From: "Oliver Pinter" <oliver.pntr@gmail.com>
To: "Linux Kernel" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
stable@kernel.org, stable-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Oliver Pinter" <oliver.pntr@gmail.com>,
"Adrian Bunk" <bunk@kernel.org>, "Greg KH" <gregkh@suse.de>,
"Justin Forbes" <jmforbes@linuxtx.org>,
"Zwane Mwaikambo" <zwane@arm.linux.org.uk>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
"Randy. Dunlap" <rdunlap@xenotime.net>,
"Chuck Wolber" <chuckw@quantumlinux.com>,
"Dave Jones" <davej@redhat.com>,
"Chris Wedgwood" <reviews@ml.cw.f00f.org>,
"Michael Krufky" <mkrufky@linuxtv.org>,
"Chuck Ebbert" <cebbert@redhat.com>,
"Domenico Andreoli" <cavokz@gmail.com>,
"chrisw@sous-sol.org" <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Subject: [2.6.22.y #2] Be more robust about bad arguments in get_user_pages()
Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2008 21:01:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6101e8c40802181201m2cb8ba3ag3bb5f1dd35be6961@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6101e8c40802170918n19c2fb19l29b564fc289fe77e@mail.gmail.com>
From a8a7690626756b6dcd49ad23b58f4406bfa59d7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2008 16:17:33 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Be more robust about bad arguments in get_user_pages()
MAINLINE: 900cf086fd2fbad07f72f4575449e0d0958f860f
So I spent a while pounding my head against my monitor trying to figure
out the vmsplice() vulnerability - how could a failure to check for
*read* access turn into a root exploit? It turns out that it's a buffer
overflow problem which is made easy by the way get_user_pages() is
coded.
In particular, "len" is a signed int, and it is only checked at the
*end* of a do {} while() loop. So, if it is passed in as zero, the loop
will execute once and decrement len to -1. At that point, the loop will
proceed until the next invalid address is found; in the process, it will
likely overflow the pages array passed in to get_user_pages().
I think that, if get_user_pages() has been asked to grab zero pages,
that's what it should do. Thus this patch; it is, among other things,
enough to block the (already fixed) root exploit and any others which
might be lurking in similar code. I also think that the number of pages
should be unsigned, but changing the prototype of this function probably
requires some more careful review.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CC: Oliver Pinter <oliver.pntr@gmail.com>
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index f64cbf9..538f054 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -983,6 +983,8 @@ int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct
mm_struct *mm,
int i;
unsigned int vm_flags;
+ if (len <= 0)
+ return 0;
/*
* Require read or write permissions.
* If 'force' is set, we only require the "MAY" flags.
--
Thanks,
Oliver
parent reply other threads:[~2008-02-18 20:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed
[parent not found: <6101e8c40802170918n19c2fb19l29b564fc289fe77e@mail.gmail.com>]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=6101e8c40802181201m2cb8ba3ag3bb5f1dd35be6961@mail.gmail.com \
--to=oliver.pntr@gmail.com \
--cc=bunk@kernel.org \
--cc=cavokz@gmail.com \
--cc=cebbert@redhat.com \
--cc=chrisw@sous-sol.org \
--cc=chuckw@quantumlinux.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=davej@redhat.com \
--cc=gregkh@suse.de \
--cc=jmforbes@linuxtx.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mkrufky@linuxtv.org \
--cc=rdunlap@xenotime.net \
--cc=reviews@ml.cw.f00f.org \
--cc=stable-commits@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stable@kernel.org \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=tytso@mit.edu \
--cc=zwane@arm.linux.org.uk \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®