From: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
roland@redhat.com, fche@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] CRED: Fix SUID exec regression
Date: Fri, 06 Feb 2009 10:32:19 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <498C6613.1030400@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090206114546.4255.74054.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
David Howells wrote:
> The patch:
>
> commit a6f76f23d297f70e2a6b3ec607f7aeeea9e37e8d
> CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials
>
> moved the place in which the 'safeness' of a SUID/SGID exec was performed to
> before de_thread() was called. This means that LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE is now
> calculated incorrectly. This flag is set if any of the usage counts for
> fs_struct, files_struct and sighand_struct are greater than 1 at the time the
> determination is made. All of which are true for threads created by the
> pthread library.
>
> However, since we wish to make the security calculation before irrevocably
> damaging the process so that we can return it an error code in the case where
> we decide we want to reject the exec request on this basis, we have to make the
> determination before calling de_thread().
>
> So, instead, we count up the number of threads (CLONE_THREAD) that are sharing
> our fs_struct (CLONE_FS), files_struct (CLONE_FILES) and sighand_structs
> (CLONE_SIGHAND/CLONE_THREAD) with us. These will be killed by de_thread() and
> so can be discounted by check_unsafe_exec().
...
> Reported-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
I've tested this patch (applied on top of v2.6.29-rc3-634-g9be260a) and
it applies correctly and fixes the problem. David, thanks for fixing this.
Acked-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
--
David Smith
dsmith@redhat.com
Red Hat
http://www.redhat.com
256.217.0141 (direct)
256.837.0057 (fax)
prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-02-06 16:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-02-06 11:45 David Howells
2009-02-06 16:32 ` David Smith [this message]
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