From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: jacob.pan@linux.microsoft.com, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>,
Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>,
Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, security@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] iommu/sva: Invalidate KVA range on kernel TLB flush
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2025 11:22:34 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <42c500b8-6ffb-4793-85c0-d3fbae0116f1@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250709111527.5ba9bc31@DESKTOP-0403QTC.>
On 7/9/25 11:15, Jacob Pan wrote:
>>> Is there a use case where a SVA user can access kernel memory in the
>>> first place?
>> No. It should be fully blocked.
>>
> Then I don't understand what is the "vulnerability condition" being
> addressed here. We are talking about KVA range here.
SVA users can't access kernel memory, but they can compel walks of
kernel page tables, which the IOMMU caches. The trouble starts if the
kernel happens to free that page table page and the IOMMU is using the
cache after the page is freed.
That was covered in the changelog, but I guess it could be made a bit
more succinct.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-09 18:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-04 13:30 Lu Baolu
2025-07-04 13:38 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-07-05 3:50 ` Baolu Lu
2025-07-05 9:06 ` Vasant Hegde
2025-07-08 5:42 ` Baolu Lu
2025-07-08 12:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-07-08 14:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-07-09 1:25 ` Baolu Lu
2025-07-09 15:51 ` Jacob Pan
2025-07-09 16:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-07-09 18:15 ` Jacob Pan
2025-07-09 18:22 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2025-07-09 18:44 ` Jacob Pan
2025-07-09 18:54 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-07-14 12:39 ` David Laight
2025-07-14 13:19 ` Uladzislau Rezki
2025-07-14 14:50 ` Mike Rapoport
2025-07-15 0:05 ` Tian, Kevin
2025-07-15 1:19 ` Baolu Lu
2025-07-10 2:57 ` Baolu Lu
2025-07-10 15:28 ` Jacob Pan
2025-07-10 15:35 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-07-11 14:36 ` Dave Hansen
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