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From: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
To: "Russell King (Oracle)" <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: <ardb@kernel.org>, <arnd@arndb.de>, <afd@ti.com>,
	<akpm@linux-foundation.org>, <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
	<eric.devolder@oracle.com>, <robh@kernel.org>, <kees@kernel.org>,
	<masahiroy@kernel.org>, <palmer@rivosinc.com>,
	<samitolvanen@google.com>, <xiao.w.wang@intel.com>,
	<alexghiti@rivosinc.com>, <nathan@kernel.org>,
	<jan.kiszka@siemens.com>, <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] ARM: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin
Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2024 09:35:21 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <46dd8990-df35-5044-7ab3-e1acb04de85f@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZqzHNN27hwms0CB/@shell.armlinux.org.uk>



On 2024/8/2 19:47, Russell King (Oracle) wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 10:53:10AM +0800, Jinjie Ruan wrote:
>> Gentle ping.
>>
>> On 2024/6/24 10:36, Jinjie Ruan wrote:
>>> Add the STACKLEAK gcc plugin to arm32 by adding the helper used by
>>> stackleak common code: on_thread_stack(). It initialize the stack with the
>>> poison value before returning from system calls which improves the kernel
>>> security. Additionally, this disables the plugin in EFI stub code and
>>> decompress code, which are out of scope for the protection.
>>>
>>> Before the test on Qemu versatilepb board:
>>> 	# echo STACKLEAK_ERASING  > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
>>> 	lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
>>> 	lkdtm: XFAIL: stackleak is not supported on this arch (HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK=n)
>>>
>>> After:
>>> 	# echo STACKLEAK_ERASING  > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
>>> 	lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
>>> 	lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
>>> 	  high offset: 80 bytes
>>> 	  current:     280 bytes
>>> 	  lowest:      696 bytes
>>> 	  tracked:     696 bytes
>>> 	  untracked:   192 bytes
>>> 	  poisoned:    7220 bytes
>>> 	  low offset:  4 bytes
>>> 	lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
>>> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> 
> Is this a feature that you have a use case for?

Yes, We have ARM32 products internally, and there is a need for security
hardening.

> 

      reply	other threads:[~2024-08-05  1:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-06-24  2:36 Jinjie Ruan
2024-06-24  7:30 ` Linus Walleij
2024-06-27  7:53   ` Jinjie Ruan
2024-06-27 17:02     ` Kees Cook
2024-07-22  2:53 ` Jinjie Ruan
2024-07-29 11:12   ` Russell King (Oracle)
2024-07-29 11:24     ` Jinjie Ruan
2024-08-02 11:47   ` Russell King (Oracle)
2024-08-05  1:35     ` Jinjie Ruan [this message]

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