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(p200300d82f09f500a38fd08659d409df.dip0.t-ipconnect.de. [2003:d8:2f09:f500:a38f:d086:59d4:9df]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id h17-20020a5d5051000000b0032d9523de65sm4924485wrt.48.2023.11.13.01.15.06 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 13 Nov 2023 01:15:06 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <60081af2-d580-4f82-9233-3d3d7dd883bc@redhat.com> Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2023 10:15:05 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [BUG?] mm/secretmem: memory address mapped to memfd_secret can be used in write syscall. Content-Language: en-US To: David Wang <00107082@163.com>, akpm@linux-foundation.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <61159548.60cf.18baec1fd65.Coremail.00107082@163.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport From: David Hildenbrand Autocrypt: addr=david@redhat.com; keydata= xsFNBFXLn5EBEAC+zYvAFJxCBY9Tr1xZgcESmxVNI/0ffzE/ZQOiHJl6mGkmA1R7/uUpiCjJ dBrn+lhhOYjjNefFQou6478faXE6o2AhmebqT4KiQoUQFV4R7y1KMEKoSyy8hQaK1umALTdL QZLQMzNE74ap+GDK0wnacPQFpcG1AE9RMq3aeErY5tujekBS32jfC/7AnH7I0v1v1TbbK3Gp XNeiN4QroO+5qaSr0ID2sz5jtBLRb15RMre27E1ImpaIv2Jw8NJgW0k/D1RyKCwaTsgRdwuK Kx/Y91XuSBdz0uOyU/S8kM1+ag0wvsGlpBVxRR/xw/E8M7TEwuCZQArqqTCmkG6HGcXFT0V9 PXFNNgV5jXMQRwU0O/ztJIQqsE5LsUomE//bLwzj9IVsaQpKDqW6TAPjcdBDPLHvriq7kGjt WhVhdl0qEYB8lkBEU7V2Yb+SYhmhpDrti9Fq1EsmhiHSkxJcGREoMK/63r9WLZYI3+4W2rAc UucZa4OT27U5ZISjNg3Ev0rxU5UH2/pT4wJCfxwocmqaRr6UYmrtZmND89X0KigoFD/XSeVv jwBRNjPAubK9/k5NoRrYqztM9W6sJqrH8+UWZ1Idd/DdmogJh0gNC0+N42Za9yBRURfIdKSb B3JfpUqcWwE7vUaYrHG1nw54pLUoPG6sAA7Mehl3nd4pZUALHwARAQABzSREYXZpZCBIaWxk ZW5icmFuZCA8ZGF2aWRAcmVkaGF0LmNvbT7CwZgEEwEIAEICGwMGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQW AgMBAh4BAheAAhkBFiEEG9nKrXNcTDpGDfzKTd4Q9wD/g1oFAl8Ox4kFCRKpKXgACgkQTd4Q 9wD/g1oHcA//a6Tj7SBNjFNM1iNhWUo1lxAja0lpSodSnB2g4FCZ4R61SBR4l/psBL73xktp rDHrx4aSpwkRP6Epu6mLvhlfjmkRG4OynJ5HG1gfv7RJJfnUdUM1z5kdS8JBrOhMJS2c/gPf wv1TGRq2XdMPnfY2o0CxRqpcLkx4vBODvJGl2mQyJF/gPepdDfcT8/PY9BJ7FL6Hrq1gnAo4 3Iv9qV0JiT2wmZciNyYQhmA1V6dyTRiQ4YAc31zOo2IM+xisPzeSHgw3ONY/XhYvfZ9r7W1l pNQdc2G+o4Di9NPFHQQhDw3YTRR1opJaTlRDzxYxzU6ZnUUBghxt9cwUWTpfCktkMZiPSDGd KgQBjnweV2jw9UOTxjb4LXqDjmSNkjDdQUOU69jGMUXgihvo4zhYcMX8F5gWdRtMR7DzW/YE BgVcyxNkMIXoY1aYj6npHYiNQesQlqjU6azjbH70/SXKM5tNRplgW8TNprMDuntdvV9wNkFs 9TyM02V5aWxFfI42+aivc4KEw69SE9KXwC7FSf5wXzuTot97N9Phj/Z3+jx443jo2NR34XgF 89cct7wJMjOF7bBefo0fPPZQuIma0Zym71cP61OP/i11ahNye6HGKfxGCOcs5wW9kRQEk8P9 M/k2wt3mt/fCQnuP/mWutNPt95w9wSsUyATLmtNrwccz63XOwU0EVcufkQEQAOfX3n0g0fZz Bgm/S2zF/kxQKCEKP8ID+Vz8sy2GpDvveBq4H2Y34XWsT1zLJdvqPI4af4ZSMxuerWjXbVWb T6d4odQIG0fKx4F8NccDqbgHeZRNajXeeJ3R7gAzvWvQNLz4piHrO/B4tf8svmRBL0ZB5P5A 2uhdwLU3NZuK22zpNn4is87BPWF8HhY0L5fafgDMOqnf4guJVJPYNPhUFzXUbPqOKOkL8ojk CXxkOFHAbjstSK5Ca3fKquY3rdX3DNo+EL7FvAiw1mUtS+5GeYE+RMnDCsVFm/C7kY8c2d0G NWkB9pJM5+mnIoFNxy7YBcldYATVeOHoY4LyaUWNnAvFYWp08dHWfZo9WCiJMuTfgtH9tc75 7QanMVdPt6fDK8UUXIBLQ2TWr/sQKE9xtFuEmoQGlE1l6bGaDnnMLcYu+Asp3kDT0w4zYGsx 5r6XQVRH4+5N6eHZiaeYtFOujp5n+pjBaQK7wUUjDilPQ5QMzIuCL4YjVoylWiBNknvQWBXS lQCWmavOT9sttGQXdPCC5ynI+1ymZC1ORZKANLnRAb0NH/UCzcsstw2TAkFnMEbo9Zu9w7Kv AxBQXWeXhJI9XQssfrf4Gusdqx8nPEpfOqCtbbwJMATbHyqLt7/oz/5deGuwxgb65pWIzufa N7eop7uh+6bezi+rugUI+w6DABEBAAHCwXwEGAEIACYCGwwWIQQb2cqtc1xMOkYN/MpN3hD3 AP+DWgUCXw7HsgUJEqkpoQAKCRBN3hD3AP+DWrrpD/4qS3dyVRxDcDHIlmguXjC1Q5tZTwNB boaBTPHSy/Nksu0eY7x6HfQJ3xajVH32Ms6t1trDQmPx2iP5+7iDsb7OKAb5eOS8h+BEBDeq 3ecsQDv0fFJOA9ag5O3LLNk+3x3q7e0uo06XMaY7UHS341ozXUUI7wC7iKfoUTv03iO9El5f XpNMx/YrIMduZ2+nd9Di7o5+KIwlb2mAB9sTNHdMrXesX8eBL6T9b+MZJk+mZuPxKNVfEQMQ a5SxUEADIPQTPNvBewdeI80yeOCrN+Zzwy/Mrx9EPeu59Y5vSJOx/z6OUImD/GhX7Xvkt3kq Er5KTrJz3++B6SH9pum9PuoE/k+nntJkNMmQpR4MCBaV/J9gIOPGodDKnjdng+mXliF3Ptu6 3oxc2RCyGzTlxyMwuc2U5Q7KtUNTdDe8T0uE+9b8BLMVQDDfJjqY0VVqSUwImzTDLX9S4g/8 kC4HRcclk8hpyhY2jKGluZO0awwTIMgVEzmTyBphDg/Gx7dZU1Xf8HFuE+UZ5UDHDTnwgv7E th6RC9+WrhDNspZ9fJjKWRbveQgUFCpe1sa77LAw+XFrKmBHXp9ZVIe90RMe2tRL06BGiRZr jPrnvUsUUsjRoRNJjKKA/REq+sAnhkNPPZ/NNMjaZ5b8Tovi8C0tmxiCHaQYqj7G2rgnT0kt WNyWQQ== Organization: Red Hat In-Reply-To: <61159548.60cf.18baec1fd65.Coremail.00107082@163.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 08.11.23 12:47, David Wang wrote: > > Hi, > According to https://lwn.net/Articles/865256/, > the memory address got from memfd_secret/ftruncate/mmap should not be used by syscalls, since it is not accessible even by kernel. > > But my test result shows that the "secret" memory could be used in syscall write, is this expected behavior? > This is my test code: CCing Mike. According to the man page: "The memory areas backing the file created with memfd_secret(2) are visible only to the processes that have access to the file descriptor. The memory region is removed from the kernel page tables and only the page tables of the processes holding the file descriptor map the corresponding physical memory. (Thus, the pages in the region can't be accessed by the kernel itself, so that, for example, pointers to the region can't be passed to system calls.) I'm not sure if the last part is actually true, if the syscalls end up walking user page tables to copy data in/out. > > int main() { > int fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0); > if (fd < 0) { > perror("Fail to create secret"); > return -1; > } > if (ftruncate(fd, 1024) < 0) { > perror("Fail to size the secret"); > return -1; > } > char *key = mmap(NULL, 1024, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); > if (key == MAP_FAILED) { > perror("Fail to mmap"); > return -1; > } > // should be some secure channel > strcpy(key, "ThisIsAKey"); > // printf("[%d]key(%s) ready: %p\n", getpid(), key, key); > // getchar(); > // make syscall, should err > write(STDOUT_FILENO, key, strlen(key)); //<-- Here the key shows up on stdout. What probably happens here is that the kernel reads the data via the user page tables, and can, therefore, access that memory just fine. Looking at the selftest (tools/testing/selftests/mm/memfd_secret.c) we test that we cannot read from the memfd and cannot write to the memfd. We don't test if other syscalls can access that user-provided buffer that is backed by a memfd. -- Cheers, David / dhildenb