From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>,
"linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [tip:x86/kaslr] x86, kaslr: Provide randomness functions
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2013 11:42:44 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <52813334.2040405@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+66dfv_048iDp+ZAv4_sS4si9cHG-8L_4zJ1OHHLxaUw@mail.gmail.com>
On 11/11/2013 11:37 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 11, 2013 at 11:27 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> wrote:
>> On 11/11/2013 10:20 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>>>
>>> Why aren't the 3 sources of entropy XOR-ed together?
>>
>> Note we don't want to poke i8254 if we have any other sources, as the
>> i8254 may not be present on newer systems and in some other cases not
>> safe to touch. We can XOR in the TSC with RDRAND although it seems a
>> bit odd.
>
> I await the final decision! :)
>
Use the i8254 if and only if nothing else is available, it isn't safe to
touch on some newer systems.
>> HOWEVER...
>>
>> + /* Only use the low bits of rdtsc. */
>> + random = raw & 0xffff;
>>
>> Why?! All that can do is throw away randomness...
>
> Due to the 2GiB addressing and 2MiB alignment, we can never use more
> than 10 bits of entropy at maximum. The existing patches only use 9
> bits (due to page table layouts) on 64-bit and 8 bits on 32-bit.
The point is that you are already doing that masking somewhere else, it
is just odd.
>> + /* Extend timer bits poorly... */
>> + random |= (random << 16);
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> + random |= (random << 32);
>> +#endif
>
> I did this so that any portion of the returned value could be used for
> the 10 bit mask.
Why? It is standard practice to only use the low bits, and in light of
the above it is even more bizarre. However, doing a circular multiply
might still spread in some additional entropy at least in the case of a
kexec boot on a non-RDRAND system.
>> For smearing out bits, a better way is usually to multiply with a large
>> prime number (preferably a circular multiply.)
>
> This shouldn't be needed since we're only using the low 10 bits.
None of the above is needed in that case, although a spreading multiply
will make it less likely that you are throwing away the highest entropy
bits.
> How would you like to see this function updated to make that more
> clear? More comments?
-hpa
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-11-11 19:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-10-11 0:18 [PATCH v8 0/6] Kernel base address randomization Kees Cook
2013-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH v8 1/6] x86, boot: move CPU flags out of cpucheck Kees Cook
2013-10-13 12:01 ` [tip:x86/kaslr] x86, boot: Move " tip-bot for Kees Cook
2013-10-13 12:02 ` [tip:x86/kaslr] x86, boot: Rename get_flags() and check_flags() to *_cpuflags() tip-bot for H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH v8 2/6] x86, kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel Kees Cook
2013-10-13 12:01 ` [tip:x86/kaslr] x86, kaslr: Return " tip-bot for Kees Cook
2013-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH v8 3/6] x86, kaslr: provide randomness functions Kees Cook
2013-10-13 12:01 ` [tip:x86/kaslr] x86, kaslr: Provide " tip-bot for Kees Cook
2013-11-11 18:20 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-11-11 18:31 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-11-11 19:32 ` Kees Cook
2013-11-11 19:37 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-11-11 20:07 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-11-11 20:11 ` Kees Cook
2013-11-11 20:16 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-11-11 19:27 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-11-11 19:37 ` Kees Cook
2013-11-11 19:42 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2013-11-11 19:58 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-11-11 20:04 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-11-11 20:09 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-11-13 18:16 ` Pavel Machek
2013-11-13 18:40 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-11-13 23:23 ` Pavel Machek
2013-11-13 23:25 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH v8 4/6] x86, kaslr: select random position from e820 maps Kees Cook
2013-10-13 12:01 ` [tip:x86/kaslr] x86, kaslr: Select " tip-bot for Kees Cook
2013-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH v8 5/6] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic Kees Cook
2013-10-13 12:01 ` [tip:x86/kaslr] x86, kaslr: Report " tip-bot for Kees Cook
2013-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH v8 6/6] x86, kaslr: raise max positions to 1GiB on x86_64 Kees Cook
2013-10-13 12:02 ` [tip:x86/kaslr] x86, kaslr: Raise the maximum virtual address to -1 GiB " tip-bot for Kees Cook
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