From: Lord Glauber Costa of Sealand <glommer@parallels.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
<linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH review 3/6] userns: Recommend use of memory control groups.
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2013 11:37:25 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <51062AB5.9060203@parallels.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87txq4hedl.fsf@xmission.com>
On 01/26/2013 06:22 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
> In the help text describing user namespaces recommend use of memory
> control groups. In many cases memory control groups are the only
> mechanism there is to limit how much memory a user who can create
> user namespaces can use.
>
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> ---
> Documentation/namespaces/resource-control.txt | 10 ++++++++++
> init/Kconfig | 7 +++++++
> 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/namespaces/resource-control.txt
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/namespaces/resource-control.txt b/Documentation/namespaces/resource-control.txt
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..3d8178a
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/namespaces/resource-control.txt
> @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
> +There are a lot of kinds of objects in the kernel that don't have
> +individual limits or that have limits that are ineffective when a set
> +of processes is allowed to switch user ids. With user namespaces
> +enabled in a kernel for people who don't trust their users or their
> +users programs to play nice this problems becomes more acute.
> +
> +Therefore it is recommended that memory control groups be enabled in
> +kernels that enable user namespaces, and it is further recommended
> +that userspace configure memory control groups to limit how much
> +memory users they don't trust to play nice can use.
> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
> index 7d30240..c8c58bd 100644
> --- a/init/Kconfig
> +++ b/init/Kconfig
> @@ -1035,6 +1035,13 @@ config USER_NS
> help
> This allows containers, i.e. vservers, to use user namespaces
> to provide different user info for different servers.
> +
> + When user namespaces are enabled in the kernel it is
> + recommended that the MEMCG and MEMCG_KMEM options also be
> + enabled and that user-space use the memory control groups to
> + limit the amount of memory a memory unprivileged users can
> + use.
> +
> If unsure, say N.
Since this becomes an official recommendation that people will likely
follow, are we really that much concerned about the types of abuses the
MEMCG_KMEM will prevent? Those are mostly metadata-based abuses users
could do in their own local disks without mounting anything extra (and
things that look like that)
Unless there is a specific concern here, shouldn't we say "... that the
MEMCG (and possibly MEMCG_KMEM) options..." ?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-01-28 7:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-01-26 2:15 [PATCH review 0/6] miscelaneous user namespace patches Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-26 2:19 ` [PATCH review 1/6] userns: Avoid recursion in put_user_ns Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-26 20:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-01-28 14:51 ` Vasily Kulikov
2013-01-28 16:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-26 2:21 ` [PATCH review 2/6] userns: Allow any uid or gid mappings that don't overlap Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-26 21:08 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-01-28 14:28 ` Aristeu Rozanski
2013-01-28 14:41 ` Lord Glauber Costa of Sealand
2013-01-28 15:12 ` Aristeu Rozanski
2013-01-26 2:22 ` [PATCH review 3/6] userns: Recommend use of memory control groups Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-26 21:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-01-27 6:19 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-28 7:37 ` Lord Glauber Costa of Sealand [this message]
2013-01-28 7:50 ` Lord Glauber Costa of Sealand
2013-01-28 8:14 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-28 8:22 ` Lord Glauber Costa of Sealand
2013-01-28 16:19 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-28 16:37 ` Lord Glauber Costa of Sealand
2013-01-28 17:18 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-28 8:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-26 2:23 ` [PATCH review 4/6] userns: Allow the userns root to mount of devpts Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-26 21:22 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-01-26 2:26 ` [PATCH review 5/6] userns: Allow the userns root to mount ramfs Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-26 21:29 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-01-27 6:09 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-27 18:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-01-27 18:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-01-26 2:26 ` [PATCH review 6/6] userns: Allow the userns root to mount tmpfs Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-27 18:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-01-28 1:28 ` Gao feng
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