Re: [PATCH 4/7] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns

[Oren Laadan <orenl@cs.columbia.edu>]

On 01/10/2011 05:51 PM, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Bastian Blank (bastian@waldi.eu.org):
>> On Mon, Jan 10, 2011 at 09:13:34PM +0000, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> +	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
>>> +	const struct cred *tcred = __task_cred(t);
>>> +
>>> +	if (cred->user->user_ns != tcred->user->user_ns) {
>>> +		/* userids are not equivalent - either you have the
>>> +		   capability to the target user ns or you don't */
>>> +		if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
>>> +			return 1;
>>> +		return 0;
>>> +	}
>>> +
>>> +	/* same user namespace - usual credentials checks apply */
>>> +	if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
>>> +	    (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
>>> +	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->suid) &&
>>> +	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->uid) &&
>>> +	    !ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
>>> +		return 0;
>>> +
>>> +	return 1;
>>
>> Isn't that equal to this?
>>
>> 	if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
>> 		return 1;
>>
>> 	if (cred->user->user_ns == tcred->user->user_ns &&
>> 	    (cred->euid == tcred->suid ||
>> 	     cred->euid == tcred->uid ||
>> 	     cred->uid == tcred->suid ||
>> 	     cred->uid == tcred->uid))
>> 		return 1;
>>
>> 	return 0;
>>
>> I would consider this much easier to read.
> 
> Unfortunately, it's actually not equivalent.  when capable()
> returns success, then it sets the current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV.
> If permission is granted based on userids and the capability
> isn't needed, then we don't want to needlessly set PF_SUPERPRIV.

A bit off-topic: does this means that c/r needs to save and 
restore this process flag ?
> 
> That's why I'm going to such lengths to call capable() as a last
> resort.

IMHO, worth a one line comment in the code ...

Oren.