mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [Patch v7 04/18] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 16:08:43 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <40733266e3484cbd576d84b67dd98f9f8769d2e3.1542758656.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542758656.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542758656.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>

STIBP is not needed when enhanced IBRS is used for Spectre V2 mitigation.
A CPU feature flag to indicate that enhanced IBRS is used will be handy
for skipping STIBP for this case.

Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED feature bit to indicate
enhanced IBRS is used for Spectre V2 mitigation.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c         | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 28c4a50..fe8e064 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_ZEN			( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV		( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
 #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED	( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */
+#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED	( 7*32+31) /* "" Enhanced IBRS enabled */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW		( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 91a754a..3a6f13b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 			/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
 			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
 			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
 			goto specv2_set_mode;
 		}
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
-- 
2.9.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-21  0:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-21  0:08 [Patch v7 00/18] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 01/18] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 02/18] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 03/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 05/18] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 06/18] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 07/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 08/18] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 09/18] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-21 13:38   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 10/18] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-11-21 13:33   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 11/18] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 12/18] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 13/18] x86/speculation: Enable IBPB for tasks with TIF_SPEC_BRANCH_SPECULATION Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 14/18] x86/speculation: Add 'seccomp' Spectre v2 app to app protection mode Tim Chen
2018-11-21 13:52   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 18:16     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-21 22:29   ` Tim Chen
2018-11-21 22:39     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 15/18] security: Update speculation restriction of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 16/18] x86/speculation: Use STIBP to restrict speculation on non-dumpable task Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 17/18] sched/smt: Make sched_smt_present track topology Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:08 ` [Patch v7 18/18] x86/smt: Allow disabling of SMT when last SMT is offlined Tim Chen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=40733266e3484cbd576d84b67dd98f9f8769d2e3.1542758656.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com \
    --to=tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
    --cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=arjan@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=asit.k.mallick@intel.com \
    --cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=david.c.stewart@intel.com \
    --cc=dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=jcm@redhat.com \
    --cc=jikos@kernel.org \
    --cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=longman9394@gmail.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

Powered by JetHome