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From: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
To: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
	Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 13/32] kmsan: Support SLAB_POISON
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2023 16:08:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <50846951de5c3c246c2c6263605a349a04a6ae45.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG_fn=WOfRvDw3r3zcZXWr8aa6MiEuKSa1etQrGVSJP+ic7=mg@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, 2023-11-16 at 15:55 +0100, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 15, 2023 at 9:34 PM Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
> wrote:
> > 
> > Avoid false KMSAN negatives with SLUB_DEBUG by allowing
> > kmsan_slab_free() to poison the freed memory, and by preventing
> > init_object() from unpoisoning new allocations.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
> > ---
> >  mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 2 +-
> >  mm/slub.c        | 3 ++-
> >  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
> > index 7b5814412e9f..7a30274b893c 100644
> > --- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
> > +++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
> > @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void kmsan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void
> > *object)
> >                 return;
> > 
> >         /* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the
> > RCU period */
> > -       if (unlikely(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU |
> > SLAB_POISON)))
> > +       if (unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
> >                 return;
> >         /*
> >          * If there's a constructor, freed memory must remain in
> > the same state
> > diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> > index 63d281dfacdb..8d9aa4d7cb7e 100644
> > --- a/mm/slub.c
> > +++ b/mm/slub.c
> > @@ -1024,7 +1024,8 @@ static __printf(3, 4) void slab_err(struct
> > kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab,
> >         add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
> >  }
> > 
> > -static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, u8
> > val)
> > +__no_sanitize_memory static void
> 
> __no_sanitize_memory should be used with great care, because it drops
> all instrumentation from the function, and any shadow writes will be
> lost.
> Won't it be better to add kmsan_poison() to init_object() if you want
> it to stay uninitialized?

I wanted to avoid a ping-pong here, in which we already have properly
poisoned memory, then memset() incorrectly unpoisons it, and then we
undo the damage. My first attempt involved using __memset() instead,
but this resulted in worse assembly code. I wish there were something
like memset_noinstr().

Right now init_object() doesn't seem to be doing anything besides these
memset()s, but this can of course change in the future. So I don't mind
using kmsan_poison() instead of __no_sanitize_memory here too much,
since it results in better maintainability.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-16 15:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-15 20:30 [PATCH 00/32] kmsan: Enable on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 01/32] ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in ftrace_ops_list_func() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 02/32] kmsan: Make the tests compatible with kmsan.panic=1 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16  9:27   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 03/32] kmsan: Disable KMSAN when DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabled Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16  9:41   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 04/32] kmsan: Increase the maximum store size to 4096 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 05/32] kmsan: Fix is_bad_asm_addr() on arches with overlapping address spaces Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 06/32] kmsan: Fix kmsan_copy_to_user() " Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16 10:13   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 07/32] kmsan: Remove a useless assignment from kmsan_vmap_pages_range_noflush() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16 10:52   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 08/32] kmsan: Remove an x86-specific #include from kmsan.h Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16  9:44   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 09/32] kmsan: Introduce kmsan_memmove_metadata() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 10/32] kmsan: Expose kmsan_get_metadata() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 11/32] kmsan: Export panic_on_kmsan Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16  9:14   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 12/32] kmsan: Allow disabling KMSAN checks for the current task Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16  8:56   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-16  9:17     ` Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 13/32] kmsan: Support SLAB_POISON Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16 14:55   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-16 15:08     ` Ilya Leoshkevich [this message]
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 14/32] kmsan: Use ALIGN_DOWN() in kmsan_get_metadata() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16  9:54   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 15/32] mm: slub: Let KMSAN access metadata Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 16/32] mm: kfence: Disable KMSAN when checking the canary Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 17/32] lib/string: Add KMSAN support to strlcpy() and strlcat() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 18/32] lib/zlib: Unpoison DFLTCC output buffers Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 19/32] kmsan: Accept ranges starting with 0 on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16 10:33   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 20/32] s390: Turn off KMSAN for boot, vdso and purgatory Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16  9:20   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 21/32] s390: Use a larger stack for KMSAN Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16  9:45   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 22/32] s390/boot: Add the KMSAN runtime stub Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 23/32] s390/checksum: Add a KMSAN check Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 24/32] s390/cpacf: Unpoison the results of cpacf_trng() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 25/32] s390/ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in kprobe_ftrace_handler() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 26/32] s390/mm: Define KMSAN metadata for vmalloc and modules Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16 15:03   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-17 16:41     ` Alexander Gordeev
2023-11-15 20:30 ` [PATCH 27/32] s390/string: Add KMSAN support Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16 21:42   ` kernel test robot
2023-11-15 20:31 ` [PATCH 28/32] s390/traps: Unpoison the kernel_stack_overflow()'s pt_regs Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16 15:32   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-15 20:31 ` [PATCH 29/32] s390/uaccess: Add KMSAN support to put_user() and get_user() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:31 ` [PATCH 30/32] s390/unwind: Disable KMSAN checks Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16  9:04   ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-16  9:05     ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-15 20:31 ` [PATCH 31/32] s390: Implement the architecture-specific kmsan functions Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-15 20:31 ` [PATCH 32/32] kmsan: Enable on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16  8:42 ` [PATCH 00/32] " Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-16 10:13   ` Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-16 10:22     ` Christian Borntraeger

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