From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=62.149.156.176 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795113213; b=UZiGRrZX7bCAL4KeE436OPasZBb3YDwDyeN/46u36m95w/+a38bzUccaI3lMPtWivJ1d NUPevhmMacAskby3ihzrKYNTQrCnAYAUqDEPVxwWQJpTMa5EVENvTksR1sX5C2Y2M1KmY MT7M4qyeMWLXwUllptKP94X4e69Cdd/R3cQOmO3CbjBX6clHjmNr4cPlbReRbmA8ehjkW EAtEtCFxZc4JAvvZP6yV/JhLm28UGuFPIx2VhfOTMMiKGtQq1nbS2dqnNji/wNOSYUKH+ 1+H2dGrz26VQ6m2lj1XDe9OjS98ATSs59HcWytK64a43xV0yZHB9IAlRisd9nyo7Pjg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795113213; h=DMARC-Filter:Received:DKIM-Signature:Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version: User-Agent:Subject:Content-Language:To:Cc:References:From:In-Reply-To: Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:X-CMAE-Envelope; bh=2TwysOH3jFptJLl7Zh65O6ibU0W1pO9RKYiZ6XUEe4o=; b=p1J0NmW5iOE7z/9DKMpMFhu0VDAk+J11iKA1tW4PxzzkydaKIAP08jMytGcn5g6aOmwv 8+6h6vJOeXfA1/c4sfhihHRMMPrFAcBEr9VrXScQaCxGm6hPKCnpNsJnXbe5izQJEAQUq orww5AWiS3V2nmIbdc+1LxleZdmtkPl2sSTdI+F3bDbO1r+xgU9FtXcCLTruYBGa4SCmO uoPfOQ3MYC+qH3QdvDKE7A+LvTF3JckhVloetZu2SfOYux7Xo/t+uaqU/wD/cbsLkdp+U 0qQPTUADNdXfd2GukO0ki6xQFyUEsecjqrRDLyOmX+Zc3WEWUCVk36dONYSbcYM/ozQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass header.from=enneenne.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=enneenne.com; dkim=pass header.d=aruba.it header.i=@aruba.it header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=a1 header.b=iMCz4c4v; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=62.149.156.176 Received: from smtpcmd15176.aruba.it (smtpcmd15176.aruba.it [62.149.156.176]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EF12860A260F for ; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 18:33:31 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.2 smtp.subspace.kernel.org EF12860A260F Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=enneenne.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=enneenne.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=aruba.it header.i=@aruba.it header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=a1 header.b=iMCz4c4v Received: from [192.168.0.186] ([101.57.122.26]) by Aruba SMTP with ESMTPSA id U6wix2IW175O9U6wix0Oma; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 19:33:23 +0100 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=aruba.it; s=a1; t=1795113203; bh=2t8AtcRowxFNGYE8HteZpHIn9jAWUm8DVCWA8vMMYBE=; h=Date:MIME-Version:Subject:To:From:Content-Type; b=iMCz4c4vXgNfjaVsNwvBuMF7tZY4Yy54lPGmuAGKY6P71MLCV/srwMTceBQ/GAt34 IwJr1uqnf/dmNjlMZQB9cLgUTxbIw6iVRuT9buaKQVDbz3kaNVFEIoEpXvAkCgmyEI PSFVCiHj3v8SvBzh912x32zMoFnRUAiLuKuPzH9wjTX7qSHSKg+cusdAEfdyhakn6U MDZ+sXbJbEnEXvAx8A/4DselQVxkwI8uuu0bk6VUSPoq8UUhqONY29s9ATTEIL13dy Cw/3hrysPCKNiLyF9KsJstL/jDdfxcyJ3j39BP5mlGiBGtXHINn2jlUD38UGg+FRMw xxp9/W63RlIFw== Message-ID: <4ad95ed5-26b6-4871-bcb6-cfebfe73917a@enneenne.com> Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 19:33:20 +0100 X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Content-Language: en-US To: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: David Howells , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Jens Wiklander , Sumit Garg , op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org, =?UTF-8?Q?Horia_Geant=C4=83?= , Pankaj Gupta , Sahil Malhotra , Ahmad Fatoum , Richard Weinberger , "Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" , Eric Biggers , Arnd Bergmann , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Randy Dunlap , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Demi Marie Obenour References: <20261118140421.584086-1-giometti@enneenne.com> <650f89ef-9745-4f75-b254-80fa5ac4773d@gmail.com> From: Rodolfo Giometti In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-CMAE-Envelope: MS4xfDXtWOlFTYpyTg35cFi8NKxn6M8tXvqRpaK6Te9d9LP538qpRWPqyhYCRUO7FN90zeUALjH4Pv0kc5qTXvx9JqFIICyIFmy8AMREg/ZL7rPvrVR8BOUd cLloYWy2etZ8Iz2Dj35VuyDIDq5OJcXlqCU0GxFuELT2Ll0+SMmq0xT0b1NQ/mGJ1DRr6EgGHmwb1jcrz7jDiFyXggFkpjEOVUfCxm33Z+AP0WZg8zgrFJ0n ffHu26kwKFVQdawAYFWmaAXnHN1p0WPTc2eQub+iUcKYdh/LB+1TMtCynW4g+PFuL/Ox/uZYSQ3twHUYmoc0NljKoPOQdr9z82B634PV+Tl5rFaczqEJswvL RMT75ziH1aZFGiT3YGWODPXE3kKUfWeYw2ky9PgD86fbcUKc9YG7O6O4C555MM8R18YgP7zwMiMpC0MPLWUV4TYOFHuGzRI3nAMUWf2OAvcXsYsO9EJVC1dZ /CJBXkFCk64KKzxL3y8DwpvUb58jZOH5wiXqHdVhVBx7moWR2O7fcnAGvb0ROFigOOWFyNifYgQAUKvRx0Gjo0aKANKYhIDOo9FoNc3nTrLMB+wllSvU908i ZvkuwtX35joO+/L82trX60+HcodZHev58cbR0wIdppW64faoXjrD2ty6e3+iNo1wzj4r1WV6hSakPGcj+ITxJAyi+jIfJwOIVZnMMjwKHWWd276ZqiyPHgzR tHcGBXPnD0+Y4FdwbDCkcDNcPihbMtNcarY0ckxuc2T0QuwtA6V5JI+qd+13NzNwBNaSBd9q0vR4Houfn0O1tVDSLHjYJhYnCW1hfd8zibQ4R4JUQeDCsiso hDRhfUPbEdA73rTyHioYeBE2HST4BYaYzwzPHgFSowkALmKiOo3P6Y+sT2OdjUa1mi5YmmKKNIRc5pqRvd/Poq1X6e5PtLi+bMEeLu/tD0VuL3zYOGxE+sHW BTqxG0WyQtxpY++s7NY1cpcH0qqhtrXP08lJaeDotFcKwlEQgSTkroRSzbXG9NMpu/BmvKQiIhI/dqa4MxRp7JEEFN/QNVR7WEj2UU0vqJswExy2aYWzzdw+ FkBYKTSapeFo97Im9jOUDeTGL1gcFhA/aHSIiD07c4PP/74NLMye+4RTaOnZlsrMaXjbB2/jn6s9k9AKtJfRSJPMFnBj3YyvI3YYi+xduehbptXY4hxkqo3D c5x2hRhHNjhs0zg+GpmJGknXwvGaK4l4a6zTOKWmfv7xMtgIZ/Vn9d4GsOJdkemp7e3WX6RGITrcgwSghHENodqP2MvCkuvhyBHE4/kY7pUMNCMYz3xNrYgX 6PdBjdKe On 19/11/2026 15:33, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: [snip] > And yeah, we don't have projected problems. I.e. "no users" is always > NAK. You have to step on the nail at first. A customer of mine stepped on it. Their product, on i.MX6, encrypts its rootfs with dm-crypt and a CAAM black key, never in clear. Its backups, though, are encrypted in user space with a key kept as a CAAM blob; to use it, the blob is opened and the key handed to user space in clear. The next generation is on i.MX93, and the customer now wants the backups and other encrypted archives protected like the rootfs: the key must never be in clear outside a secure world. The i.MX93 has no CAAM. OP-TEE can hold the key, but every way the mainline keyring offers to use it (a trusted key, through dm-crypt or AF_ALG) unseals its bytes into kernel memory, and AF_ALG no longer reaches hardware drivers. keycrypt's OP-TEE backend does not unseal it: a key it generates leaves the TA only sealed. Ciao, Rodolfo -- GNU/Linux Solutions e-mail: giometti@enneenne.com Linux Device Driver giometti@linux.it Embedded Systems phone: +39 349 2432127 UNIX programming