From: peter enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: "Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
"Thiébaud Weksteen" <tweek@google.com>,
"Nick Kralevich" <nnk@google.com>,
"Eric Paris" <eparis@parisplace.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Mauro Carvalho Chehab" <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Rob Herring" <robh@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"SElinux list" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] selinux: add permission names to trace event
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 15:39:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5a545bde-0158-b7f8-94d7-525591db23a1@sony.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhTLOWsD9LbVGBj=o3N3SPe-uJDvrdQAySy6MmE4uyuzng@mail.gmail.com>
On 8/21/20 3:19 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 21, 2020 at 8:29 AM Stephen Smalley
> <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 10:31 PM Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> wrote:
>>> On Wed, 19 Aug 2020 09:11:08 -0400
>>> Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> So we'll need to update this plugin whenever we modify
>>>> security/selinux/include/classmap.h to keep them in sync. Is that a
>>>> concern? I don't suppose the plugin could directly include classmap.h?
>>>> I guess we'd have to export it as a public header. It isn't considered
>>>> to be part of the kernel API/ABI and can change anytime (but in practice
>>>> changes are not that frequent, and usually just additive in nature).
>>> Yes, it would require some stability between userspace and the plugin.
>>> If the value indexes don't change then that would work fine. If you add
>>> new ones, that too should be OK, just have a way to state "unknown" in
>>> the plugin.
>> Since we introduced the dynamic class/perm mapping support, it has
>> been possible for the values of existing classes/permissions to
>> change, and that has happened at time, e.g. when we added watch
>> permissions to the common file perms, that shifted the values of the
>> class file perms like entrypoint, when we added the process2 class
>> right after the process class, it shifted the values of all the
>> subsequent classes in the classmap.h. So you can't rely on those
>> values remaining stable across kernel versions.
> I think it is becoming increasingly clear that generating the
> permission set string in userspace isn't really workable without
> breaking the dynamic class/permission mapping to some degree.
> Unfortunately I don't see these perf changes as a big enough "win" to
> offset the loss of the dynamic mapping loss.
>
> I'm okay with merging patches 1/3 and 2/3 wth the changes Stephen
> suggested, but I think we will need to leave patch 3/3 out of this for
> now.
>
Ok.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-21 13:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-17 17:07 [PATCH v3 0/3] selinux: add detailed tracepoint on audited events Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-17 17:07 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] selinux: add " Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-18 14:31 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-17 17:07 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] selinux: add basic filtering for audit trace events Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-18 14:36 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-17 17:07 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] selinux: add permission names to trace event Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-17 20:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-17 20:29 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-18 16:09 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-19 13:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-21 2:31 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-21 12:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-21 13:19 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-21 13:39 ` peter enderborg [this message]
[not found] ` <CA+zpnLfNjDwxgoG2p3W8YfXxYVQDum4Eh_MJQvKP4rGLqsqACA@mail.gmail.com>
2020-08-21 13:46 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-17 20:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-18 8:11 ` peter enderborg
2020-08-18 12:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-21 2:22 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-21 5:53 ` peter enderborg
2020-08-21 12:14 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-21 13:10 ` Paul Moore
[not found] ` <20200824132252.31261-1-peter.enderborg@sony.com>
2020-08-24 13:22 ` [RFC PATCH] selinux: Add denied trace with permssion filter Peter Enderborg
2020-08-26 13:42 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-26 14:34 ` peter enderborg
2020-08-26 14:45 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-26 15:06 ` peter enderborg
2020-08-27 13:30 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-27 14:04 ` peter enderborg
2020-08-31 14:16 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-31 14:19 ` Robert Judy
2020-08-31 14:24 ` Paul Moore
2020-08-31 15:34 ` peter enderborg
2020-09-01 15:31 ` Paul Moore
2020-09-01 17:18 ` peter enderborg
2020-09-18 1:47 ` Steven Rostedt
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