From: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin@broadcom.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Doug Covelli" <doug.covelli@broadcom.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@kernel.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
"David Woodhouse" <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
"Paul Durrant" <paul@xen.org>, "Xin Li" <xin@zytor.com>,
"Francesco Lavra" <flavra@baylibre.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@ventanamicro.com>,
"Liran Alon" <liran.alon@oracle.com>,
"Arbel Moshe" <arbel.moshe@oracle.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Zack Rusin" <zack.rusin@broadcom.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 09/12] KVM: selftests: Port VMware backdoor coverage
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 00:59:58 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4dca09deb85d2d5db157888ae4a2de7cbf6421d2.1794374897.git.zack.rusin@broadcom.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1794374897.git.zack.rusin@broadcom.com>
Add vmware_backdoor_test, adapted from KVM-unit-tests' vmware_backdoors
test. From CPL3, with CR4.PCE clear and no I/O permission bitmap in
the TSS, read the VMware pseudo-PMCs with RDPMC and issue backdoor
commands on the backdoor port with IN. Verify that the pseudo-PMC
reads succeed and the port accesses exit to userspace only when the
backdoor is enabled and raise #GP otherwise, and that other PMC indices
and ports always raise #GP. Repeat the pseudo-PMC checks at CPL3 with
CR4.PCE set and at CPL0, where RDPMC doesn't fault before KVM handles
it. Skip the pseudo-PMC checks if KVM doesn't virtualize a PMU, as KVM
then injects #GP for every RDPMC.
Run the checks for a VM that relies on the enable_vmware_backdoor
default and for a VM that enables KVM_VMWARE_ENABLE_BACKDOOR, and
verify that KVM_CAP_X86_VMWARE rejects every flag it doesn't report.
KVM-unit-tests can only cover the module parameter, which applies to
every VM, while the selftest also covers the per-VM capability.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aIEoNpe-LFoH6LBm@google.com
Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin@broadcom.com>
---
MAINTAINERS | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/x86/vmware_backdoor_test.c | 272 ++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 274 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/vmware_backdoor_test.c
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 017053e8f76e..39fa67a180f5 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -15050,6 +15050,7 @@ S: Supported
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm.git
T: git https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux.git
F: arch/x86/kvm/vmware.*
+F: tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/vmware_backdoor_test.c
KVM X86 Xen (KVM/Xen)
M: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm
index 95867977beb3..0ef08d7783ae 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/sync_regs_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/ucna_injection_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/userspace_io_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/userspace_msr_exit_test
+TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/vmware_backdoor_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/vmx_apic_access_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/vmx_apicv_updates_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86 += x86/vmx_exception_with_invalid_guest_state
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/vmware_backdoor_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/vmware_backdoor_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e4e87d2ce3c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/vmware_backdoor_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2025-2026 Broadcom. All Rights Reserved. The term
+ * "Broadcom" refers to Broadcom Inc. and/or its subsidiaries.
+ *
+ * Adapted from kvm-unit-tests' x86/vmware_backdoors.c.
+ */
+
+#include "kvm_util.h"
+#include "processor.h"
+#include "test_util.h"
+
+#define VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_HOST_TSC 0x10000
+#define VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_REAL_TIME 0x10001
+#define VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_APPARENT_TIME 0x10002
+
+#define VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PORT 0x5658
+#define VMWARE_MAGIC 0x564d5868
+#define VMPORT_CMD_GETVERSION 0x0a
+#define VMPORT_CMD_ILLEGAL 0xfff
+#define VMPORT_DEFAULT_RETVAL 0xdeadbeef
+#define RANDOM_IO_PORT 0x1234
+#define RANDOM_PMC 0xfff
+
+struct insn_result {
+ u64 value;
+ u8 vector;
+};
+
+struct backdoor_results {
+ struct insn_result pmc[4];
+ struct insn_result port[3];
+};
+
+enum backdoor_mode {
+ USER_MODE, /* CPL3, CR4.PCE clear */
+ USER_MODE_PCE, /* CPL3, CR4.PCE set */
+ KERNEL_MODE, /* CPL0 */
+};
+
+static struct backdoor_results results;
+static bool expect_backdoor;
+static bool test_pmcs;
+
+static struct insn_result guest_rdpmc(u32 pmc)
+{
+ struct insn_result result;
+ u32 eax;
+ u32 edx;
+ u64 error_code;
+
+ asm volatile(KVM_ASM_SAFE("rdpmc")
+ : "=a"(eax), "=d"(edx),
+ KVM_ASM_SAFE_OUTPUTS(result.vector, error_code)
+ : "c"(pmc)
+ : KVM_ASM_SAFE_CLOBBERS);
+ result.value = ((u64)edx << 32) | eax;
+ return result;
+}
+
+static struct insn_result guest_inl(u16 port, u32 command)
+{
+ struct insn_result result;
+ unsigned long rax = VMPORT_DEFAULT_RETVAL;
+ unsigned long rbx = VMPORT_DEFAULT_RETVAL;
+ unsigned long rcx = command;
+ unsigned long rdx = port;
+ u64 error_code;
+
+ asm volatile(KVM_ASM_SAFE("inl %%dx, %%eax")
+ : "+a"(rax), "+b"(rbx), "+c"(rcx), "+d"(rdx),
+ KVM_ASM_SAFE_OUTPUTS(result.vector, error_code)
+ :
+ : KVM_ASM_SAFE_CLOBBERS);
+ result.value = rbx;
+ return result;
+}
+
+static void guest_read_pmcs(void)
+{
+ results.pmc[0] = guest_rdpmc(VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_HOST_TSC);
+ results.pmc[1] = guest_rdpmc(VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_REAL_TIME);
+ results.pmc[2] = guest_rdpmc(VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PMC_APPARENT_TIME);
+ results.pmc[3] = guest_rdpmc(RANDOM_PMC);
+}
+
+static void guest_check_pmcs(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ GUEST_ASSERT_EQ(results.pmc[i].vector,
+ expect_backdoor ? 0 : GP_VECTOR);
+ if (expect_backdoor)
+ GUEST_ASSERT_NE(results.pmc[i].value, 0);
+ }
+ GUEST_ASSERT_EQ(results.pmc[3].vector, GP_VECTOR);
+}
+
+static void guest_done_handler(struct ex_regs *regs)
+{
+ if (test_pmcs)
+ guest_check_pmcs();
+
+ GUEST_ASSERT_EQ(results.port[0].vector,
+ expect_backdoor ? 0 : GP_VECTOR);
+ GUEST_ASSERT_EQ(results.port[1].vector,
+ expect_backdoor ? 0 : GP_VECTOR);
+ if (expect_backdoor)
+ GUEST_ASSERT_EQ(results.port[0].value, VMWARE_MAGIC);
+ GUEST_ASSERT_EQ(results.port[2].vector, GP_VECTOR);
+
+ GUEST_DONE();
+}
+
+static void guest_user_code(void)
+{
+ if (test_pmcs)
+ guest_read_pmcs();
+
+ results.port[0] = guest_inl(VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PORT,
+ VMPORT_CMD_GETVERSION);
+ results.port[1] = guest_inl(VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PORT,
+ VMPORT_CMD_ILLEGAL);
+ results.port[2] = guest_inl(RANDOM_IO_PORT, VMPORT_CMD_ILLEGAL);
+
+ asm volatile("int3");
+}
+
+/* At CPL0, only the pseudo-PMCs depend on the backdoor. */
+static void guest_kernel_code(void)
+{
+ guest_read_pmcs();
+ guest_check_pmcs();
+ GUEST_DONE();
+}
+
+static void handle_vmware_port(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
+ struct kvm_regs regs;
+ u32 *data;
+
+ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(run->io.direction, KVM_EXIT_IO_IN);
+ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(run->io.size, 4);
+ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(run->io.count, 1);
+ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(run->io.port, VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PORT);
+
+ data = (void *)run + run->io.data_offset;
+ *data = 0;
+
+ vcpu_regs_get(vcpu, ®s);
+ regs.rbx = VMWARE_MAGIC;
+ vcpu_regs_set(vcpu, ®s);
+}
+
+static void test_unsupported_flags(u64 supported)
+{
+ struct kvm_vm *vm = vm_create_barebones();
+ int bit, ret;
+
+ for (bit = 0; bit < 64; bit++) {
+ if (supported & BIT_ULL(bit))
+ continue;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ ret = __vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_X86_VMWARE, BIT_ULL(bit));
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret == -1 && errno == EINVAL,
+ "Unsupported VMware flag %d: ret=%d errno=%d",
+ bit, ret, errno);
+ }
+ kvm_vm_free(vm);
+}
+
+static void run_backdoor_test(bool enable_cap, bool expected,
+ enum backdoor_mode mode)
+{
+ struct kvm_sregs sregs;
+ struct idt_entry *idt;
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+ struct kvm_vm *vm;
+ int port_exits = 0;
+
+ expect_backdoor = expected;
+ memset(&results, 0, sizeof(results));
+
+ vm = vm_create(1);
+ sync_global_to_guest(vm, expect_backdoor);
+ sync_global_to_guest(vm, test_pmcs);
+ sync_global_to_guest(vm, results);
+ if (enable_cap)
+ vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_X86_VMWARE,
+ KVM_VMWARE_ENABLE_BACKDOOR);
+ if (mode == KERNEL_MODE) {
+ vcpu = vm_vcpu_add(vm, 0, guest_kernel_code);
+ } else {
+ vcpu = vm_vcpu_add(vm, 0, guest_user_code);
+
+ idt = addr_gva2hva(vm, vm->arch.idt);
+ idt[BP_VECTOR].dpl = 3;
+ vm_install_exception_handler(vm, BP_VECTOR, guest_done_handler);
+ vm_init_user_mode(vm);
+ vcpu_enter_user_mode(vcpu);
+ }
+
+ if (mode == USER_MODE_PCE) {
+ vcpu_sregs_get(vcpu, &sregs);
+ sregs.cr4 |= X86_CR4_PCE;
+ vcpu_sregs_set(vcpu, &sregs);
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
+ struct ucall uc;
+
+ vcpu_run(vcpu);
+ TEST_ASSERT_KVM_EXIT_REASON(vcpu, KVM_EXIT_IO);
+
+ if (run->io.port == VMWARE_BACKDOOR_PORT) {
+ TEST_ASSERT(expected,
+ "Disabled VMware backdoor reached userspace");
+ handle_vmware_port(vcpu);
+ port_exits++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ switch (get_ucall(vcpu, &uc)) {
+ case UCALL_ABORT:
+ REPORT_GUEST_ASSERT(uc);
+ break;
+ case UCALL_DONE:
+ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(port_exits,
+ expected && mode != KERNEL_MODE ? 2 : 0);
+ kvm_vm_free(vm);
+ return;
+ default:
+ TEST_FAIL("Unexpected ucall 0x%lx", uc.cmd);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ unsigned int supported = kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_X86_VMWARE);
+ enum backdoor_mode mode;
+ bool module_default;
+
+ TEST_REQUIRE(supported & KVM_VMWARE_ENABLE_BACKDOOR);
+
+ test_unsupported_flags(supported);
+
+ /* KVM serves the pseudo-PMCs only if it virtualizes a PMU. */
+ test_pmcs = kvm_is_pmu_enabled();
+ if (!test_pmcs)
+ ksft_print_msg("vPMU disabled, skipping pseudo-PMC checks\n");
+
+ module_default = get_kvm_param_bool("enable_vmware_backdoor");
+ run_backdoor_test(false, module_default, USER_MODE);
+ run_backdoor_test(true, true, USER_MODE);
+
+ /*
+ * RDPMC at CPL0, or at CPL3 with CR4.PCE set, doesn't raise the #GP
+ * that the emulator handles, so check the pseudo-PMCs there as well.
+ */
+ if (test_pmcs) {
+ for (mode = USER_MODE_PCE; mode <= KERNEL_MODE; mode++) {
+ run_backdoor_test(false, module_default, mode);
+ run_backdoor_test(true, true, mode);
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-11 6:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-11 5:59 [PATCH v3 00/12] KVM: Improve VMware guest support Zack Rusin
2026-11-11 5:59 ` [PATCH v3 01/12] KVM: x86/pmu: Honor enable_vmware_backdoor for VMware pseudo-PMCs Zack Rusin
2026-11-11 5:59 ` [PATCH v3 02/12] KVM: x86: Move VMware backdoor support to separate files Zack Rusin
2026-11-11 5:59 ` [PATCH v3 03/12] KVM: x86: Encapsulate VMware backdoor checks Zack Rusin
2026-11-11 5:59 ` [PATCH v3 04/12] KVM: x86: Add CONFIG_KVM_VMWARE Zack Rusin
2026-11-11 5:59 ` [PATCH v3 05/12] KVM: x86: Add a unified VMware capability Zack Rusin
2026-11-11 5:59 ` [PATCH v3 06/12] KVM: x86: Forward VMware hypercalls to userspace Zack Rusin
2026-11-11 5:59 ` [PATCH v3 07/12] KVM: x86: Route nested VMware backdoors to KVM Zack Rusin
2026-11-11 5:59 ` [PATCH v3 08/12] KVM: selftests: Add helpers to run x86 guest code in user mode Zack Rusin
2026-11-11 5:59 ` Zack Rusin [this message]
2026-11-11 5:59 ` [PATCH v3 10/12] KVM: selftests: Test VMware hypercall exits Zack Rusin
2026-11-11 6:00 ` [PATCH v3 11/12] KVM: selftests: Test VMware hypercall exits with nested Hyper-V flushes Zack Rusin
2026-11-11 6:00 ` [PATCH v3 12/12] KVM: selftests: Test nested VMware backdoor routing Zack Rusin
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