From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Xen-devel@lists.xen.org" <Xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] NUMA_BALANCING and Xen PV guest regression in 3.20-rc0
Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2015 10:47:52 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <54E710D8.9020605@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFw-E=vRRq=jKMCJQn=qj6FZ0h8d6DZf2w3m44dmE_T6CA@mail.gmail.com>
On 20/02/15 01:49, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 19, 2015 at 5:05 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov
> <kirill@shutemov.name> wrote:
>> I'm feeling I miss very basic background on how Xen works, but why does it
>> set _PAGE_GLOBAL on userspace entries? It sounds strange to me.
> It is definitely strange. I'm guessing that it's some ancient Xen hack
> for the early Intel virtualization that used to have absolutely
> horrendous vmenter/exit costs, including very much the TLB overhead. \
>
> These days, Intel has address space identifiers, and doesn't flush the
> whole TLB on VM entry/exit, so it's probably pointless to play games
> with the global bit.
It was introduced in 2006, but has nothing to do with VT-x
http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=6f562e72cdc4b7e1519e23be75f812aebbf41db3
As long mode drops segment limit checking, the only way to protect a
64bit PV kernel from its userspace (both of which run in ring3 on user
pages) is to maintain two sets of pagetables and switch between them on
guest kernel/user context switches. The user set lack kernel mappings.
I can't comment about the performance impact of the patch (way before my
time), but the justification was to try and reduce the overhead of guest
context switches.
>
> I get the feeling that a lot of Xen stuff is that kind of "legacy
> hacks" that should just be cleaned up, but nobody has the energy or
> the interest.
Time, mainly.
There certainly are areas which should be up for re-evaluation, given 9
years of change in hardware.
> There was the whole odd crazy SHARED_KERNEL_PMD hackery too.
SHARED_KERNEL_PMD is an artefact of Xen living in the same virtual
address space as a PV guest, and needing to maintain linear mappings.
~Andrew
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-02-20 10:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-02-19 13:06 David Vrabel
2015-02-19 17:01 ` Mel Gorman
2015-02-23 15:13 ` [Xen-devel] " Dario Faggioli
2015-02-23 15:46 ` Mel Gorman
2015-02-19 23:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-02-20 10:28 ` [Xen-devel] " David Vrabel
2015-02-20 1:05 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2015-02-20 1:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-02-20 10:47 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2015-02-20 11:29 ` [Xen-devel] " Kirill A. Shutemov
2015-02-20 11:54 ` Andrew Cooper
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