From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: "Maxime Bélair" <maxime.belair@canonical.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, mic@digikod.net,
kees@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
takedakn@nttdata.co.jp, penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp,
song@kernel.org, rdunlap@infradead.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 5/5] Smack: add support for lsm_config_self_policy and lsm_config_system_policy
Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2025 06:41:42 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5252d5ed-4e10-42c2-b0fd-071c04ce98f9@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251010132610.12001-6-maxime.belair@canonical.com>
On 10/10/2025 6:25 AM, Maxime Bélair wrote:
> Enable users to manage Smack policies through the new hooks
> lsm_config_self_policy and lsm_config_system_policy.
>
> lsm_config_self_policy allows adding Smack policies for the current cred.
> For now it remains restricted to CAP_MAC_ADMIN.
>
> lsm_config_system_policy allows adding globabl Smack policies. This is
> restricted to CAP_MAC_ADMIN.
>
> Signed-off-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com>
Apologies for the late review. I see that Paul has suggested the set
wait until the LSM namespace discussions have moved forward.
> ---
> security/smack/smack.h | 8 +++++
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/smack/smackfs.c | 2 +-
> 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
> index bf6a6ed3946c..3e3d30dfdcf7 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack.h
> +++ b/security/smack/smack.h
> @@ -275,6 +275,14 @@ struct smk_audit_info {
> #endif
> };
>
> +/*
> + * This function is in smackfs.c
> + */
> +ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> + size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
> + struct list_head *rule_list,
> + struct mutex *rule_lock, int format);
> +
> /*
> * These functions are in smack_access.c
> */
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 99833168604e..bf4bb2242768 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -5027,6 +5027,76 @@ static int smack_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>
> +/**
> + * smack_lsm_config_system_policy - Configure a system smack policy
Smack prefers to say "rule set" instead of "policy". Smack policy
doesn't change, but the allowed exceptions to the policy (rules)
are mutable.
> + * @op: operation to perform. Currently, only LSM_POLICY_LOAD is supported
> + * @buf: User-supplied buffer in the form "<fmt><policy>"
> + * <fmt> is the 1-byte format of <policy>
> + * <policy> is the policy to load
> + * @size: size of @buf
> + * @flags: reserved for future use; must be zero
> + *
> + * Returns: number of written rules on success, negative value on error
> + */
> +static int smack_lsm_config_system_policy(u32 op, void __user *buf, size_t size,
> + u32 flags)
> +{
> + loff_t pos = 0;
> + u8 fmt;
> +
> + if (op != LSM_POLICY_LOAD || flags)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + if (size < 2)
> + return -EINVAL;
There should be a max check as well.
> +
> + if (get_user(fmt, (uint8_t *)buf))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + return smk_write_rules_list(NULL, buf + 1, size - 1, &pos, NULL, NULL, fmt);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * smack_lsm_config_self_policy - Configure a smack policy for the current cred
> + * @op: operation to perform. Currently, only LSM_POLICY_LOAD is supported
> + * @buf: User-supplied buffer in the form "<fmt><policy>"
> + * <fmt> is the 1-byte format of <policy>
> + * <policy> is the policy to load
> + * @size: size of @buf
> + * @flags: reserved for future use; must be zero
> + *
> + * Returns: number of written rules on success, negative value on error
> + */
> +static int smack_lsm_config_self_policy(u32 op, void __user *buf, size_t size,
> + u32 flags)
> +{
> + loff_t pos = 0;
> + u8 fmt;
> + struct task_smack *tsp;
> +
> + if (op != LSM_POLICY_LOAD || flags)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + if (size < 2)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (get_user(fmt, (uint8_t *)buf))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + /**
> + * smk_write_rules_list could be used to gain privileges.
> + * This function is thus restricted to CAP_MAC_ADMIN.
> + * TODO: Ensure that the new rule does not give extra privileges
> + * before dropping this CAP_MAC_ADMIN check.
> + */
> + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> +
> + tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
> + return smk_write_rules_list(NULL, buf + 1, size - 1, &pos, &tsp->smk_rules,
> + &tsp->smk_rules_lock, fmt);
> +}
> +
> struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
> .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> @@ -5203,6 +5273,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, smack_uring_sqpoll),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, smack_uring_cmd),
> #endif
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsm_config_self_policy, smack_lsm_config_self_policy),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsm_config_system_policy, smack_lsm_config_system_policy),
> +
> };
>
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> index 90a67e410808..ed1814588d56 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> @@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_parse_long_rule(char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule,
> * "subject<whitespace>object<whitespace>
> * acc_enable<whitespace>acc_disable[<whitespace>...]"
> */
> -static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> +ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
> struct list_head *rule_list,
> struct mutex *rule_lock, int format)
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-04 14:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-10 13:25 [PATCH v6 0/5] lsm: introduce lsm_config_self_policy() and lsm_config_system_policy() syscalls Maxime Bélair
2025-10-10 13:25 ` [PATCH v6 1/5] Wire up lsm_config_self_policy and lsm_config_system_policy syscalls Maxime Bélair
2025-10-10 18:06 ` Song Liu
2025-10-10 21:13 ` Casey Schaufler
2025-10-11 12:07 ` kernel test robot
2025-10-10 13:25 ` [PATCH v6 2/5] lsm: introduce security_lsm_config_*_policy hooks Maxime Bélair
2025-10-10 13:25 ` [PATCH v6 3/5] AppArmor: add support for lsm_config_self_policy and lsm_config_system_policy Maxime Bélair
2025-10-10 13:25 ` [PATCH v6 4/5] SELinux: add support for lsm_config_system_policy Maxime Bélair
2025-10-10 13:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-10-10 14:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-10-10 14:57 ` Paul Moore
2025-10-10 13:25 ` [PATCH v6 5/5] Smack: add support for lsm_config_self_policy and lsm_config_system_policy Maxime Bélair
2025-10-10 15:15 ` Casey Schaufler
2025-11-04 14:41 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
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