From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 73BF9C43457 for ; Fri, 16 Oct 2020 12:19:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1DC8220708 for ; Fri, 16 Oct 2020 12:19:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2407425AbgJPMTS (ORCPT ); Fri, 16 Oct 2020 08:19:18 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34050 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2407405AbgJPMTR (ORCPT ); Fri, 16 Oct 2020 08:19:17 -0400 Received: from smtp-8fa9.mail.infomaniak.ch (smtp-8fa9.mail.infomaniak.ch [IPv6:2001:1600:3:17::8fa9]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ADE49C061755 for ; Fri, 16 Oct 2020 05:19:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp-3-0001.mail.infomaniak.ch (unknown [10.4.36.108]) by smtp-2-3000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4CCQDy0WxlzlhX9r; Fri, 16 Oct 2020 14:19:14 +0200 (CEST) Received: from ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu (unknown [94.23.54.103]) by smtp-3-0001.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 4CCQDx0z2wzlh8TJ; Fri, 16 Oct 2020 14:19:13 +0200 (CEST) Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] dm verity: Add support for signature verification with 2nd keyring To: Milan Broz , Mike Snitzer Cc: Alasdair Kergon , Andrew Morton , Deven Bowers , Jaskaran Khurana , dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , =?UTF-8?Q?Micka=c3=abl_Sala=c3=bcn?= References: <20201015150504.1319098-1-mic@digikod.net> <20201015165229.GA5513@redhat.com> <022e949e-00c4-d98a-b536-1c5f9e05c09c@digikod.net> From: =?UTF-8?Q?Micka=c3=abl_Sala=c3=bcn?= Message-ID: <55389f91-60a5-05db-b3e1-8f24aa356893@digikod.net> Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2020 14:19:12 +0200 User-Agent: MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-15 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 16/10/2020 13:08, Milan Broz wrote: > On 16/10/2020 10:49, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >> On 16/10/2020 10:29, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >>> >>> On 15/10/2020 18:52, Mike Snitzer wrote: >>>> Can you please explain why you've decided to make this a Kconfig CONFIG >>>> knob?  Why not either add: a dm-verity table argument? A dm-verity >>>> kernel module parameter? or both (to allow a particular default but >>>> then >>>> per-device override)? >>> >>> The purpose of signed dm-verity images is to authenticate files, or said >>> in another way, to enable the kernel to trust disk images in a flexible >>> way (i.e. thanks to certificate's chain of trust). Being able to update >>> such chain at run time requires to use the second trusted keyring. This >>> keyring automatically includes the certificate authorities from the >>> builtin trusted keyring, which are required to dynamically populate the >>> secondary trusted keyring with certificates signed by an already trusted >>> authority. The roots of trust must then be included at build time in the >>> builtin trusted keyring. >>> >>> To be meaningful, using dm-verity signatures implies to have a >>> restricted user space, i.e. even the root user has limited power over >>> the kernel and the rest of the system. Blindly trusting data provided by >>> user space (e.g. dm-verity table argument, kernel module parameter) >>> defeat the purpose of (mandatory) authenticated images. >>> >>>> >>>> Otherwise, _all_ DM verity devices will be configured to use secondary >>>> keyring fallback.  Is that really desirable? >>> >>> That is already the current state (on purpose). >> >> I meant that when DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG is set, dm-verity >> signature becomes mandatory. This new configuration >> DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING extend this trust to the >> secondary trusted keyring, which contains certificates signed (directly >> or indirectly) by CA from the builtin trusted keyring. >> >> So yes, this new (optional) configuration *extends* the source of trust >> for all dm-verity devices, and yes, it is desirable. I think it should >> have been this way from the beginning (as for other authentication >> mechanisms) but it wasn't necessary at that time. > > Well, I understand why you need a config option here. > And using the secondary keyring actually makes much more sense to me than > the original approach. > > But please do not forget that dm-verity is sometimes used in different > contexts where such strict in-kernel certificate trust is unnecessary. > With your configure options set, you deliberately remove the possibility > to configure such devices. It doesn't make sense to set DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG in generic distro because such policy is configured at build time in the kernel with hardcoded CAs. If the new option is not set then nothing change. I don't see why it could be an issue for use cases we previously defined (with DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG). > I understand that it is needed for "trusted" systems, but we should be > clear > in the documentation. > Maybe also add note to > /Documentation/admin-guide/device-mapper/verity.rst ? > We already mention DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG there. The current documentation remains true. DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING depends on DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG. > > The current userspace configuration through veritysetup does not need > any patches for your patch, correct? Right, it's only different from the kernel point of view. > > Thanks, > Milan >