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From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
To: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Hiker Cl <clhiker365@gmail.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	 Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	Andrii Nakryiko	 <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	 Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>,
	Ihor Solodrai	 <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Paul Chaignon	 <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>,
	Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>,
	Shung-Hsi Yu	 <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>,
	KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev>,
	Daniel Wade	 <danjwade95@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, 	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf 1/2] bpf: fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 11:25:25 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <57a57ed806a954de19774b7c0833dc1742560cd2.camel@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260819125840.286434-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>

On Wed, 2026-08-19 at 20:58 +0800, Jiayuan Chen wrote:
> Take the following unprivileged program as an example:
> 
> 	r0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(...)	/* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, offset 0 */
> 	...
> 	14: r0 += r1			/* r1 is a bounded scalar */
> 	15: r9 = r0
> 
> Loading it triggers a verifier warning from reg_bounds_sanity_check():
> 
> 	verifier bug: REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (alu): const subreg tnum out
> 	of sync with range bounds r64={.base=0x0, .size=0x0}
> 	r32={.base=0x0, .size=0xffffffff} var_off=(0x0, 0x0)
> 
> What happens:
> 
> 1. Processing insn 14 (r0 += r1) in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the new
>    offset is computed into dst_reg's var_off and 32/64-bit ranges.
> 
> 2. Because pointer registers do not track 32-bit subregister bounds,
>    __mark_reg32_unbounded() first sets r32 to the full range; r32 is
>    re-derived from the offset at the end of the function by
>    reg_bounds_sync().
> 
> 3. On the unprivileged path, sanitize_ptr_alu() is called and, via
>    sanitize_speculative_path() -> push_stack(), snapshots the current
>    register state and schedules the next instruction (insn 15) to be
>    verified directly as a speculative path.
> 
> 4. That snapshot is taken between step 2 and the final reg_bounds_sync():
>    at this point dst_reg's var_off still holds the (const) original
>    offset while r32 has just been blanked to the full range, i.e. the two
>    are out of sync. When the speculative path later verifies insn 15
>    (r9 = r0), the inconsistent state reaches reg_bounds_sanity_check() and
>    trips the warning.
> 
> var_off and the 32-bit range must always be consistent. There are two
> ways to keep the snapshot consistent:
> 
>   1. sync var_off and r32 before the snapshot so they match, or
>   2. leave r32 at its original (already consistent) value and blank it
>      only after the snapshot.
> 
> The whole point of sanitize_ptr_alu() is to insert a harmless masking
> sequence that keeps the access in bounds under speculation, so the state
> it snapshots should faithfully represent that. Take approach 2: move
> __mark_reg32_unbounded() to after sanitize_ptr_alu(), so the speculative
> snapshot keeps the pointer's original, consistent r32. The non-speculative
> path is unchanged: r32 is still blanked before the offset is applied and
> re-derived by reg_bounds_sync().
> 
> Fixes: 5f99f312bd3b ("bpf: add register bounds sanity checks and sanitization")
> Reported-by: Hiker Cl <clhiker365@gmail.com>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAGM=xGB1fJ9kT8XTitVo74B0WGqgjkoUHdLwzytwV0AyqeVApw@mail.gmail.com/
> Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
> ---

Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>

>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 11 ++++++++---
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index d17f14b35b79..d79038a8da10 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -14558,9 +14558,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  	}
>  
> -	/* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */
> -	__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
> -
>  	if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
>  		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
>  				       &info, false);
> @@ -14568,6 +14565,14 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn
>  			return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret);
>  	}
>  
> +	/* Pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. Blank r32
> +	 * only after sanitize_ptr_alu() may have snapshotted dst_reg into a
> +	 * speculative path: otherwise that snapshot freezes a const offset
> +	 * with an unbounded r32, which later trips reg_bounds_sanity_check().
> +	 * reg_bounds_sync() below re-derives r32 from the updated offset.
> +	 */

Nit: comment is a bit too verbose. "... otherwise reg_bounds_sanity_check()
     might hit some constraints violations" should have been enough.

> +	__mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
> +
>  	switch (opcode) {
>  	case BPF_ADD:
>  		/*

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-08-20 18:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-19 12:58 Jiayuan Chen
2026-08-19 12:58 ` [PATCH bpf 2/2] selftests/bpf: Add reg-invariants test for " Jiayuan Chen
2026-08-19 13:49   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-20 18:26   ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-20 18:25 ` Eduard Zingerman [this message]
2026-08-20 18:45   ` [PATCH bpf 1/2] bpf: fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on " Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-08-20 18:50 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf

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