From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1750715AbWELATU (ORCPT ); Thu, 11 May 2006 20:19:20 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1750716AbWELATU (ORCPT ); Thu, 11 May 2006 20:19:20 -0400 Received: from mail-in-03.arcor-online.net ([151.189.21.43]:23002 "EHLO mail-in-03.arcor-online.net") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750715AbWELATT (ORCPT ); Thu, 11 May 2006 20:19:19 -0400 In-Reply-To: References: <20060511143440.23517.qmail@securityfocus.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v749.3) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed Message-Id: <494244CE-33D6-4A9D-8C84-A439D427C143@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: "Ed White" , "ML" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: Segher Boessenkool Subject: Re: SecurityFocus Article Date: Fri, 12 May 2006 02:19:14 +0200 To: "linux-os \(Dick Johnson\)" X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.749.3) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > If the SMRAM control register exists, the D_LCK bit can be set > in 16-bit mode during the boot sequence. This makes the SMRAM > register read/only so the long potential compromise sequence > that Mr. Duflot describes would not be possible. If the control > register doesn't exist, then the vulnerably doesn't exist. No, if there is no mechanism to lock down SMmode (re)configuration, the vulnerability of course _does_ exist. > The writer doesn't like the fact that a root process can execute Rest of this email happily ignored... Segher