfTBmNA nZkTZeTbON1s/WgOM71XpV+L87B5dDFYZVz4dLwwz7WzeeOLm3RJZi8guyD/vgaIu0z9zoA74 8zr6bSoXj1Rn4k6wfjgPuBDFRnUXEs9fMlYax8pzHBI0lnlHZ4XbxFat84bpEUZ0wkjHuEOwP uOwjyfFym0RbxriyPVbK/Udh01uNR7dIHn53xQfdo5JLdHuGxiUPLg0Az4OxGi2zDbbJ0ZAGo o/vFC8MDe8sJ5x6xXZ6SzcoKt+TxCYdLE8P7AruYOV4I6CKq2FWU50nh4bQ= Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 17.02.2018 23:11, Richard Weinberger wrote: Hi, >> +static LIST_HEAD(caphash_writers); >> +>> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);>> +>> +struct crypto_ahash *hmac_tfm = NULL;>> +>> +static int caphash_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)>> +{>> + struct caphash_writer *tmp = NULL;>> + struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();>> + int retval = 0;>> + struct list_head *pos, *q;>> +>> + /* make sure only one instance per namespace can be opened */>> + mutex_lock(&lock);>> +>> + list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &(caphash_writers)) {>> + tmp = list_entry(pos, struct caphash_writer, list);>> + if (tmp->user_ns == user_ns) {>> + pr_err("already locked in this namespace\n");> > So, evil guy opens the device but does not close it, therefore the > whole service is blocked in a namespace? Yes, exactly as specified. There may be only one host factotum running, which can create caps. It's an important security feature. > In general, I think we should open that device in > kernel_init_freeable() and hand over the fd to init/systemd. That would require an customized init and factotum, and wouldn't be Plan9 compatible. >> +static int caphash_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) >> +{ >> + int retval = 0; >> + struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); > > Why not obtaining the user namespace from the open file? > That way one can close a caphash file hande she never opened. > Think of open, followed by nsenter, ... hmm, good point. >> + list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &(caphash_writers)) { >> + tmp = list_entry(pos, struct caphash_entry, list); > > list_for_each_entry. what's the exact difference ? >> +static ssize_t capuse_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, >> + size_t count, loff_t *f_pos) >> +{ >> + ssize_t retval = count; >> + char *rand_str, *src_uname, *dst_uname; >> + u8 hashval[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 }; >> + char *cmdbuf; >> + >> + if (!(cmdbuf = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL))) > > count is unbound, please apply a limit check. ok. >> + { >> + char *walk = cmdbuf; > > cmdbuf is toxic, make sure it is at least nul-terminated. ok. >> + if (hmac_tfm) > > IS_ERR()? Otherwise you free a error value, if crypto_alloc_ahash() fails. ok --mtx -- Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult Free software and Linux embedded engineering info@metux.net -- +49-151-27565287