From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] Smack transmute fixes
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 14:31:10 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53897379-0c7a-4da7-870c-1eb7e822a129@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231116090125.187209-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
On 11/16/2023 1:01 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>
> The first two patches are obvious fixes, the first restricts setting the
> SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr only for directories, and the second makes it
> possible to set SMACK64TRANSMUTE if the filesystem does not support xattrs
> (e.g. ramfs).
>
> The remaining fixes are optional, and only required if we want filesystems
> without xattr support behave like those with xattr support. Since we have
> the inode_setsecurity and inode_getsecurity hooks to make the first group
> work, it seems useful to fix inode creation too (SELinux should be fine).
>
> The third patch is merely a code move out of the 'if (xattr)' condition.
> The fourth updates the security field of the in-memory inode directly in
> smack_inode_init_security() and marks the inode as instantiated,
I have taken patches 1-4 in smack-next. I'm still waiting on a convincing
approval for patch 5.
> and the
> fifth adds a security_inode_init_security() call in ramfs to initialize the
> security field of the in-memory inodes (needed to test transmuting
> directories).
>
> Both the Smack (on xfs) and IMA test suite succeed with all patches
> applied. Tests were not executed on v3 (trivial changes).
>
> By executing the tests in a ramfs, the results are:
>
> Without the patches:
> 86 Passed, 9 Failed, 90% Success rate
>
> With the patches:
> 93 Passed, 2 Failed, 97% Success rate
>
> The remaining two failures are:
> 2151 ioctl(4, BTRFS_IOC_CLONE or FICLONE, 3) = -1 EOPNOTSUPP (Operation not supported)
> 2152 lsetxattr("./targets/proc-attr-Snap", "security.SMACK64EXEC", "Pop", 3, 0) = -1 EOPNOTSUPP (Operation not supported)
>
> The first one is likely due ramfs lack of support for ioctl() while the
> second could be fixed by handling SMACK64EXEC in smack_inode_setsecurity().
>
> The patch set applies on top of lsm/dev, commit e246777e2a03 ("MAINTAINERS:
> update the LSM entry").
>
> The ramfs patch potentially could be useful to correctly initialize the
> label of new inodes in the initramfs, assuming that it will be fully
> labeled with support for xattrs in the cpio image:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20190523121803.21638-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com/
>
> Ramfs inode labels will be set from xattrs with the inode_setsecurity hook.
>
> Changelog
>
> v2:
> - Replace return with goto in the ramfs patch, for better maintainability
> (suggested by Andrew Morton)
>
> v1:
> - Rebase on top of latest lsm/next
> - Remove -EOPNOTSUPP check in patch 5 (cannot happen)
>
> Roberto Sassu (5):
> smack: Set SMACK64TRANSMUTE only for dirs in smack_inode_setxattr()
> smack: Handle SMACK64TRANSMUTE in smack_inode_setsecurity()
> smack: Always determine inode labels in smack_inode_init_security()
> smack: Initialize the in-memory inode in smack_inode_init_security()
> ramfs: Initialize security of in-memory inodes
>
> fs/ramfs/inode.c | 32 ++++++++++++-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
> 2 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-24 22:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-16 9:01 Roberto Sassu
2023-11-16 9:01 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] smack: Set SMACK64TRANSMUTE only for dirs in smack_inode_setxattr() Roberto Sassu
2023-11-16 9:01 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] smack: Handle SMACK64TRANSMUTE in smack_inode_setsecurity() Roberto Sassu
2023-11-16 9:01 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] smack: Always determine inode labels in smack_inode_init_security() Roberto Sassu
2023-11-16 9:01 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] smack: Initialize the in-memory inode " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-16 9:01 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] ramfs: Initialize security of in-memory inodes Roberto Sassu
2024-01-12 8:17 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-01-16 8:39 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-01-26 1:08 ` Andrew Morton
2024-01-26 7:53 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-01-26 16:27 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-01-24 22:31 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2024-01-25 8:44 ` [PATCH v3 0/5] Smack transmute fixes Roberto Sassu
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