From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id ; Tue, 7 Aug 2001 10:29:57 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id ; Tue, 7 Aug 2001 10:29:47 -0400 Received: from acmex.gatech.edu ([130.207.165.22]:27534 "EHLO acmex.gatech.edu") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id ; Tue, 7 Aug 2001 10:29:37 -0400 Message-Id: <5.1.0.14.2.20010807103637.00a88b60@pop.prism.gatech.edu> X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.1 Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2001 10:37:57 -0400 To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: David Maynor Subject: encrypted swap Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org >This is nonsense. Of course the computer can do this. This is exactly what we >already do for TCP sequence numbers, disk UUIDS, and many other things. >Granted, we need a little more initial entropy, but the principle has already >been established. >Remember that this is not the same as a crypted filesystem in that no user >(even root) need ever have any access to the key. That's important. Because >the swapspace is essentially wiped at powerup, the system can happily gen a new >key every boot, crypt away and never let the users know the key at all. This is a should-if debate, in my opinion. That is, not if you can do it, but should you. Has anybody thought of the performance hit that you would take encrypting your swap? David Maynor