From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org, peterz@infradead.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
David.Kaplan@amd.com, bp@alien8.de, mingo@kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, regressions@leemhuis.info,
Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usage
Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 16:19:09 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <47e5f0a7-e3ee-79c8-7460-2c67cf9960cc@pengutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1de1ace90f1645fc629c075826aa67eda8dfd138.camel@kernel.org>
Hello Jarkko,
On 10.10.23 15:49, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, 2023-10-10 at 18:44 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
>> On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 at 18:03, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Fri, 2023-10-06 at 10:48 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
>>>> Static calls invocations aren't well supported from module __init and
>>>> __exit functions. Especially the static call from cleanup_trusted() led
>>>> to a crash on x86 kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y.
>>>>
>>>> However, the usage of static call invocations for trusted_key_init()
>>>> and trusted_key_exit() don't add any value from either a performance or
>>>> security perspective. Hence switch to use indirect function calls instead.
>>>>
>>>> Note here that although it will fix the current crash report, ultimately
>>>> the static call infrastructure should be fixed to either support its
>>>> future usage from module __init and __exit functions or not.
>>>>
>>>> Reported-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
>>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZRhKq6e5nF%2F4ZIV1@fedora/#t
>>>> Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
>>>> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
>>>> ---
>>>>
>>>> Changes in v2:
>>>> - Polish commit message as per comments from Mimi
>>>>
>>>> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 13 +++++--------
>>>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
>>>> index c6fc50d67214..85fb5c22529a 100644
>>>> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
>>>> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
>>>> @@ -44,13 +44,12 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
>>>> #endif
>>>> };
>>>>
>>>> -DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init);
>>>> DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_seal, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->seal);
>>>> DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_unseal,
>>>> *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->unseal);
>>>> DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_get_random,
>>>> *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->get_random);
>>>> -DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_exit, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->exit);
>>>> +static void (*trusted_key_exit)(void);
>>>> static unsigned char migratable;
>>>>
>>>> enum {
>>>> @@ -359,19 +358,16 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
>>>> if (!get_random)
>>>> get_random = kernel_get_random;
>>>>
>>>> - static_call_update(trusted_key_init,
>>>> - trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init);
>>>> static_call_update(trusted_key_seal,
>>>> trusted_key_sources[i].ops->seal);
>>>> static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal,
>>>> trusted_key_sources[i].ops->unseal);
>>>> static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random,
>>>> get_random);
>>>> - static_call_update(trusted_key_exit,
>>>> - trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit);
>>>> + trusted_key_exit = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit;
>>>> migratable = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->migratable;
>>>>
>>>> - ret = static_call(trusted_key_init)();
>>>> + ret = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init();
>>>> if (!ret)
>>>> break;
>>>> }
>>>> @@ -388,7 +384,8 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
>>>>
>>>> static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
>>>> {
>>>> - static_call_cond(trusted_key_exit)();
>>>> + if (trusted_key_exit)
>>>> + (*trusted_key_exit)();
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> late_initcall(init_trusted);
>>>
>>> Would it be less confusing to require trusted_key_exit from each?
>>>
>>
>> It is already required for each trust source to provide exit callback
>> but this NULL check was added via this fix [1] in case there isn't any
>> trust source present.
>>
>> [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/stable/20220126184155.220814-1-dave.kleikamp@oracle.com/
>
> I'd considering creating a placeholder trusted_key_default_exit() with
> perhaps pr_debug() statement acknowledging it getting called.
>
> Hmm.. if we had that I wonder if we could get away with __weak... Then
> you would not need to assign anything. This is not through-out analyzed.
> Tbh I'm not sure how module loader handles this type of scenario but
> at least the placeholder function would make sense in any case.
If you define a default exit function as __weak and expect trusted key sources
to override it, you can only have one trust source at most in the compiled
kernel and no boot-time selection would be possible.
Cheers,
Ahmad
>
> If abusing weak symbols was in-fact possible probably then the whole
> idea of using static_call could be thrown to garbage bin but there's
> now a lot of context here related on how module loader works linux
> that I'm ignoring...
>
> BR, Jarkko
>
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-10 14:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-06 5:18 Sumit Garg
2023-10-06 5:56 ` Hyeonggon Yoo
2023-10-10 12:33 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-10-10 13:14 ` Sumit Garg
2023-10-10 13:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-10-10 14:19 ` Ahmad Fatoum [this message]
2023-10-10 14:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-10-10 18:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-10-10 19:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-10-10 19:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-10-11 5:54 ` Sumit Garg
2023-10-11 5:52 ` Sumit Garg
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