Re: [PATCH 5/5] mm: check permissions and bounds for vm_ops->access

["Kuehling, Felix" <felix.kuehling@amd.com>]

On 2026-11-12 17:09, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
> GUP rejects VM_IO and VM_PFNMAP mappings early. __access_remote_vm() then
> falls back to vm_ops->access without checking VMA permissions and without
> limiting the request to the VMA size.
>
> Consequently, /proc/<pid>/mem can bypass protections even without
> FOLL_FORCE, or cross into another mapping without checking its
> permissions.
>
> Check VMA permissions before calling ->access and limit each request to
> the current VMA. Implement similar access permission checks as GUP,
> however:
>   (1) Reject writes to CoW mappings because the callbacks access backing
>       memory directly and cannot handle CoW.
>   (2) Allow forced writes to non-CoW mappings with VM_MAYWRITE.
>
> This intentionally breaks forced writes through legacy amdgpu PROT_NONE,
> MAP_PRIVATE debugger mappings. The workaround in commit fa5239f2af98
> ("drm/amdgpu: workaround failed COW checks for Thunk VMAs") cleared
> VM_MAYWRITE to avoid CoW, but debugger writes still succeeded by
> exploiting the missing access-permission checks fixed here. Reads remain
> supported. Userspace must use MAP_SHARED instead; ROCm 5.5.0, released
> in May 2023, already does so.

Thank you for considering this use case and checking the ROCm history. 
The patch is

Acked-by: Felix Kuehling <felix.kuehling@amd.com>


>
> Link: https://github.com/ROCm/ROCT-Thunk-Interface/commit/fea44fab6e84eda52fcf6b419b35600c18f4c022
> Fixes: 272ddc8b3735 ("proc: don't use FOLL_FORCE for reading cmdline and environment")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
> Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
> Cc: Simona Vetter <simona@ffwll.ch>
> Reported-by: Chris Mason <mason@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
> ---
>   mm/memory.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
>   1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
> index d4370c1b331c9..9872f289c1e49 100644
> --- a/mm/memory.c
> +++ b/mm/memory.c
> @@ -7362,6 +7362,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(generic_access_phys);
>   static int __access_remote_vm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
>   			      void *buf, int len, unsigned int gup_flags)
>   {
> +	const bool force = gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE;
>   	void *old_buf = buf;
>   	int write = gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE;
>   
> @@ -7401,15 +7402,35 @@ static int __access_remote_vm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
>   			if (gup_flags & FOLL_ANON)
>   				break;
>   
> +			if (write) {
> +				if (!vma_test(vma, VMA_MAYWRITE_BIT))
> +					break;
> +				if (!vma_test(vma, VMA_WRITE_BIT) && !force)
> +					break;
> +				/*
> +				 * In contrast to GUP, we historically allowed
> +				 * FOLL_FORCE write access to non-CoW mappings.
> +				 * However, we must always reject CoW mappings
> +				 * as we cannot CoW here.
> +				 */
> +				if (vma_is_cow_mapping(vma))
> +					break;
> +			} else if (!vma_test(vma, VMA_READ_BIT)) {
> +				if (!force || !vma_test(vma, VMA_MAYREAD_BIT))
> +					break;
> +			}
> +
>   			/*
>   			 * Check if this is a VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP VMA, which
>   			 * we can access using slightly different code.
>   			 */
>   			bytes = 0;
>   #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT
> -			if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->access)
> +			if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->access) {
> +				bytes = min_t(unsigned long, len, vma->vm_end - addr);
>   				bytes = vma->vm_ops->access(vma, addr, buf,
> -							    len, write);
> +							    bytes, write);
> +			}
>   #endif
>   			if (bytes <= 0)
>   				break;
>