From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2024 15:15:17 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <588319e8-5983-4f15-abae-b5021f1e4fce@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241021053921.33274-5-jarkko@kernel.org>
On 10/21/24 1:39 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Move allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that the
> field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not.
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
> Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions")
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> ---
> v5:
> - No changes.
> v4:
> - Change to bug.
> v3:
> - No changes.
> v2:
> - A new patch.
> ---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
> 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> index 78c650ce4c9f..6e52785de9fd 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> @@ -484,7 +484,8 @@ static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v,
> sha256_final(&sctx, out);
> }
>
> -static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
> +static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip,
> + struct tpm2_auth *auth)
> {
> struct crypto_kpp *kpp;
> struct kpp_request *req;
> @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
> sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ);
> sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ);
> kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2);
> - sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ);
> + sg_init_one(d, auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ);
> kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ);
> crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req);
> kpp_request_free(req);
> @@ -554,8 +555,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
> * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it
> * writes the salt
> */
> - tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x,
> - chip->auth->salt);
> + tpm2_KDFe(auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, auth->salt);
>
> out:
> crypto_free_kpp(kpp);
> @@ -854,6 +854,8 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> /* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */
> tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
> memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
> + kfree(auth);
> + chip->auth = NULL;
> } else {
> /* reset for next use */
> auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> @@ -882,6 +884,8 @@ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>
> tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
> memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
> + kfree(auth);
> + chip->auth = NULL;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session);
>
> @@ -970,25 +974,29 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key)
> */
> int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> {
> + struct tpm2_auth *auth;
> struct tpm_buf buf;
> - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
> - int rc;
> u32 null_key;
> + int rc;
>
> - if (!auth) {
> - dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n");
> + if (chip->auth) {
> + dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is active\n");
> return 0;
> }
>
> + auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!auth)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key);
> if (rc)
> - goto out;
> + goto err;
>
> auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
>
> rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS);
> if (rc)
> - goto out;
> + goto err;
>
> /* salt key handle */
> tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key);
> @@ -1000,7 +1008,7 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
>
> /* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */
> - tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip);
> + tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth);
> /* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */
> tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC);
>
> @@ -1021,10 +1029,13 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>
> tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
>
> - if (rc)
> - goto out;
> + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
> + chip->auth = auth;
> + return 0;
> + }
>
> - out:
> +err:
like in many other cases before kfree(auth):
memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
With this:
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> + kfree(auth);
> return rc;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session);
> @@ -1377,10 +1388,6 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> return rc;
> }
>
> - chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!chip->auth)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> -
> return rc;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-23 19:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-21 5:39 [PATCH v7 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-21 5:39 ` [PATCH v7 1/5] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_null_primary() failure Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-23 17:46 ` Stefan Berger
2024-10-24 11:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-21 5:39 ` [PATCH v7 2/5] tpm: Implement tpm2_load_null() rollback Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-23 17:38 ` Stefan Berger
2024-10-21 5:39 ` [PATCH v7 3/5] tpm: flush the null key only when /dev/tpm0 is accessed Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-23 18:18 ` Stefan Berger
2024-10-24 11:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-21 5:39 ` [PATCH v7 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session() Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-23 19:15 ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2024-10-24 11:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-24 12:59 ` Stefan Berger
2024-10-25 14:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-21 5:39 ` [PATCH v7 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-23 19:28 ` Stefan Berger
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=588319e8-5983-4f15-abae-b5021f1e4fce@linux.ibm.com \
--to=stefanb@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=jgg@ziepe.ca \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=peterhuewe@gmx.de \
--cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®