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From: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	mpe@ellerman.id.au
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] Restrict devmem for confidential VMs
Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2025 16:41:27 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <55d0c2a9-54a3-4063-9f57-624e7eef4720@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <681005cdd3631_1d522948e@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com.notmuch>

Hi Dan

On 28/04/2025 23:48, Dan Williams wrote:
> Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 4/17/25 12:11, Dan Williams wrote:
>>>   arch/x86/Kconfig          |    4 ++++
>>>   arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c |   31 ++++---------------------------
>>>   drivers/char/mem.c        |   27 +++++++++------------------
>>>   include/linux/io.h        |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
>>>   4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
>>
>> This looks like a good idea on multiple levels. We can take it through
>> tip, but one things that makes me nervous is that neither of the "CHAR
>> and MISC DRIVERS" supporters are even on cc.
>>
>>> Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> (supporter:CHAR and MISC DRIVERS)
>>> Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (supporter:CHAR and MISC DRIVERS)
> 
> Good catch, just note that until this latest iteration the proposal was
> entirely contained to x86 specific support functions like devmem_is_allowed().
> So yes, an oversight as this moved to a more general devmem mechanism.
> 
>> I guess arm and powerpc have cc_platform_has() so it's not _completely_
>> x86 only, either. Acks from those folks would also be appreciated since
>> it's going to affect them most immediately.
> 
> I have added Suzuki and Michael for their awareness, but I would not say
> acks are needed at this point since to date CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT is
> strictly an x86-ism.
> 
> For example, the PowerPC implementation of cc_platform_has() has not been
> touched since Tom added it.
> 
> Suzuki, Michael, at a minimum the question this patch poses to ARM64 and
> PowerPC is whether they are going to allow CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=n, or otherwise
> understand that CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y == LOCKDOWN with
> CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT.

For CCA we don't really enforce STRICT_DEVMEM. But we do expect people
to use it for safety reasons, but is not mandatory.

Does that help ?

Suzuki



> 
>> Also, just to confirm, patch 2 can go to stable@ without _any_
>> dependency on patch 1, right?
> 
> Correct. I will make them independent / unordered patches on the repost.
> 
> Next posting to fix the "select" instead of "depends on" dependency
> management, h/t Naveen, and clarify the "'crash' vs 'SEPT violation'"
> description.


      parent reply	other threads:[~2025-04-30 15:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-17 19:11 Dan Williams
2025-04-17 19:12 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] x86/devmem: Remove duplicate range_is_allowed() definition Dan Williams
2025-04-17 19:30   ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-17 19:12 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] x86/devmem: Drop /dev/mem access for confidential guests Dan Williams
2025-04-17 19:33   ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-17 22:31   ` kernel test robot
2025-04-17 23:24   ` kernel test robot
2025-04-18 20:04   ` [PATCH v4 " Dan Williams
2025-04-22 13:38     ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-04-23 17:18     ` Naveen N Rao
2025-04-23 20:36       ` Dan Williams
2025-04-24  6:35         ` Naveen N Rao
2025-04-28 15:53     ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-28 16:30       ` Jianxiong Gao
2025-04-28 16:36         ` Dave Hansen
2025-05-07  5:44   ` [PATCH v3 " kernel test robot
2025-04-22 14:09 ` [PATCH v3 0/2] Restrict devmem for confidential VMs Nikolay Borisov
2025-04-28 15:50 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-28 22:48   ` Dan Williams
2025-04-29  0:37     ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-30 15:41     ` Suzuki K Poulose [this message]

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