From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753779AbbIAOND (ORCPT ); Tue, 1 Sep 2015 10:13:03 -0400 Received: from mail-pa0-f54.google.com ([209.85.220.54]:34417 "EHLO mail-pa0-f54.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752238AbbIAOM7 (ORCPT ); Tue, 1 Sep 2015 10:12:59 -0400 Message-ID: <55E5B257.6070205@quarksecurity.com> Date: Tue, 01 Sep 2015 10:12:39 -0400 From: Joshua Brindle User-Agent: Postbox 3.0.11 (Macintosh/20140602) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Paul Moore CC: "Luis R. Rodriguez" , Takashi Iwai , Ming Lei , David Howells , Peter Jones , "selinux@tycho.nsa.gov" , "Schaufler, Casey" , Stephen Smalley , Matthew Garrett , Kees Cook , =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Vojtech_Pavl=EDk?= , Seth Forshee , "james.l.morris@oracle.com" , Dmitry Kasatkin , Johannes Berg , Joey Lee , Kyle McMartin , "linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , Andy Lutomirski , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Vitaly Kuznetsov , David Woodhouse Subject: Re: Linux Firmware Signing References: <1440462367.2737.4.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1440464705.2737.36.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <14540.1440599584@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <31228.1440671938@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <36ddb60c1d22756234392a2d065a02cb.squirrel@twosheds.infradead.org> <20150827212907.GF8051@wotan.suse.de> <476DC76E7D1DF2438D32BFADF679FC560105ABD6@ORSMSX103.amr.corp.intel.com> <20150829020301.GM8051@wotan.suse.de> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Paul Moore wrote: > > Yes, there are lots of way we could solve the signed policy format > issue, I just don't have one in mind at this moment. Also, to be > honest, there are enough limitations to signing SELinux policies that > this isn't very high onmy personal SELinux priority list. > The fact that there are so many userspace specific parts of the policy that never make it into the kernel precludes any meaningful verification anyway. And SELinux already has a mechanism for raising the integrity of a process to do things like signature checking in userspace, the domain transition. If someone wants validation of the SELinux policy they just need to eliminate every domains ability to load policy except for a trusted policy loader that does signature checking.