From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 41F70E95A82 for ; Sun, 8 Oct 2023 09:37:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1344573AbjJHJhu (ORCPT ); Sun, 8 Oct 2023 05:37:50 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:39800 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230441AbjJHJht (ORCPT ); Sun, 8 Oct 2023 05:37:49 -0400 Received: from mgamail.intel.com (mgamail.intel.com [198.175.65.9]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 21144B6; Sun, 8 Oct 2023 02:37:48 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1696757867; x=1728293867; h=message-id:date:mime-version:subject:to:cc:references: from:in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding; bh=pZl858y3jcWEECXn8DCK3d9ymq7qvurpMSIhAHEG+Ws=; b=Hul6q5fIpFVoCdtSOGj6LhsGsY027gVvz5kgWWDI1z45uRBaRhw6aAGa Lr9EADwAFweZfvqIt91+7NvhJFGo8a2fqRIdMn0yB8MXZ31NOQejg/nKQ pG8xqlSIsvwR168xEPJM8U3xwxhwWv7hfUSZ/Gvih7paL/9iaYDmmahti Ua2qDLLZl+upToNWKzwKuv4Q1TScfCqRK8Q/3Pqi43oRiIea7p5b/3zIh Dn8vPejBuoLW5MzjSR5lawsGky6ZInQOWMn5SXOzNT7R1V1QNOv7Lb7Ex oZ4USezCUx2uX0ieBHU4UG9P/9WjFCRiG95gSTY6Wjojrk9n1OX5F3Far w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10856"; a="2591576" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.03,207,1694761200"; d="scan'208";a="2591576" Received: from fmsmga004.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.48]) by orvoesa101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Oct 2023 02:37:46 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10856"; a="823023975" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.03,207,1694761200"; d="scan'208";a="823023975" Received: from binbinwu-mobl.ccr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.93.2.44]) ([10.93.2.44]) by fmsmga004-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 Oct 2023 02:37:44 -0700 Message-ID: <46b73aa3-4776-8d95-b3f4-c2ddf4f0696c@linux.intel.com> Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2023 17:37:42 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/102.15.1 Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 00/16] LAM and LASS KVM Enabling To: seanjc@google.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, chao.gao@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com, David.Laight@ACULAB.COM, robert.hu@linux.intel.com, guang.zeng@intel.com References: <20230913124227.12574-1-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> From: Binbin Wu In-Reply-To: <20230913124227.12574-1-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi Sean, Does this version of LAM patch set have the chance to be pulled for 6.7? On 9/13/2023 8:42 PM, Binbin Wu wrote: > This patch series includes KVM enabling patches for Linear-address masking > (LAM) v11 and Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) v3 since the two features > have overlapping prep work and concepts. Sent as a single series to reduce the > probability of conflicts. > > The patch series is organized as follows: > - Patch 1-4: Common prep work for both LAM and LASS. > - Patch 5-13: LAM part. > - Patch 14-16: LASS part. > > Dependency: > - LAM has no other dependency. > - LASS patches depends on LASS kernel enabling patches, which are not merged yet. > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/ > > > ==== LAM v11 ==== > > Linear-address masking (LAM) [1], modifies the checking that is applied to > *64-bit* linear addresses, allowing software to use of the untranslated > address bits for metadata and masks the metadata bits before using them as > linear addresses to access memory. > > When the feature is virtualized and exposed to guest, it can be used for > efficient address sanitizers (ASAN) implementation and for optimizations in > JITs and virtual machines. > > The patch series brings LAM virtualization support in KVM. > > Please review and consider applying. > > LAM QEMU patch: > https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2023-07/msg04160.html > > LAM kvm-unit-tests patch: > https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20230530024356.24870-1-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com/ > > --- Test --- > 1. Add test cases in kvm-unit-test for LAM [2], including LAM_SUP and LAM_{U57,U48}. > For supervisor pointers, the test covers CR4 LAM_SUP bits toggle, Memory/MMIO > access with tagged pointer, and some special instructions (INVLPG, INVPCID, > INVVPID), INVVPID cases also used to cover VMX instruction VMExit path. > For user pointers, the test covers CR3 LAM bits toggle, Memory/MMIO access with > tagged pointer. > MMIO cases are used to trigger instruction emulation path. > Run the unit test with both LAM feature on/off (i.e. including negative cases). > Run the unit test in L1 guest with both LAM feature on/off. > 2. Run Kernel LAM kselftests in guest, with both EPT=Y/N. > 3. Launch a nested guest and run tests listed in 1 & 2. > > All tests have passed on real machine supporting LAM. > > [1] Intel ISE https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368 > Chapter Linear Address Masking (LAM) > [2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20230530024356.24870-1-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com/ > > ---------- > Changelog > > v11: > - A separate patch to drop non-PA bits when getting GFN for guest's PGD [Sean] > - Add a patch to remove kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa() [Isaku] > - Squash CR4 LAM bit handling with the address untag for supervisor pointers. [Sean] > - Squash CR3 LAM bits handling with the address untag for user pointers. [Sean] > - Adopt KVM-governed feature framework to track "LAM enabled" as a separate > optimization patch, and add the reason in patch change log. [Sean, Kai] > - Some comment modifications/additions according to reviews [Sean] > > v10: > https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20230719144131.29052-1-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com/ > > > ==== LASS v3 ==== > > Linear Address Space Separation (LASS)[1] is a new mechanism that > enforces the same mode-based protections as paging, i.e. SMAP/SMEP > but without traversing the paging structures. Because the protections > enforced by LASS are applied before paging, "probes" by malicious > software will provide no paging-based timing information. > > This patch series provide a LASS KVM solution and depends on kernel > enabling that can be found at [2]. > > --- Test --- > 1. Test the basic function of LASS virtualization including LASS > enumeration and enabling in guest and nested environment. > 2. Run selftest with following cases: > - data access to user address space in supervisor mode > - data access to supervisor address space in user mode > - data access to linear address across space boundary > - Using KVM FEP mechanism to run test cases above > - VMX instruction execution with VMCS structure in user > address space > - instruction fetch from user address space in supervisor mode > - instruction fetch from supervisor address space in user mode > > All tests have passed on real machine supporting LASS. > > [1] Intel ISE spec https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368 > Chapter Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) > > [2] LASS kernel patch series > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/ > > ---------- > Change log > > v3: > 1. Refine commit message [Sean/Chao Gao] > 2. Enhance the implementation of LASS violation check [Sean] > 3. Re-organize patch as Sean's suggestion [Sean] > > v2: > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230719024558.8539-1-guang.zeng@intel.com/ > > > Binbin Wu (10): > KVM: x86: Consolidate flags for __linearize() > KVM: x86: Use a new flag for branch targets > KVM: x86: Add an emulation flag for implicit system access > KVM: x86: Add X86EMUL_F_INVLPG and pass it in em_invlpg() > KVM: x86/mmu: Drop non-PA bits when getting GFN for guest's PGD > KVM: x86: Add & use kvm_vcpu_is_legal_cr3() to check CR3's legality > KVM: x86: Remove kvm_vcpu_is_illegal_gpa() > KVM: x86: Introduce get_untagged_addr() in kvm_x86_ops and call it in > emulator > KVM: x86: Untag address for vmexit handlers when LAM applicable > KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "LAM enabled" > > Robert Hoo (3): > KVM: x86: Virtualize LAM for supervisor pointer > KVM: x86: Virtualize LAM for user pointer > KVM: x86: Advertise and enable LAM (user and supervisor) > > Zeng Guang (3): > KVM: emulator: Add emulation of LASS violation checks on linear > address > KVM: VMX: Virtualize LASS > KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space > > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 4 +- > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 8 ++- > arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 +- > arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 13 ++-- > arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 39 +++++++---- > arch/x86/kvm/governed_features.h | 1 + > arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 13 ++++ > arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 8 +++ > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 2 +- > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 1 + > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 2 +- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 4 +- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 14 ++-- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 4 +- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 5 ++ > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 28 +++++++- > arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 4 ++ > 18 files changed, 226 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) > > > base-commit: 0bb80ecc33a8fb5a682236443c1e740d5c917d1d > prerequisite-patch-id: 51db36ad7156234d05f8c4004ec6a31ef609b81a