From: Thara Gopinath <tgopinath@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Cc: kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com, decui@microsoft.com,
tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org,
ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org,
James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, javierm@redhat.com,
lszubowi@redhat.com, francescopompo2@gmail.com,
tgopinath@microsoft.com, x86@kernel.org,
linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 07/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: load secure kernel image from firmware
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2026 12:22:37 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4d876bd8-3885-4d65-a272-d846ae0d7d3d@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260902043732.GF2583463@liuwe-devbox-debian-v2.local>
On 9/2/2026 12:37 AM, Wei Liu wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 01, 2026 at 09:55:21AM -0700, Thara Gopinath wrote:
>> LVBS bring-up requires loading a secure kernel image into VTL1 before
>> starting it. Add the VTL0-side loader that stages the image in the
>> memory region reserved by hv_vsm_securekernel, in preparation for the
>> VTL1 bring-up.
>>
>> The image is a 64-bit ELF fetched via request_firmware("vsm_sk"). It
>> is expected to ship inside the signed UKI/initramfs so it is
>> authenticated end-to-end via Secure Boot before the loader consumes
>> it; sourcing it from an unauthenticated location would break the LVBS
>> trust model.
>>
>> The loader validates the ELF header, stages the PT_LOAD segments into
>> the reserved region and records the entry point as a physical address
>> for use at VTL1 start time.
>>
>> If VSM support has been advertised to the hypervisor but no secure
>> kernel region was reserved on the command line, panic: LVBS bring-up
>> is committed at this point and there is no safe way to continue.
>
> This conflicts with the memory reservation patch, in which there is an
> automatic allocation when no kernel command line is specified.
Ah no.. So securekernel= has to be specified in the command line for
__setup() to be invoked . It can be left blank without parameters like
securekernel= or with parameters like securekernel=256M@0x80000000. The
reservation logic will take care of reserving the correct memory if there
are no parameters but if there is no command line specified __setup will
not be called. The other way of solving this and invoking the reservations
unconditionally will be to call it from setup_arch like how reserve_crashkernel
is invoked. I am not sure if we want to do that now ?? What do you think ?
But I will reword this and state that the panic happens if there is no
securekernel memory allocated (either because securekernel= was not
specified or because memory reservation itself failed)
>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@linux.microsoft.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Thara Gopinath <tgopinath@linux.microsoft.com>
>> ---
>> drivers/hv/hv_vsm.h | 17 ++++
>> drivers/hv/hv_vsm_boot.c | 201 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>> include/hyperv/vsm.h | 21 ++++
>> 3 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> create mode 100644 drivers/hv/hv_vsm.h
>> create mode 100644 include/hyperv/vsm.h
> [...]
>> +
>> +static void __init hv_vsm_get_sk_mem(void)
>> +{
>> + /*
>> + * The reserved secure kernel region is mandatory once VSM support has
>> + * been advertised. Without it we cannot load the secure kernel and
>> + * bringing up VTL1 is impossible, so fail hard rather than continuing
>> + * in an unusable state.
>> + */
>> + if (!sk_res.start)
>> + panic("No memory reserved in cmdline for secure kernel");
>> +
>
> This log line is wrong.
I will fix this
Warm Regards
Thara
>
> Wei
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-02 16:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-01 16:55 [RFC PATCH 00/12] Introduce LVBS support for Hyper-V guests Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 01/12] drivers: hv: Add HYPERV_VSM kconfig option Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 02/12] drivers: hv: hv_common: Allocate Hyper-V output arg page when VSM is enabled Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 03/12] drivers: hv: Reserve memory for VSM secure kernel during early boot Thara Gopinath
2026-09-02 0:59 ` Wei Liu
2026-09-02 13:38 ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 04/12] firmware: efi: libstub: x86-stub: Enable VSM awareness in efi os indications variable Thara Gopinath
2026-09-02 1:09 ` Wei Liu
2026-09-02 14:23 ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 05/12] include: hyperv: hvgdk_mini.h: Add VTL-specific structures and bits Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 06/12] drivers: hv: Add VSM boot driver and enable VTL1 at the partition level Thara Gopinath
2026-09-02 1:16 ` Wei Liu
2026-09-02 14:28 ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-02 4:43 ` Wei Liu
2026-09-04 13:23 ` Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 07/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: load secure kernel image from firmware Thara Gopinath
2026-09-02 4:37 ` Wei Liu
2026-09-02 16:22 ` Thara Gopinath [this message]
2026-09-02 22:58 ` Wei Liu
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 08/12] arch: x86: hyperv: Build initial vCPU context for VTL1 secure kernel Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 09/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: Enable VTL1 on the boot processor Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 10/12] arch: x86: hyperv: hv_vtl_vsm: Introduce vtlcall Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 11/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: Boot primary processor in VTL1 Thara Gopinath
2026-09-01 16:55 ` [RFC PATCH 12/12] drivers: hv: hv_vsm_boot: Boot secondary processors " Thara Gopinath
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