mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: <simon.guinot@sequanux.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	<matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>, <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linus.walleij@linaro.org>, <gary.hook@amd.com>,
	<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>,
	<hpa@zytor.com>, <cl@linux.com>, <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	<aarcange@redhat.com>, <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
	<andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	<herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>, <bhe@redhat.com>,
	<xemul@parallels.com>, <joro@8bytes.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	<peterz@infradead.org>, <piotr.luc@intel.com>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
	<msalter@redhat.com>, <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>,
	<dyoung@redhat.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>, <keescook@chromium.org>,
	<arnd@arndb.de>, <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	<mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>, <luto@kernel.org>,
	<devel@linuxdriverproject.org>, <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	<tglx@linutronix.de>, <mchehab@kernel.org>,
	<iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>, <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	<tony.luck@intel.com>, <alexandre.bounine@idt.com>,
	<kuleshovmail@gmail.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<mcgrof@kernel.org>, <mst@redhat.com>,
	<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, <tj@kernel.org>,
	<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	<davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 15:04:42 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <413f12e9-818a-745d-374b-3dbc439e972c@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170307145954.l2fqy5s5h65wbtyz@pd.tnic>

On 3/7/2017 8:59 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:13:32AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>
>> In order for memory pages to be properly mapped when SEV is active, we
>> need to use the PAGE_KERNEL protection attribute as the base protection.
>> This will insure that memory mapping of, e.g. ACPI tables, receives the
>> proper mapping attributes.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> index c400ab5..481c999 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> @@ -151,7 +151,15 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>>                 pcm = new_pcm;
>>         }
>>
>> +       /*
>> +        * If the page being mapped is in memory and SEV is active then
>> +        * make sure the memory encryption attribute is enabled in the
>> +        * resulting mapping.
>> +        */
>>         prot = PAGE_KERNEL_IO;
>> +       if (sev_active() && page_is_mem(pfn))
>
> Hmm, a resource tree walk per ioremap call. This could get expensive for
> ioremap-heavy workloads.
>
> __ioremap_caller() gets called here during boot 55 times so not a whole
> lot but I wouldn't be surprised if there were some nasty use cases which
> ioremap a lot.
>
> ...
>
>> diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c
>> index 9b5f044..db56ba3 100644
>> --- a/kernel/resource.c
>> +++ b/kernel/resource.c
>> @@ -518,6 +518,46 @@ int __weak page_is_ram(unsigned long pfn)
>>  }
>>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(page_is_ram);
>>
>> +/*
>> + * This function returns true if the target memory is marked as
>> + * IORESOURCE_MEM and IORESOUCE_BUSY and described as other than
>> + * IORES_DESC_NONE (e.g. IORES_DESC_ACPI_TABLES).
>> + */
>> +static int walk_mem_range(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages)
>> +{
>> +	struct resource res;
>> +	unsigned long pfn, end_pfn;
>> +	u64 orig_end;
>> +	int ret = -1;
>> +
>> +	res.start = (u64) start_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
>> +	res.end = ((u64)(start_pfn + nr_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT) - 1;
>> +	res.flags = IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
>> +	orig_end = res.end;
>> +	while ((res.start < res.end) &&
>> +		(find_next_iomem_res(&res, IORES_DESC_NONE, true) >= 0)) {
>> +		pfn = (res.start + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> +		end_pfn = (res.end + 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> +		if (end_pfn > pfn)
>> +			ret = (res.desc != IORES_DESC_NONE) ? 1 : 0;
>> +		if (ret)
>> +			break;
>> +		res.start = res.end + 1;
>> +		res.end = orig_end;
>> +	}
>> +	return ret;
>> +}
>
> So the relevant difference between this one and walk_system_ram_range()
> is this:
>
> -			ret = (*func)(pfn, end_pfn - pfn, arg);
> +			ret = (res.desc != IORES_DESC_NONE) ? 1 : 0;
>
> so it seems to me you can have your own *func() pointer which does that
> IORES_DESC_NONE comparison. And then you can define your own workhorse
> __walk_memory_range() which gets called by both walk_mem_range() and
> walk_system_ram_range() instead of almost duplicating them.
>
> And looking at walk_system_ram_res(), that one looks similar too except
> the pfn computation. But AFAICT the pfn/end_pfn things are computed from
> res.start and res.end so it looks to me like all those three functions
> are crying for unification...

I'll take a look at what it takes to consolidate these with a pre-patch. 
Then I'll add the new support.

Thanks,
Tom

>

  reply	other threads:[~2017-03-16 20:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 94+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-02 15:12 [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/32] x86: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:01     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-04 10:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 18:11         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 20:54           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/32] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/32] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07  0:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/32] x86: Use encrypted access of BOOT related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 19:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:42   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 21:15     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07  0:03       ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-13 20:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/32] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 14:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 20:04     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-03-17 14:32       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/32] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08  8:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/32] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 10:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/32] x86: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/32] x86: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 14:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:13     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 16:35         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:16           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 14:28             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 15:09               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:11                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:29                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 19:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 11:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 22:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 13:15       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 12:28   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/32] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-03-24 17:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-27 15:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-28 18:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:21     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:32       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/32] x86: kvmclock: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 15:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 17:08     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/32] crypto: ccp: Introduce the AMD Secure Processor device Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 17:39   ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-02 19:11     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 13:55       ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/32] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/32] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/32] kvm: svm: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/32] kvm: introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:25   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:33   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:48   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:54   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-17 11:09       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:03   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:34     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 31/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/32] x86: kvm: Pin the guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:38   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:17     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:15   ` Brijesh Singh

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=413f12e9-818a-745d-374b-3dbc439e972c@amd.com \
    --to=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=alexandre.bounine@idt.com \
    --cc=andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=bhe@redhat.com \
    --cc=bhelgaas@google.com \
    --cc=bp@suse.de \
    --cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=cl@linux.com \
    --cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=devel@linuxdriverproject.org \
    --cc=dyoung@redhat.com \
    --cc=gary.hook@amd.com \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=jroedel@suse.de \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kuleshovmail@gmail.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=labbott@fedoraproject.org \
    --cc=linus.walleij@linaro.org \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-pci@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
    --cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
    --cc=mcgrof@kernel.org \
    --cc=mchehab@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=msalter@redhat.com \
    --cc=mst@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul.gortmaker@windriver.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=piotr.luc@intel.com \
    --cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
    --cc=ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=sfr@canb.auug.org.au \
    --cc=simon.guinot@sequanux.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=tj@kernel.org \
    --cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
    --cc=toshi.kani@hpe.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=xemul@parallels.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

Powered by JetHome