From: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: sds@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@namei.org, chrisw@sous-sol.org,
serue@us.ibm.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, haradats@nttdata.co.jp,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, hch@lst.de, crispin@crispincowan.com,
casey@schaufler-ca.com
Subject: Re: [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 01/11] Introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2008 14:09:47 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <48FD641B.80406@nttdata.co.jp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <E1Krxrj-0001r8-7t@pomaz-ex.szeredi.hu>
Miklos Szeredi wrote:
>> (6) Introducing new LSM hooks.
>> (this patch)
>>
>> We understand that adding new LSM hooks which receive "struct
>> vfsmount" outside VFS helper functions is the most straightforward
>> approach. This approach has less impact to existing LSM module and
>> no impact to VFS helper functions.
>
> AppArmor will need a few additional hooks, but the ones added by this
> patch look OK. One thing I'd prefer is if there were two different
> hooks for truncate and ftruncate:
>
> int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path, ...);
>
> and
>
> int (*file_truncate) (struct file *file, ...);
When you submit AppArmor, you can introduce security_file_truncate()
and replace security_path_truncate() with security_file_truncate()
since TOMOYO can get "struct path *path" from
"struct file *file"->f_path .
> security_path_truncate() is missing from do_coredump() in exec.c. Is
> this intentional?
Yes.
TOMOYO checks only requests from userspace, not from kernel (e.g.
filesystem). Since do_coredump() performs request from kernel, we
don't insert security_path_truncate() in do_coredump() .
> Also seems to be missing:
>
> - security_path_mknod() from do_create() in ipc/mqueue.c
TOMOYO doesn't check IPC for now.
> - security_path_mknod() from unix_bind() in net/unix/af_unix.c
There is security_path_mknod() call in unix_bind(). Please see below.
;-)
--- linux-next.orig/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ linux-next/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -828,7 +828,12 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock
err = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
if (err)
goto out_mknod_dput;
+ err = security_path_mknod(&nd.path, dentry, mode, 0);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_mknod_drop_write;
err = vfs_mknod(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, 0);
+ security_path_clear();
+out_mknod_drop_write:
mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
if (err)
goto out_mknod_dput;
> - security_path_unlink() from sys_mq_unlink() in ipc/mqueue.c
Same reason as security_path_mknod() from do_create() in ipc/mqueue.c .
> The hooks are also not called from nfsd, I presume that's intentional?
Same reason as do_coredump() . Requests from nfsd are not from
userspace.
Since AppArmor checks both reqests from userspace and kernel,
AppArmor will need to insert security_path_*() to more locations.
Then TOMOYO will want a mechanism for dinstinguishing requests from
userspace and ones from kernel.
>> (6.1) Introducing security_path_clear() hook.
>> (this patch)
>>
>> To perform DAC performed in vfs_foo() before MAC, we let
>> security_path_foo() save a result into our own hash table and
>> return 0, and let security_inode_foo() return the saved
>> result. Since security_inode_foo() is not always called after
>> security_path_foo(), we need security_path_clear() to clear the
>> hash table.
>
> This is not a good interface, IMO. It's easy to forget (e.g. two
> places in open.c), and hard to detect.
>
> And is it necessary at all? Saving the result in the per-task
> security context and destroying it at exit should be an equivalent
> solution.
Though current kernel has current->security, CRED patchset by David moves
security field from current to current->cred . Since current->cred is shared by
multiple processes, we'll not be able to implement per-task security. Please see
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/10/2/7 in detail.
Regards,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-10-21 5:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-10-20 7:34 [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 00/11] TOMOYO Linux Kentaro Takeda
2008-10-20 7:34 ` [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 01/11] Introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available Kentaro Takeda
2008-10-20 12:27 ` Shaya Potter
2008-10-20 19:34 ` crispin
2008-10-20 21:23 ` Shaya Potter
2008-10-23 17:57 ` Shaya Potter
2008-10-20 16:44 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-10-21 5:09 ` Kentaro Takeda [this message]
2008-10-20 7:34 ` [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 02/11] Add in_execve flag into task_struct Kentaro Takeda
2008-10-20 7:34 ` [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 03/11] Singly linked list implementation Kentaro Takeda
2008-10-20 7:34 ` [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 04/11] Introduce d_realpath() Kentaro Takeda
2008-10-20 7:34 ` [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 05/11] Memory and pathname management functions Kentaro Takeda
2008-10-20 7:34 ` [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 06/11] Common functions for TOMOYO Linux Kentaro Takeda
2008-10-20 7:34 ` [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 07/11] File operation restriction part Kentaro Takeda
2008-10-20 7:34 ` [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 08/11] Domain transition handler Kentaro Takeda
2008-10-20 7:34 ` [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 09/11] LSM adapter functions Kentaro Takeda
2008-10-20 7:34 ` [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 10/11] Kconfig and Makefile Kentaro Takeda
2008-10-20 7:34 ` [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 11/11] MAINTAINERS info Kentaro Takeda
2008-10-27 2:18 ` [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 00/11] TOMOYO Linux Kentaro Takeda
2008-10-29 19:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-10-30 5:27 ` Toshiharu Harada
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