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From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2024 15:15:17 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <588319e8-5983-4f15-abae-b5021f1e4fce@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241021053921.33274-5-jarkko@kernel.org>



On 10/21/24 1:39 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Move allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that the
> field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not.
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
> Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions")
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> ---
> v5:
> - No changes.
> v4:
> - Change to bug.
> v3:
> - No changes.
> v2:
> - A new patch.
> ---
>   drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
>   1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> index 78c650ce4c9f..6e52785de9fd 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> @@ -484,7 +484,8 @@ static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v,
>   	sha256_final(&sctx, out);
>   }
>   
> -static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
> +static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip,
> +				struct tpm2_auth *auth)
>   {
>   	struct crypto_kpp *kpp;
>   	struct kpp_request *req;
> @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   	sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ);
>   	sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ);
>   	kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2);
> -	sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ);
> +	sg_init_one(d, auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ);
>   	kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ);
>   	crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req);
>   	kpp_request_free(req);
> @@ -554,8 +555,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   	 * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it
>   	 * writes the salt
>   	 */
> -	tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x,
> -		  chip->auth->salt);
> +	tpm2_KDFe(auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, auth->salt);
>   
>    out:
>   	crypto_free_kpp(kpp);
> @@ -854,6 +854,8 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
>   			/* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */
>   			tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
>   		memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
> +		kfree(auth);
> +		chip->auth = NULL;
>   	} else {
>   		/* reset for next use  */
>   		auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> @@ -882,6 +884,8 @@ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   
>   	tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
>   	memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
> +	kfree(auth);
> +	chip->auth = NULL;
>   }
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session);
>   
> @@ -970,25 +974,29 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key)
>    */
>   int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   {
> +	struct tpm2_auth *auth;
>   	struct tpm_buf buf;
> -	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
> -	int rc;
>   	u32 null_key;
> +	int rc;
>   
> -	if (!auth) {
> -		dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n");
> +	if (chip->auth) {
> +		dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is active\n");
>   		return 0;
>   	}
>   
> +	auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!auth)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
>   	rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key);
>   	if (rc)
> -		goto out;
> +		goto err;
>   
>   	auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
>   
>   	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS);
>   	if (rc)
> -		goto out;
> +		goto err;
>   
>   	/* salt key handle */
>   	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key);
> @@ -1000,7 +1008,7 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   	tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
>   
>   	/* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */
> -	tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip);
> +	tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth);
>   	/* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */
>   	tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC);
>   
> @@ -1021,10 +1029,13 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   
>   	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
>   
> -	if (rc)
> -		goto out;
> +	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
> +		chip->auth = auth;
> +		return 0;
> +	}
>   
> - out:
> +err:

like in many other cases before kfree(auth):
memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));

With this:

Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>

> +	kfree(auth);
>   	return rc;
>   }
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session);
> @@ -1377,10 +1388,6 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>   		return rc;
>   	}
>   
> -	chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL);
> -	if (!chip->auth)
> -		return -ENOMEM;
> -
>   	return rc;
>   }
>   #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */


  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-23 19:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-21  5:39 [PATCH v7 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-21  5:39 ` [PATCH v7 1/5] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_null_primary() failure Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-23 17:46   ` Stefan Berger
2024-10-24 11:22     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-21  5:39 ` [PATCH v7 2/5] tpm: Implement tpm2_load_null() rollback Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-23 17:38   ` Stefan Berger
2024-10-21  5:39 ` [PATCH v7 3/5] tpm: flush the null key only when /dev/tpm0 is accessed Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-23 18:18   ` Stefan Berger
2024-10-24 11:25     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-21  5:39 ` [PATCH v7 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session() Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-23 19:15   ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2024-10-24 11:28     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-24 12:59       ` Stefan Berger
2024-10-25 14:45         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-21  5:39 ` [PATCH v7 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-23 19:28   ` Stefan Berger

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