From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Nikolaus Voss <nv@vosn.de>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Yael Tzur <yaelt@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2022 10:43:14 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53730789a41358673b1715dd650706e9ffcb1199.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220919072317.E41421357@mail.steuer-voss.de>
On Fri, 2022-09-16 at 07:45 +0200, Nikolaus Voss wrote:
> Commit cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided
> decrypted data") added key instantiation with user provided decrypted data.
> The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer.
> Fix this to use hex2bin instead.
Thanks, Nikolaus. We iterated a number of times over what would be the
safest userspace input. One of the last changes was that the key data
should be hex-ascii-encoded. Unfortunately, the LTP
testcases/kernel/syscalls/keyctl09.c example isn't hex-ascii-encoded
and the example in Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
just cat's a file. Both expect the length to be the length of the
userspace provided data. With this patch, when hex2bin() fails, there
is no explanation.
--
thanks,
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-09-20 14:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-16 5:45 Nikolaus Voss
2022-09-20 5:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-20 7:58 ` Nikolaus Voss
2022-09-21 17:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-28 13:03 ` Nikolaus Voss
2022-09-20 14:43 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2022-09-20 16:23 ` Nikolaus Voss
2022-09-20 22:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-09-21 7:24 ` Nikolaus Voss
2022-09-21 12:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-09-28 12:08 ` Nikolaus Voss
2022-09-28 16:33 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-05 10:04 ` Nikolaus Voss
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=53730789a41358673b1715dd650706e9ffcb1199.camel@linux.ibm.com \
--to=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=nv@vosn.de \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=yaelt@google.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®