From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id ; Tue, 7 Aug 2001 11:20:49 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id ; Tue, 7 Aug 2001 11:20:40 -0400 Received: from acmey.gatech.edu ([130.207.165.23]:44693 "EHLO acmey.gatech.edu") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id ; Tue, 7 Aug 2001 11:20:25 -0400 Message-Id: <5.1.0.14.2.20010807112251.00a8c440@pop.prism.gatech.edu> X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.1 Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2001 11:28:45 -0400 To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: David Maynor Subject: encrypted swap Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > >This is not about paranoia, this is about stolen notebooks. > >(And you can't easily add hundreds of megabytes to such systems >usually.) Then you can use a hardware token so that the machine will not boot at all with out it present or write an encrypted super block, but I can't really see the advantage of encrypted swap. At the point it would become effective, the attacker is already on the machine (from remote access or the have physical access) and then its not if you can keep them from getting the info, its only a matter of when.