From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753360AbcGSJWL (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Jul 2016 05:22:11 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:11760 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752974AbcGSJWI (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Jul 2016 05:22:08 -0400 X-IBM-Helo: d06dlp02.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com X-IBM-MailFrom: borntraeger@de.ibm.com X-IBM-RcptTo: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org;linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org;sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy To: Kees Cook , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <1468619065-3222-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <1468619065-3222-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Balbir Singh , Daniel Micay , Josh Poimboeuf , Rik van Riel , Casey Schaufler , PaX Team , Brad Spengler , Russell King , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Ard Biesheuvel , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Michael Ellerman , Tony Luck , Fenghua Yu , "David S. Miller" , x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter , Pekka Enberg , David Rientjes , Joonsoo Kim , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Borislav Petkov , Mathias Krause , Jan Kara , Vitaly Wool , Andrea Arcangeli , Dmitry Vyukov , Laura Abbott , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com From: Christian Borntraeger Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 11:21:13 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1468619065-3222-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-MML: disable X-Content-Scanned: Fidelis XPS MAILER x-cbid: 16071909-0008-0000-0000-0000029FB544 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 16071909-0009-0000-0000-0000191FE496 Message-Id: <578DF109.5030704@de.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:,, definitions=2016-07-19_06:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1604210000 definitions=main-1607190102 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 07/15/2016 11:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > +config HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING > + bool > + help > + An architecture should select this if it has a secondary linear > + mapping of the kernel text. This is used to verify that kernel > + text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. I have trouble parsing this. (What does secondary linear mapping mean?) So let me give an example below > + [...] > +/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */ > +static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr, > + unsigned long n) > +{ > + unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext; > + unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext; > + > + if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh)) > + return ""; > + > +#ifdef HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING > + /* Check against linear mapping as well. */ > + if (overlaps(ptr, n, (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow)), > + (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh)))) > + return ""; > +#endif > + > + return NULL; > +} s390 has an address space for user (primary address space from 0..4TB/8PB) and a separate address space (home space from 0..4TB/8PB) for the kernel. In this home space the kernel mapping is virtual containing the physical memory as well as vmalloc memory (creating aliases into the physical one). The kernel text is mapped from _stext to _etext in this mapping. So I assume this would qualify for HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING ?