Re: [PATCH v4] ceph: mark directory as non-complete complete after loading key

[Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>]

On 30/11/2022 14:54, Gregory Farnum wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 29, 2022 at 7:21 AM Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, Nov 29, 2022 at 3:50 PM Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 29/11/2022 22:32, Ilya Dryomov wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Nov 29, 2022 at 3:15 PM Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 29/11/2022 18:39, Luís Henriques wrote:
>>>>>> When setting a directory's crypt context, ceph_dir_clear_complete() needs to
>>>>>> be called otherwise if it was complete before, any existing (old) dentry will
>>>>>> still be valid.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This patch adds a wrapper around __fscrypt_prepare_readdir() which will
>>>>>> ensure a directory is marked as non-complete if key status changes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>> Hi Xiubo,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here's a rebase of this patch.  I did some testing but since this branch
>>>>>> doesn't really have full fscrypt support, I couldn't even reproduce the
>>>>>> bug.  So, my testing was limited.
>>>>> I'm planing not to update the wip-fscrypt branch any more, except the IO
>>>>> path related fixes, which may introduce potential bugs each time as before.
>>>>>
>>>>> Since the qa tests PR has finished and the tests have passed, so we are
>>>>> planing to merge the first none IO part, around 27 patches. And then
>>>>> pull the reset patches from wip-fscrypt branch.
>>>> I'm not sure if merging metadata and I/O path patches separately
>>>> makes sense.  What would a user do with just filename encryption?
>>> Hi Ilya,
>>>
>>> I think the IO ones should be followed soon.
>>>
>>> Currently the filename ones have been well testes. And the contents will
>>> be by passed for now.
>>>
>>> Since this is just for Dev Preview feature IMO it should be okay (?)
>> I don't think there is such a thing as a Dev Preview feature when it
>> comes to the mainline kernel, particularly in the area of filesystems
>> and storage.  It should be ready for users at least to some extent.  So
>> my question stands: what would a user do with just filename encryption?
> I think how this merges is up to you guys and the kernel practices.
> Merging only the filename encryption is definitely of *limited*
> utility, but I don't think it's totally pointless -- the data versus
> metadata paths are different and you are protecting against somewhat
> different vulnerabilities and threat models with them. For instance,
> MDS logs dump filenames, but OSD logs do not dump object data. There's
> some obvious utility there even if you basically trust your provider,
> or run your own cluster but want to be more secure about sending logs
> via ceph-post-file.

Hi Greg,

Sounds reasonable to me.

I will leave this to Ilya.

Thanks!

- Xiubo

> -Greg
>
>> Thanks,
>>
>>                  Ilya
>>