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From: "Gupta, Pankaj" <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, svsm-devel@coconut-svsm.dev
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 01/14] x86/sev: Rename snp_init() in the boot/compressed/sev.c file
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 18:19:59 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4c6d1088-71f0-c558-dc4e-bd6371a0ac35@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <425afa6512994b1ca1bb366eb7abfb24d65175aa.1711405593.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

On 3/25/2024 11:26 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> The snp_init() in boot/compressed/sev.c is local to that file and is not
> called from outside of the file. Change the name so that it is not tied
> to the function definition in arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h. Move the renamed
> snp_init() and related functions up in the file to avoid having to add a
> forward declaration and make the function static, too.
> 
> This will allow the snp_init() function in arch/x86/kernel/sev.c to be
> changed without having to make the same change in boot/compressed/sev.c.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

Seems no functional change. Just rename snp_init() & move functions up 
in the file.

Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>


> ---
>   arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 162 ++++++++++++++++-----------------
>   1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> index ec71846d28c9..5ad0ff4664f1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> @@ -413,6 +413,85 @@ void snp_check_features(void)
>   	}
>   }
>   
> +/* Search for Confidential Computing blob in the EFI config table. */
> +static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_efi(struct boot_params *bp)
> +{
> +	unsigned long cfg_table_pa;
> +	unsigned int cfg_table_len;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ret = efi_get_conf_table(bp, &cfg_table_pa, &cfg_table_len);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	return (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)efi_find_vendor_table(bp, cfg_table_pa,
> +								cfg_table_len,
> +								EFI_CC_BLOB_GUID);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Initial set up of SNP relies on information provided by the
> + * Confidential Computing blob, which can be passed to the boot kernel
> + * by firmware/bootloader in the following ways:
> + *
> + * - via an entry in the EFI config table
> + * - via a setup_data structure, as defined by the Linux Boot Protocol
> + *
> + * Scan for the blob in that order.
> + */
> +static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
> +{
> +	struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
> +
> +	cc_info = find_cc_blob_efi(bp);
> +	if (cc_info)
> +		goto found_cc_info;
> +
> +	cc_info = find_cc_blob_setup_data(bp);
> +	if (!cc_info)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +found_cc_info:
> +	if (cc_info->magic != CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC)
> +		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
> +
> +	return cc_info;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Indicate SNP based on presence of SNP-specific CC blob. Subsequent checks
> + * will verify the SNP CPUID/MSR bits.
> + */
> +static bool early_snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
> +{
> +	struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
> +
> +	if (!bp)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	cc_info = find_cc_blob(bp);
> +	if (!cc_info)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If a SNP-specific Confidential Computing blob is present, then
> +	 * firmware/bootloader have indicated SNP support. Verifying this
> +	 * involves CPUID checks which will be more reliable if the SNP
> +	 * CPUID table is used. See comments over snp_setup_cpuid_table() for
> +	 * more details.
> +	 */
> +	setup_cpuid_table(cc_info);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Pass run-time kernel a pointer to CC info via boot_params so EFI
> +	 * config table doesn't need to be searched again during early startup
> +	 * phase.
> +	 */
> +	bp->cc_blob_address = (u32)(unsigned long)cc_info;
> +
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
>   /*
>    * sev_check_cpu_support - Check for SEV support in the CPU capabilities
>    *
> @@ -463,7 +542,7 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>   		bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
>   
>   	/*
> -	 * Do an initial SEV capability check before snp_init() which
> +	 * Do an initial SEV capability check before early_snp_init() which
>   	 * loads the CPUID page and the same checks afterwards are done
>   	 * without the hypervisor and are trustworthy.
>   	 *
> @@ -478,7 +557,7 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>   	 * Setup/preliminary detection of SNP. This will be sanity-checked
>   	 * against CPUID/MSR values later.
>   	 */
> -	snp = snp_init(bp);
> +	snp = early_snp_init(bp);
>   
>   	/* Now repeat the checks with the SNP CPUID table. */
>   
> @@ -535,85 +614,6 @@ u64 sev_get_status(void)
>   	return m.q;
>   }
>   
> -/* Search for Confidential Computing blob in the EFI config table. */
> -static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_efi(struct boot_params *bp)
> -{
> -	unsigned long cfg_table_pa;
> -	unsigned int cfg_table_len;
> -	int ret;
> -
> -	ret = efi_get_conf_table(bp, &cfg_table_pa, &cfg_table_len);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return NULL;
> -
> -	return (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)efi_find_vendor_table(bp, cfg_table_pa,
> -								cfg_table_len,
> -								EFI_CC_BLOB_GUID);
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * Initial set up of SNP relies on information provided by the
> - * Confidential Computing blob, which can be passed to the boot kernel
> - * by firmware/bootloader in the following ways:
> - *
> - * - via an entry in the EFI config table
> - * - via a setup_data structure, as defined by the Linux Boot Protocol
> - *
> - * Scan for the blob in that order.
> - */
> -static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
> -{
> -	struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
> -
> -	cc_info = find_cc_blob_efi(bp);
> -	if (cc_info)
> -		goto found_cc_info;
> -
> -	cc_info = find_cc_blob_setup_data(bp);
> -	if (!cc_info)
> -		return NULL;
> -
> -found_cc_info:
> -	if (cc_info->magic != CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC)
> -		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
> -
> -	return cc_info;
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * Indicate SNP based on presence of SNP-specific CC blob. Subsequent checks
> - * will verify the SNP CPUID/MSR bits.
> - */
> -bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
> -{
> -	struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
> -
> -	if (!bp)
> -		return false;
> -
> -	cc_info = find_cc_blob(bp);
> -	if (!cc_info)
> -		return false;
> -
> -	/*
> -	 * If a SNP-specific Confidential Computing blob is present, then
> -	 * firmware/bootloader have indicated SNP support. Verifying this
> -	 * involves CPUID checks which will be more reliable if the SNP
> -	 * CPUID table is used. See comments over snp_setup_cpuid_table() for
> -	 * more details.
> -	 */
> -	setup_cpuid_table(cc_info);
> -
> -	/*
> -	 * Pass run-time kernel a pointer to CC info via boot_params so EFI
> -	 * config table doesn't need to be searched again during early startup
> -	 * phase.
> -	 */
> -	bp->cc_blob_address = (u32)(unsigned long)cc_info;
> -
> -	return true;
> -}
> -
>   void sev_prep_identity_maps(unsigned long top_level_pgt)
>   {
>   	/*


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-12 16:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-25 22:26 [PATCH v3 00/14] Provide SEV-SNP support for running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] x86/sev: Rename snp_init() in the boot/compressed/sev.c file Tom Lendacky
2024-04-09 17:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-09 17:44     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-09 17:57       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-12 16:19   ` Gupta, Pankaj [this message]
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] x86/sev: Make the VMPL0 checking function more generic Tom Lendacky
2024-04-12 16:41   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-04-17 11:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-17 20:35     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-17 20:50       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-18 18:38         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-21  7:12           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP Secrets page Tom Lendacky
2024-04-12 17:03   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-04-17 20:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-18 21:17     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-22 22:07       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas Tom Lendacky
2024-04-12 16:04   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-04-12 15:28   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support Tom Lendacky
2024-04-15 16:12   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16  4:54   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 15:17     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 15:47       ` Dan Williams
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] configfs-tsm: Allow the privlevel_floor attribute to be updated Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16  4:55   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 15:23     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 15:57       ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 16:17         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16  5:37   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 15:53     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 16:19       ` Dan Williams
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] fs/configfs: Add a callback to determine attribute visibility Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16  5:46   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 16:01     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 18:25       ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 19:54         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 20:03           ` Dan Williams
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] x86/sev: Hide SVSM attestation entries if not running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-09 18:12   ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-12 15:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-15 19:16       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-15 19:48         ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-15 20:13           ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-15 21:50             ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-15 22:03               ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16  6:09                 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16  6:08             ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16  6:05         ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16  5:47   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 16:07     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16  6:03   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 16:10     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present Tom Lendacky

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