From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Richard Hughes <hughsient@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Gutson <daniel@eclypsium.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Rahul Tanwar <rahul.tanwar@linux.intel.com>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Ability to read the MKTME status from userspace
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2020 08:36:02 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5bc72926-2193-79af-0139-97bd63857129@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAD2FfiEit9HR_ikc3WQXg9c_hyNHtk6b0rVnYJd-R8gJ7tbQOw@mail.gmail.com>
On 6/19/20 8:02 AM, Richard Hughes wrote:
>> Someone does 'cat /proc/mktme' (or whatever) and it says "1" or
>> whatever, which means yay, encryption is on. What do they do?
> I think "is my memory encrypted" for Intel has to be a superset of:
>
> 1. TME in CPU info
> 2. not disabled by the platform
> 3. not using unencrypted swap
> 4. not using a memory accelerator
> 5. entire DRAM area is marked with EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO
Also realize that this can all be true at one point in time, but can
change if memory is added.
> It seems the only way to answer the questions and make it easy for the
> consumer to know the answer is to ask the kernel for each of the 5
> different questions. At the moment we can only get 1, 3, maybe 4, soon
> to be 5, but not 2.
Actually, the accelerators I had in mind would show up in the memory map
and would have EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO properly set by the firmware.
In any case, if we do something like this, I think it fundamentally
needs to be more fine-grained than the whole system. It probably needs
to be on a per-NUMA-node basis. That's really the only way for us to
provide meaningful promises about encryption to end users.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-19 15:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-18 21:02 Daniel Gutson
2020-06-18 21:08 ` Dave Hansen
[not found] ` <CAFmMkTHNxSN_uWtm63TdkGxj44NXQQKEOmATXhjA=4DSCS92kQ@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-18 22:01 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <CAFmMkTGMAu-huTnP1aeMb_W4NddbTD_b2jhbDVKBDrkwgB97wg@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-19 7:40 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <CAFmMkTGV0ZR6C=EBGQAiz1vw1vrUXSLTnH5ZbBUvfhPLg_tF6g@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-19 13:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 13:31 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 13:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 13:50 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 15:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-19 16:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 16:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-19 16:31 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 16:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 16:33 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 16:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-19 16:47 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 19:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-19 19:58 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 20:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-19 20:24 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-22 9:34 ` Boris Petkov
2020-06-18 23:52 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19 7:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 13:25 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 13:33 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19 13:37 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 13:58 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19 14:09 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 14:23 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19 14:36 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 14:48 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19 15:02 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 15:36 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2020-06-19 7:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
[not found] ` <CAFmMkTF7QBJQdKxhsPiUPifsxykyCVv=NYandpB0z8EccAxMXw@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-19 14:02 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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