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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>,
	"Gustavo A . R . Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Jennifer Miller <jmill@asu.edu>, Tiffany Bao <tbao@asu.edu>,
	Ruoyu Wang <fishw@asu.edu>, Adam Doupe <doupe@asu.edu>,
	Kyle Zeng <zengyhkyle@asu.edu>,
	Yan Shoshitaishvili <yans@asu.edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: widen guard region to defeat ENTER-based stack pivot
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 16:37:36 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4e96acf4-25e7-4f30-8455-f9b3f49062be@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPpSM+QTiwgPk3KNmWbjSk_SS8LLL5XDfikWC1A98vetom3yeg@mail.gmail.com>

On 6/29/26 16:28, Xiang Mei wrote:
>>> That is more than enough to step off the current stack, across the
>>> one-page guard, and into the adjacent sprayed pages. When those pages
>>> contain a return sled feeding a ROP chain, reaching any ENTER gadget
>>> (opcode 0xc8, abundant as both intended and unintended gadgets) turns a
>>> control-flow hijack into full ROP execution without any register control
>>> at the hijack site, making it a one-gadget-style primitive that
>>> significantly eases exploitation. The pivot happens after the control
>>> transfer, so it is not constrained by CFI (kCFI/FineIBT).
>> This all sounds super theoretical.
>>
>> I don't think we should mess with any of this without there being some
>> sign that this is an actual, practical juicy exploit target.
>>
> Yes, I am sorry to reuse some incorrect comments I copied from v1.
> I'll remove the CFI-related content since we assume we already have
> control flow hijacking.

I think you missed the main point: this all sounds *SUPER* theoretical.
In other words, no real attacker would ever need to use ENTER like. Only
make-believe attackers in imaginary academic papers. Those imagined
attackers' only goal is to help mint PhD's.

Upstream, we're concerned with practical attacks, not theoretical ones.

You've done virtually nothing here to show that this is a practical
attack that someone might use in the real world, outside of the
PhD-minting industry.

Please don't even try to send a v3 without addressing this.

  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-29 23:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-29 21:47 Xiang Mei
2026-06-29 22:29 ` Dave Hansen
2026-06-29 23:28   ` Xiang Mei
2026-06-29 23:37     ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2026-06-30  1:22       ` Xiang Mei
2026-06-30 14:01         ` Dave Hansen
2026-06-30 14:58           ` Pedro Falcato
2026-07-01  7:23             ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-06-30 22:02           ` Xiang Mei
2026-06-30 22:05             ` Dave Hansen
2026-06-30 22:13               ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-06-30 22:47                 ` Xiang Mei
2026-06-30 23:40                   ` Dave Hansen
2026-06-30 23:48                     ` Xiang Mei
2026-07-01  7:19           ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-06-30 14:40     ` Pedro Falcato
2026-06-30 15:15       ` Dave Hansen
2026-06-30 21:54         ` Dave Hansen
2026-06-30 21:41       ` Xiang Mei
2026-07-01  7:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-07-01  7:48     ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-07-01  7:58       ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-07-01  8:31         ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-07-01 21:04           ` Xiang Mei
2026-07-10 18:58             ` Dave Hansen

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